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# THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGION

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ABOUT sixty years ago, when Nietzsche was preparing to write *The Antichrist,* a girl of twenty-two, who had been brought up in a strict Puritan home, was taken to see Gounod's *Faust.* When asked by her father what she thought of the play, she replied, "If the Good Angel had done his duty as well as Mephistopheles had done his, there need have been no tragedy." The judgment may have been naïve, but its validity can hardly be denied. The Faust story was intended to convey something of the sort, while providing the suggestion of a somewhat unconvincing alternative. The play dates from a decade prior to Luther's *Ninety-Five Theses* (1517) and is an attempt to reply to the growing increase of the religion of the heath, of the German past, against the increasing lack of satisfaction to be obtained from a Jewish Saviour transmitted by Roman authority.

I cite this story and the sequel not as an attack on Christianity or the Christian church, but as familiar illustration of a problem which finds its place in all religions: Zoroaster in Persia; Gautama Buddha in Benares; the Jewish Prophets—Ezechiel, perhaps, excepted; Jesus of Nazareth; St. Francis of Assisi; Martin Luther; Voltaire, less sincerely, and Rousseau more so; and sixty years ago Nietzsche, while Wagner was engaged in scornful mockery of the impotence of the Christian faith. Tannhäuser's staff buds, but buds *too late.*

Two costly wars—costly in lives, wealth, and welfare—within a quarter of a century have given rise to a renewed sense of the futility of religion all the world over. Oriental religions are being abandoned for Western cults of a more pragmatic order, and the cry of pulpits is vain as the preacher inveighs against secularism—the spirit of the age—indifference, and immorality despite the glamor invoked in vain equally by rhetorical, sartorial, or ceremonial profusion. Even the perverted doctrine of progress, which started as a doctrine of sacrifice for the sake of posterity and has reached its climax in the prospects of the Atomic Age, with bigger and better bombs to ensure the extermination of mankind *and* posterity—even the idea of progress has begun to lose its grip on even the second-rate minds which had hitherto espoused its cause;

and progress *was* a religion, born in tragedy, as have been all religions, only to be parodied and cheapened later, by generations which knew not the woes that were its birth pangs. Drama itself emerges as a religious expression of the primitive man's view of the tragedy of life, and our age may be witnessing the full drama of the Tragedy of Religion.

The problem is twofold: to discuss the origin and foundations of religion and to assess the nature and causes of its apparent—or real—decline during the past century. I shrink from calling this period the last phase or the end of religion, as it is not clear whether the decline in church attendance in the Christian church and elsewhere is symptomatic of a decline or a revival. In other words, is it a chicken emerging from its shell or the belated death of an aged bird? It is on this question that will rest the determination whether the breakdown of churchmanship and institutional religion is a matter for regret or rejoicing. One thing is certain, *viz.,* that the failure of the churches and temples to command the confidence of those in quest of the satisfaction of religion cannot be regarded with indifference or cured by dogmatic assertions and claims. That it may be leading to disaster is shown by the rise of strange cults of an exotic or saccharic order, which serve rather to emphasize than to bridge the gulf that lies between the church and religion. I use the word *church* to include the mosque, the temple, or any other form of religious association formed for the purpose of worshiping any deity, for the development does not appear to be peculiar to Christianity. It has long afflicted the world of China and Japan. West of the Sino-Japanese area, it has aroused the anxiety of the Hindu and Muslim worlds, and the ultimate tragedy lies in the fact that when men are finding the need of a far stronger support for their morale than that provided by the vagaries of morality, scientific certitude, and political stability, all such sources having been discredited, they turn to religious institutions only to find that *their* salt, too, has lost its savor.

Evidence of this conclusion is to be found in the growth of interest in mysticism. This phenomenon is common to the Christian, Muslim, and Hindu worlds. It is important here to remember that although mysticism is the sign of a quest for the certitude of the Divine, it is also—I might say, therefore—a symptom of the breakdown of the institutions of formal religious creeds. Another sign is the quest for a pragmatic philosophy, which works in the opposite direction to mysticism, for while mysticism takes men to the heart of religion, pragmatism carries men to the superficial, be it in ritualistic practice or in the philosophy of efficiency and its father, the illusion known as progress—that eschatological hope of the Enlightenment, which, in its degraded modern mechanical parody, is removed *toto cælo* from its original sacred intention.

With this short introduction I propose to turn to the origin and nature of religion, which emerged as man's dramatic quest for the solution of the tragedy which beset his life. It emerges today as the Tragedy of Religion.

If "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom," the fear of the triumph of darkness over light is the beginning of religion, and not only of religion, but also of its embodiment—the king—the original sacrifice of a man for the sake of all mankind.

The earliest traces of religion are to be found in the fear of primitive man, that the declining length of the daylight as December elapsed was due to the steady, victorious encroachment of the darkness, which would ultimately obliterate the sun completely and put an end not only to its warmth, of which it was the source, but also to life itself, which derived its existence and very being from the sun's light and warmth. For, to primitive man, darkness was not merely "Privation mere of light and absent day," as Milton described it. Darkness was a sticky, tarry substance, the very power of evil and devoid of form, capable of engulfing life and of obliterating it. The light was "the good," darkness was "the evil"; and every year saw the swaying struggle. It was in this struggle between the twain that man found his original religious concepts, which continue to this day, uninfluenced for the main part by scientific discovery, for the symbolism of language has preserved the initial sense of reality in poetic imagery and metaphor.

The problem of averting the calamity, which was an annual menace, produced the idea of the sacrifice of the life of a man to strengthen the power of life and light—a man, perfect in bodily form, strength, and wisdom, was chosen a year ahead and set aside for the sacrifice. He was the king. For his regnal year, he ruled his people under the shadow of his approaching death; judging them in face of the coming sacrifice, with just judgments. The people's hope of food, raiment, and life itself rested in his fulfillment of the sacrifice—his death—a sacrifice to *satisfy* the powers of darkness and death, and to fortify with his life the powers of light and life.

The ritual was that he should be hanged on a tree and transfixed or wounded in the side with a spear or javelin, so that his living blood should be poured out on the earth to give life to the earth and the children of the earth. Evidence of this sacrifice is to be found all the way from Iceland to the Bay of Bengal. (Frazer has found it outside the area, but I propose to limit this survey to Eurasia and its dependant civilizations.) A couplet from the Island of Uist reveals memories of older beliefs:

"Nine days he hang pa de rutless tree . . .
Nine long nights in da nippin' rime."

The man who dies for his people is the hero and king. The authorities to whom the choice is consigned are the wise men—in Media and Persia, the Magi—who develop into the priesthood. The change appears to take place when one man, who had been designated for the sacrifice, shows the necessary wisdom to preserve his own life by suggesting that the *form* of the sacrifice could be efficacious without the necessity of the fatal ending. The ritual of the humiliation and reinstatement of the king is to be found in the twenty-second Psalm. From this point emerges the doctrine of the royal wisdom from the earlier *sacrificial* doctrine of the royal glory. If either is abused or its name taken in vain, it is said to depart from the king, and its parting may cost him his life. This is the main theme of the Book of Daniel, linking the folly of Nebuchadrezzar, Belshazzar, and Antiochus Epiphanes. The death of the king may, however, be necessary, as Shakespeare viewed the death of Richard II; William II too may have been a victim. In the West, the sacrifice continues in the king of the Coven in witchcraft—the Western branch of Mithraic religion. It is possibly the case, too, of the death of Julian the Apostate—the sacrifice to Mithra.

The most striking figure, however, is Mephistopheles in the Faust legend, representing the king of the ancient religion, and so the devil of the new: red from the blood of the bull, whose skin he wears, whose horns are his mark, and whose hoof constitutes the cloven hoof of the Renaissance devil. It is to the cult of the Coven that the Western world returns, when the church fails to transmit its doctrine of salvation. It is also the royal cult of the French and Norman kings. The church was the cult of the priests of the new—the Roman—order; so the churchmen slew its most famous exponent, Jeanne d'Arc.

To return, however, to the king, who has succeeded in reducing his death to an annual ritual; the kingship had been established, but at a price. The priesthood claimed the right to determine the conditions under which both the king and the people should conduct themselves, and the right to determine the true successor on the death of the king, as before. Sacrifice is usually sublimated, and birds and beasts replace men, though human sacrifices are by no means always excluded, if it is deemed a necessity for the reconciliation of the deity and the nation. "It is fitting that one man die for the people" is a relic of the ancient sacrifice of the king.

In order to control the relations between the deity and the people, however, regular sacrifice is not all. In Persia, the Magi determined the laws; hence the word *magic*. In India the Brahmins supersede the rajah, and he must obey the conditions laid down by the Brahmin deputies of the God Brahma. In Judaism, Solomon sacrifices with his own hands, speaks as the voice of the people to God and as the voice of God to the

people, the priests acting as his assistants; but with the subsequent decline of the royal authority, the priesthood gains the ascendancy, and, after the deposition of Zerubbabel by Darius, the priesthood emerges supreme. The same process occurs with the Maccabees whose successors remain in control until the fall of Jerusalem in A.D. 70. In Christianity the emperor of Rome recedes before the advance of the bishop of Rome.

Alongside the priestly magic, sooner or later there develops another magic—both in Judæa and in India. This form is called "ethics." It represents the details demanded of the king and people in matters of conduct in order that the national *ethos* may be satisfactory to the deity. The original protest against the codification and legal amplification of this code came from the prophets of the Jews, and the essence of the movement was summed up in the return to the primitive royal sacrifice, known as the Crucifixion, in all its original crudity. The priesthood and the Pharisees joined to protect the law from the recrudescence of the kingship, and their error made a King after they had acknowledged Cæsar as the king! In other words, it is not in the suffering of the Crucified but in the irony of the Crucifixion that the meaning of the cross is to be found. Hymnology alone bears sufficient witness to the way that the Christian church has missed the point, and theology—the queen of sciences—has provided merely the intellectual satisfaction necessary to scientific conviction among the theologians. The rest of Christian history and the history of its theology is one long process of revivification of a dead priesthood and an annihilated ethical code by means of literary transfusions from the ethical past of Judæa, Athens, Alexandria, and Rome, clothed in sublimated Mithraic or Roman imperial royal ritual, save in the case of John Calvin who appealed from the empire to the Roman republic, reproducing the patrician and the plebs on the ecclesiastical background of the Institutes of Gaius and Justinian, with the help of Cicero's *De Republica.* Calvin was an ecclesiastical Brutus; perhaps the noblest Roman of them all, but a Roman nonetheless.

It is at this point that religion, as known popularly today, begins. It arises from the demand by the priesthood that, inasmuch as the priests have the choice of the royal victim, for they know the mysteries of that choice, since it is by their wisdom and authority that the king continues to live instead of dying at the end of the royal year, their authority, consequently overrides that of the king, whose *rôle* emerges as the secular ruler, while they claim to be the representatives of the spiritual and the divine.

With the steady process of the ecclesiastical view, the kingdom becomes not only laicised but also secularized; and the process of representative government, in which financial and secular interests gain the upper hand, and the assertion of lay rights, associated with Erastus, come

to be branded as Erastian. Then the priesthood erects the bogey of the secular, which is but Latin for "worldly," and the legatee of the deity being the sacrifice for his people comes to be identified with the anointed of Satan, or the devil's deputy. Politically, the development is seen in Macchiavelli's *The Prince,* which satirizes his ideal *rôle* in terms of a pope's bastard—a fact of which Rousseau was aware, but our political scientists are disdainful. Macchiavelli's *The Prince* is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the ecclesiastical notion of the king as the son of the pope. Nietzsche saw the point and regretted the misfortune which deprived Cæsar Borgia of the succession to his papal father, and derided the appearance of Luther on the ecclesiastical scene in his stead. Since then *The Prince* has become the recognized manual of statecraft and diplomacy —at least in practice—and constitutes the last legacy of Latin Christianity to the confusion of the barbarian world for its political destruction—the Trojan horse of the age, against which pietistic Christendom preaches pacifistic ideals with the completest impotence. To coin a Nietzschean proverb, "Against an idea, ideals are impotent, being but the shadows of their enemy."

It is time now to develop the consequences of the price exacted by the priesthood for the life of the king. They fall into two main parts: 1. The development of the ecclesiastical control of the laity and in particular of the king and kingdom by a priestly programme called "the supremacy of the spiritual," which either deprives the layman of his rights, as in the Middle Ages, or of any sense of the reality and sanctity of his physical sense, as does the modern revival of the doctrine by the department of philosophy of Boston University in these latter days. 2. The development of lay opposition to the king and his control over the people. In this line of attack, the Brahmin, the Magi, the Catholic priesthood of the Middle Ages, and their modern descendants—the Republican Calvinists—are at one with the Zadokite. The rule is *divide et impera.* Luther, alone, at the Reformation stands for the sanctity of the king; and his doctrine is diluted by Melanchthon—the black sheep of his followers—until it is rendered innocuous, even to the Calvinist and Catholic. By the nineteenth century, Henry IV's victory over Hildebrand at Canossa has been twisted into a royal defeat, and the ethical has betrayed the religious.

Priestly control falls into two parts: the ceremonial and the ethical. The ethical is the *ex post facto raison d'être* of the fundamental ceremonial, which can be summed up as the ritual of the atonement or the reconciliation of an angered deity on account of the "sins" of the people. Now sins differ from crimes, which are offences against the royal law, and it is only by clerical encroachment that crime comes to be brought within the category of sin. Furthermore, in cases of conflict between the king and

the clergy, conformity with the ecclesiastical code may become a crime. The best instance of such a case can be seen when the clergy under Edward I of England refused grants to the king for the war in France at the command of Pope Boniface VIII, under threat of excommunication in the event of disobedience. Edward outlawed the clergy, who promptly submitted to the nearer authority at the expense of the more remote. The continuation, in the Christian tradition, of the Jewish doctrine of sin is the denial and perversion of the meaning of the Cross. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, pietism, which was initially a mystical movement, degenerated into a morbid sense of the depravity of man, from which an experience called "conversion" was necessary in order to ensure escape from hell. (The *locus classicus* of this view in New England is Jonathan Edwards' famous sermon.)

In Germany, it was mainly associated with a degenerate Lutheranism, under the influence of which Nietzsche was brought up. It was its "will to impotence," as much as anything else, that inspired Nietzsche's "will to power"; and Nietzsche's *Antichrist* is a contemptuous caricature of the pietistic Jesus as the basis for his own opposition. He was the last man to disown Luther's militant doctrine, "Sin lustily that grace may abound." Seventy years before Nietzsche's *Antichrist* (1888), William Blake had written in *The Everlasting Gospel*

> "If Moral Virtue was Christianity,
> Christ's Pretensions were all Vanity,
> And Caiaphas and Pilate, Men
> Praise Worthy, and the Lion's Den
> And not the Sheepfold, Allegories
> Of God and Heaven and their Glories.
> The Moral Christian is the Cause
> Of the Unbeliever and his Laws.
>
> . . . .
>
> What is the Accusation of Sin
> But Moral Virtues' deadly Gin?
>
> . . . .
>
> For Moral Virtues all begin
> In the Accusations of Sin,
> And all the Heroic Virtues End
> In destroying the Sinners' Friend.
>
> . . . .
>
> If he had been Antichrist, Creeping Jesus,
> He'd have done anything to please us—
> Gone sneaking into Synagogues
> And not us'd the Elders and Priests like dogs,

But humble as a Lamb or Ass
Obey'd himself to Caiaphas.
God wants not man to Humble himself:
This is the trick of the ancient Elf.
This is the Race that Jesus ran:
Humble to God, Haughty to Man,
Cursing the Rulers before the People
Even to the temple's highest Steeple;
And when he Humbled himself to God,
Then descended the Cruel Rod."

Blake's laconic couplet,

"I am sure this Jesus will not do
Either for Englishman or Jew,"

may serve to conclude the quotations.

Blake has frequently been regarded as a forerunner of Nietzsche, but it is doubtful whether Nietzsche remembered much of Blake, otherwise *The Antichrist* must have taken a different form. He would have recognized in the Christ of the theologian the opponent of the Christ the Crucified, for the theologian seldom exceeds his own knowledge of Greek, and it was neither Nietzsche nor Blake who wrote the words "a stumbling block to the Jews and sheer nonsense to the Greeks."

Behind the attacks of the Enlightenment and its apostles on Christianity, or rather on the Christian church, there follow the rationalist scholars from Tübingen. Starting from Baur and Strauss, whose work was determined more by Kantian and other current philosophical views than by the canons of historical scholarship, there follows the long stream of criticism, of which Wellhausen and Noeldeke are the greatest exponents. The fear created by their conclusions cause a strong reaction to pietistic fundamentalism and a renewed identity of faith with the inferiority conscience. It provided, too, the strength for the renewal of Latin certitude under the guidance of the reinstated Jesuits. As the demands of intelligence rose on one side, the quality of faith declined on the other. This was a major tragedy, as the Christian doctrine of faith ultimately means the courage to act intelligently in a crisis. It is the first quality of the hero, who was being parodied under the ægis of Carlyle.

Christianity and Judaism were not the only religions affected. Already the discovery of Zoroastian documents and the transmission of copies, smuggled out of India by Anquetil Duperron, had started a movement known as the Comparative Study of Religion. Its earlier studies were often antagonistic to the two faiths, but more often were treated with disdain by the two Western faiths. Missionary enterprise of the old order

was alarmed by the threatened betrayal of the faith by the younger men of the new order. Ecclesiastical control on both the Catholic and Protestant side was exerted in the direction of maintenance of order and authority rather than in the recognition of intelligence and the quest of knowledge. The result has been that it is only within the last three decades that the great oriental renaissance has found its way into theological schools. In India and the Middle and Near East, philological studies have illuminated our knowledge of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam, but their effect on the enlightenment of the ordinary believers has been practically nonexistent. The terrors of their many deities are still the foundation of Brahmin strength and fortunes; Islam has been disheartened by the overthrow of the caliphate and the inroads of secularism, which served to increase fanaticism at the expense of sterner Muslim piety. The crowning blow to all religion, however, has come from the effects of mercantilism and the industrial revolutions of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. Not only has religion suffered, but her ancillaries—education in the arts, which exist in order to teach men to think, and the sciences, whose purpose appears to be much more sinister.

What the ecclesiastic had debilitated, the rise of mercantilism now killed: that was the king, the sacrifice of his people. And with the king died the central doctrine of the main religions of mankind, the concept of the kingdom of God on earth, which, as I have shown already, was the core of the religion of the Hindus, the Persians, the Jews, the Christians, the early Germanic barbarians, our ancestors, and the Chinese and Japanese. Rome alone held completely aloof.

"He would be crown'd:
How that might change his nature; there's the question"

was the fatal sentence to Julius Cæsar, and the Roman empire flourished under a *military* authority—*imperium* in the person of the imperator. The authority of Rome rested on its dispensation from kingship which became its target of disdain, and any doctrine of the Kingdom of God was bound to suffer from the blight of the tyranny of Tarquinius Superbus. In France, where the barbarian legacy of Clovis had tempered Catholicism into Gallicanism, the legacy of Louis XIV had fallen into the feeble hands of Louis XV in 1715, and Voltaire took the opportunity of writing the biography of what his sovereign was *not,* in *The Reign of the Great King.* Censorship was thus deprived of a possible victim. Montesquieu took another line and utilized oriental kings as the characters whereon to pillory Louis XV, a course which Anquetil Duperron showed was a caricature of the real and valid institution of which the enlightened despots were likewise caricatures.

The decay in the faith in the absent God who had for four thousand years issued a series of warnings and promises to mankind and in his omnipotence was guilty of having done nothing to ease the troubles, woes, and tragedies of man, save to threaten "to damn him quite"—this decay of theology and religion produced a new doctrine of sacrifice: the sacrifice of the living generation for the generations unborn, that their lot by progressive sacrifice might be progressively bettered until a heavenly kingdom was established on earth by the diligence of man where the Deity had failed. This sober doctrine of sacrifice was the source of two main caricatures of itself, one theological and the other material: the doctrine of the eschatological hope, that man at the last *would* be saved, but not in this life, a doctrine successfully parodied by Wagner in *Tannhäuser,* and driven home with all the bitter raillery and irony of long series of taunting, frustrated cadences; and the other, the doctrine of progress, the great illusion of the last century, the *idolum sæculi hujus* whose crown and culmination was the Crystal Palace—*monstrum horrendum ingens*—which was bombed, ironically enough, by the despairing exponents of progress in this age—the Germans.

The doctrine of progress was the Enlightenment's substitute doctrine of vicarious sacrifice for the discredited Christian doctrine of the same name. It was destined, however, to undergo the same process of mechanical depravity at the hands of the mercantilist, the scientist, and the philosopher as its predecessor had suffered at the hands of the ecclesiastic and theologian. It ended in a doctrine of self-help, worked out by James Mill and popularized by Samuel Smiles' book *Self-Help* and a number of illustrative biographies, which were still the proper reading for boys in my boyhood days. It was a doctrine of the mercantile Will to Power, despised in its form by Nietzsche on account of its bourgeois origin. The doctrine was in reality a doctrine of despair of the Deity's power or desire to assist man in his titanic struggle against adverse fate. Nevertheless, it was harnessed by the Christian church to complete the irony by compounding a cocktail of mutually adverse spirits under the name "Christian Progress," in order to tickle the jaded homiletic palates of the congregations by the prescription of an illusion to supplant the dying faith in the miraculous. In order to anæsthetize the process, the learned theologian, in his ignorance of the orient, proceeded to create a mystery out of the doctrine of "the son of man," the meaning of which any illiterate Pathan or Afghan could have given him! It is an idiom for "a certain man" or "an individual man." Baur and Strauss in Tübingen started a process of criticism in the New Testament which has marked the characteristic line of Continental non-Catholic scholarship ever since. In Germany it came to be called *liberāl,*

in English colorlessly translated or transliterated "liberal," for the *liberāl*[1] has this to his credit: that he is bitterly opposed to all the theories of inspiration and is radical in his work; while the liberal has neither the courage to be radical nor the sense to be conservative but desires to be inspiring and ends in complete fiasco. He strives to harmonize everything, however contradictory, and ends in believing, if aught of clarity remains, that the twain are but two Hegelian aspects of which he is the Hegelian synthesis. Perhaps he is right. He is a child of the Enlightenment in whom the light was darkness. How great then is his *darkness!*

The chaos produced by the sequelæ of the Thirty Years' War had led to a third stand—and this in Germany. There began the revival of the pagan hero cult, and the cult of the primitive Mithraic worship of the ancient god of the heath and *his* messiah, rèd from the blood of the bull, dressed in his skin and buskins—the horned god of the witch cult. Almost contemporary with Goethe's *Doctor Faustus* emerges the first modern edition of the *Nibelungenlied*, the song of Germany's great barbarian hero king, Siegfried and his lawful bride Brunhild, ending in the most magnificent instance of revenge, by means of the barbarian sacrament of *satī*, in the whole realm of barbarian literature—Hindu or Germanic. The treacherous Rhinegold was shortly to be emphasized by the Napoleonic invasion. Its origin would seem to be Rome and the gift of Rome—the Christian faith of the Catholic church. A new royal barbarian cult was born, or rather, the old national faith was reborn. Faust showed the futility of trusting the Good Angel; the Nibelungs showed the strength of the ancient worship, and the fight was joined. The real tragedy lay in the fact that the mystery of the dying king was turned once more, as it had been after Calvary, against its original sacramental concepts.

Wagner, as we have seen, was the prophet of the movement. In his lifetime, Gounod and Berlioz produced two Faust operas, and Wagner himself long contemplated a third. The climax is reached in the propaganda preceding the two great world wars. Nietzsche added his classical concept, *The Antichrist*, which is a picture of the painful pietistic Jesus of a diluted Lutheranism, which had lost the *faith* of Luther. His attack on Victorian English religion belongs to the same order. There George Eliot in 1855 had opened her attack on the church in her picture of Dr. Cumming. Behind all was Shelley's *Prometheus Unbound*. In America, where the last relics of Jonathan Edwards' controversy had worked out its own nemesis of inevitable bankruptcy, James Russell Lowell wrote the poem:

"Once to every man and nation comes the moment to decide,
In the strife of Truth with Falsehood, for the good or evil side;"

[1] The spelling *liberāl* is to distinguish the German from the English.—Ed.

to be followed by the verse

"Then to side with Truth is noble when we share her wretched crust,
Ere her cause bring fame and profit, and 't is prosperous to be just;
Then it is the brave man chooses, while the coward stands aside,
Doubting in his abject spirit, till his Lord is crucified,
And the multitude make virtue of the faith they had denied."

In 1888, the year that Nietzsche's mind collapsed finally, thus confirming, for some, the saying, *Quem vult perdere Jupiter priusquam dementat,* regular church attendance was still a social *devoir,* as a sacrament of ethical soundness at least. The Puritan sabbath was still not dead. In other words, the age was ethically sound, and continued to be so for about another score years, when the collapse came, and the faithful few, then, who attended, were scolded for the remissness of the absentees.

Behind the church's pretensions, however, lay the woes of the unheeded victims of the Industrial Revolution. It was still unbecoming to mention these matters in church when Armenian atrocities of the Turk and the Belgian atrocities in the Congo provided safer pictures of "man's inhumanity to man" from an appropriate distance, sufficient to lend enchantment to the view. Father Tyrell's fate provided a temporary outburst of anti-Roman homiletic, though little appreciation of the issues at stake.

The Lambeth Conference in 1888 issued its summons to Protestant union, against the Vatican decrees of 1870, but at a time when the term Protestant was becoming decreasingly palatable to the more vociferous section of its communion. Here and there some "cranky cleric" would reveal the error of his thought in a sermon branded as socialistic. The violation of the sound canons of the Manchester school of economics, which had as its bible the journal of the prosperous nonconformist conscience—I refer to the *Manchester Guardian*—such violation jeopardized the finality of the Calvinistic doctrine of the depravity of man, and, as it threatened the foundations of mercantile optimism, it was anathema. It was consequently left to literary miscreants of the order of H. G. Wells, Bernard Shaw, the Webbs, and the other writers of the Fabian Society to unearth the magnitude of the sins of the Industrial Revolution and, in their grave breach of good form, to be branded as "muckrakers"; even stronger terms of abuse, not yet permitted in drawing rooms, were welcomed from the pulpit. But church attendance continued to decline, and the need of sound business procedure became increasingly evident. *Facilis descensus Averno,* and the church took it.

Then came wars and the rumors of war. The breakdown of Muslim official unity in the Balkan Wars led straight to the wars of Germanic unity, 1914-1919 and 1939-1945, first essayed in 1866-1870. The Indus-

trial Revolution had reinforced the power of the despised barbarian doctrine of the hero king; and, in the vanity of its power, the barbarian hero passes from the realm of the king—the sacrifice of his people—to the *Führer,* for whom "it is better that all men die than that this man perish" —the words of Goebbels.

The score of years between the wars had been wasted, as the years since the armistice have been, and the church was caught spiritually and intellectually unprepared for the coming of peace. The guidance of democratic applause—the shouts of the mob; the strange lack of conscience of good and evil, which is the mark of the Liberal, who is more concerned with compromise than right; the substitution of exotic ritualism and sentimental social appeal for solid thought and cogent reasoning—these remind one of the bitter verse of Whittier:

"And yet the past comes round again,
And new doth old fulfil;
In sensual transports wild as vain
We brew in many a Christian fane
The heathen Soma still!"

(By the irony of fate, the following stanzas have been wrenched from their context and set to a tune as a hymn. The name of the tune should be "Drunk With Soma," for it transforms a magnificent reply into a cringing approach to a hopeless deity. It was composed by F. C. Maker in *1887.*)

The sons of men have shared in the supreme sacrifice of the Son of Man, and have laid down their lives for their own and all mankind, but the guidance of the negotiations of the peace and the destinies of the church remain in the hands of those who shared not the task but are prepared to capitalize on their own account the fruits of victory. A partner of a legal firm, which consented to take charge of enemy interests in this country, has taken the leadership of the Federal Council of Churches. Can the attorney of Hitler and Goering be also the attorney of Christ without raising the smiles of the scornful—and the anxiety of the sincere?

And through mankind's last, supremest struggle we see the Cross, the sign of man's redemption, first broken, and then its broken form permuted by deft streamline into the sign of the dollar, while Mammon gloats o'er his final triumph and leads back Jove to his mended throne, while Judas writhes below—his hell the memory of a deal mistimed.

Theology is bankrupt before its task, and the climax of the bankruptcy is seen in the realm of New Testament scholarship, the crucial point in Christian theology. In Hinduism, reaction is triumphant, thanks to the sentimental ignorance with which Mahatma Gandhi was regarded as

the Christ of the modern world. In Islam, there is the same chaotic reaction. Elsewhere, and even in these regions, the shackles of mercantilism threaten to enslave more of the races of mankind, while men are being intoxicated by further doses of the soma of modern liberalism until they boast or break down under the pernicious influence of press and pulpit. Individual thought is anathema.

For a pretense we have "reunion all round" (with certain exceptions, of course, where fear has begotten ingratitude): United Nations, a United Christendom—these are the mockeries with which mankind is beguiled! While atomic research is directed more and more exclusively to the purposes of united destruction of the United Nations and their United Church in one United Explosion! The church remains impotent because it lacks conviction and faith, but possesses, in its membership, the control of wealth and power. "A kingdom divided against itself cannot stand."

And yet, the ordinary man's perplexity, his worry and his anxiety still remain—immeasurably increased. He looks to the church, or to its counterpart in other religions, for guidance—and finds little or none. He finds the preaching of peace, where there is no peace; he is offered idealistic alternatives to his real difficulties, and throughout he finds a complete lack of cogency in the answers he receives. The concept of universality suggests the presence of the fool, whose eyes are in the ends, not only of the earth, but of the universe also. In place of assurance, he is met by a system of mass worship (*utroque sensu*), in which organization has driven out the Spirit. The competition and advertisement of the cult of Hollywood has implanted an imitative spirit of sensationalism in sermon or ceremonial, suggestive of an inferiority complex towards that insidious spring of evil.

Yet there is the need, fully realized, indeed, the longing for that peace, which passeth all understanding. In place of a sense of reality, the layman finds a ministry comprised of those, whose lack of contact with his own struggles, born of the vicious struggle for existence, can give no cogent answer, counsel, or comfort to his perplexity. Religion, that springs from the experience or menace of suffering, is transformed into something else: it acquires a social aspect, which only approaches real religion when it most closely resembles mass hysteria—but that is to confess to its morbidity.

It is not there, however, that the essence of the tragedy lies. The final and ultimate tragedy of religion rests in the fact that true religion is ultimately mystical—not in the sense parodied and ridiculed by Max Nordau, but in the sense in which the individual's hope is to find his oneness with the Deity, by being found by the Deity, so that he can say, "No longer Thou and I, but Thou alone," whereby he comes to be

what every man is called to be: the manifestation of his own God on earth, or, as St. Augustine said, "The Christ of his own Christ." This view implies religion in severalty not religion *in congregatione.* Indeed, religion is closely akin to poetic inspiration, and the nearest approach to religion organized on an ecclesiastical basis would be organized mass production of poetry! To harness religion to the cart of ethics is sheer prostitution of its muse, even as is didactic verse whose only bond with poetry is metre and form. All attempts at organization involve the overriding of this fundamental principle. The essence of mysticism lies not in ecstasy, which is a special gift of God, but in that quiet certitude, which unreality can but undermine, when it is not secure, or in disgust. It is the main function of religion to impart this sense of certitude, which is the foundation of faith and intelligence, whereby a man becomes not *like* God—for likeness rests on essential difference and separation, as Athanasius pointed out to the Council of Nicæa—but one with God, whose partial incarnation each man is, and must realize in order to realize his destiny. Ethics—including what is called Christian ethics—belongs to the realm of ecclesiastical or social cosmetics, and produces that substitute for religion—apism.

The tragedy of the church, and the still greater tragedy of religion, is the loss of this original fact. The error is summed up in an Oxford limerick, which I quote in all seriousness, as it contains both the evil diagnosis and the consequent lack of faith:

"God's plan made a hopeful beginning
But man spoiled his chances by sinning.
We trust that the story
Will end in God's glory,
But at present, the other side's winning."

This is the eschatological hope of the theologian set forth in its most pungent form, which is final despair. Its consequences drive us back to Lucretius for the diagnosis of the age:

> Indeed fear holds all mortals in so tight a grasp, because they see that things are done in heav'n and earth, the cause of which they can in nowise see, and so believe that they are done by deity. And therefore, when we see that nothing can be born from nothing we shall soon from that more clearly see what we are seeking, both the source from which each thing can be created and the way in which all things are done without the agency of Gods.[2]

So Deity is absolved by annihilation, and the triumph of the theologian is complete.

[2] Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura* I, 153-159 (translated by Thomas Jackson).

# THE POSSIBILITY OF MIRACLES

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NOT SO VERY LONG AGO miracles were the chief stock in trade, the golden arrow in the quiver, as it were, of the apologist for Christianity. Today, by contrast, there are few to do them reverence. Reports of miracles have become a source of embarrassment rather than the cornerstone of the apologetic edifice, not because they have been shown impossible but chiefly because of the vast influence of the mechanistic philosophy. Even biblical scholars approach the records not without a bias which predisposes them to reject any element that seems miraculous. Because of this dominant world view many Christians hesitate, to state it mildly, to be caught in the camp of miracle believers. Not only are they afraid that their contemporaries might think them superstitious and "unscientific," but they themselves have been so influenced by mechanistic views and denials that desire to maintain intellectual self-respect strengthens their caution.

It is the purpose of this paper to demonstrate the possibility of miracles, properly understood, from the standpoint of basic Christian beliefs concerning God and the universe. From the view of mechanism miracles are clearly an impossibility. The Christian thinker, however, approaches the problem from a very different metaphysic. Certainly if mechanical, unknowing, nonpurposeful nature is all that exists, no miracle can take place since all that occurs will arise in nature, be natural, and proceed in mechanical fashion. No matter what his supposed religious beliefs may be, the thinker who consciously or unconsciously accepts such a view of reality as this is perfectly logical in his rejection of the possibility of miracles.

The religious thinker, however, starts from very different presuppositions. Fundamental in his approach is his belief in the existence of a God beyond human comprehension who yet has characteristics of purpose, knowledge, and creative love, combined with vast power. Further, the Christian thinker believes that this material universe is not self-explanatory. Of itself alone it could not have come into existence and could perhaps not now maintain itself. Creation of this material universe resulted from the love of God willing to share his power and goodness with other beings. It is not the purpose of this paper to attempt to justify these beliefs. They are rooted in the Christian tradition. On the basis of these concepts we approach the problem of miracles. The argument is addressed primarily to those thinking people who are Christians and who therefore supposedly accept these basic views, yet who deny the possibility of miracles.

Before proceeding to the main argument, we turn to consideration of the problem whether so-called miracles, particularly the biblical ones, may not after all be perfectly natural events, distinguished only by their rarity. We question whether there is any logically convincing argument for rejecting most of these reported events as inherently impossible. It is conceivable that many of them may actually have happened in much the form in which they are reported, yet without their being exceptions to natural laws. Religion, like science, assumes generally an orderly universe. The origin of the belief in the orderliness of nature came first from religious understandings. Science later adopted it. The first chapter of Genesis, for instance, indicates that God's creative task was the reduction of chaos to order. The Psalms speak of his ordering the stars and the heavens. The religious view is not one that normally emphasizes disorder and unpredictability, but their opposites. Orderliness is assumed *because* a rational God stands behind the cosmos.

Unlike mechanism, however, religious thought refuses to accept the idea that the order of nature is a closed affair. It maintains that God is capable of operating freely within it. It is at this point, then, not at the question of exceptions to law, that we reach the heart of the problem, to which return will be made later in the argument.

The biblical accounts of extraordinary happenings, generally called miracles, are popularly classified as false chiefly because they cannot be readily explained by current scientific theories. Some would consider them deliberate falsifications; others might charitably suggest they are misinterpretations of events which in themselves were perfectly ordinary. The statement is frequently made that such events *could* not have happened. The chief basis, undeclared but implicit, for such a belief is the thought that the common experience of mankind today covers all possible experience. Departure from the accustomed pattern is therefore believed not possible. The reported miracles of healing, for example, in many religions, are supposed impossible simply because healings today are not commonly obtained in such ways. We do not wish to try to defend every strange story in the Bible but we do wish to point out the obvious weakness in this reasoning. It scarcely needs mention that we now have many activities based on inventions previously unknown which, had such events occurred in isolation and without knowledge of underlying principles, would have been considered miraculous. But such lack of knowledge and accustomedness would not have made them exceptions to natural law! It follows that in view of our limitations of knowledge many events might possibly occur which, if they appeared in isolation and without knowledge of their principles, would also appear miraculous. Yet again they might not be exceptions to natural law.

Most important for our theme in this connection are the experiences which centre about prayer, faith, and worship. These play so small and insignificant a part in the actual lives of most today that what they might effect if practiced diligently and seriously we cannot begin to imagine. It has been maintained that these attitudes and practices can bring very significant results not only of a subjective but also of an objective kind.[1] If this is true, then one like Jesus with unbounded faith and constant in prayer might conceivably perform deeds that today seem miraculous simply because unusual in terms of our common experiences. These results, it may be, could be ascribed not to exceptions to natural law but rather to the use of principles and powers always present but not commonly used and understood. What might appear "miraculous" may then be the result of perfectly natural principles bringing about unusual results because of unusual and generally unused practices and methods. Radio research did not originate new laws in the universe or break the old laws. Prayer and faith may likewise use what is already present, and available to the methods of prayer and faith.

The point being emphasized is that caution is needed in labeling any event an exception to natural law merely because it is unusual and its precedents unknown. It is characteristic of popular thought to identify all such events as miracles, due to God if good and to the devil if evil. In ancient Greece, for instance, the phenomenon of drunkenness was not biologically understood. Since in this condition the one affected felt himself to be braver and cleverer than normally, it was said to be caused by the god Dionysus present in the wine. Likewise the phenomena accompanying some modern revival services are regarded as coming from God because unusual and seemingly not to be explained in terms of normal factors. We are arguing that many slightly understood happening may be no less and no more due to God's direct intervention than is the attractive force of gravity. Consequently events recorded in the Bible that are considered exceptions to natural law may, in at least some cases, be perfectly orderly, the result of activities and forces not generally recognized and used. This is at least a possible approach to these supposed miracles, particularly to those of healing but also to others as well.

We turn now to the general problem of the possibility of miracles occurring. It is said that they are impossible because they involve a "breaking of natural laws" which, for some assumed reason, are thought to be "unbreakable." But this is a wrong emphasis from the standpoint of religion. "Miracles" of this sort are of some importance, but are secondary. Our concern with miracles is a broader one. It is a practical desire to

[1] See in this regard: Alexis Carrel, *Man the Unknown*, pp. 133-150; Mary Austin, *Can Prayer Be Answered?*

know whether man must make his way entirely alone or whether God may be believed to be available for help and support. In this wider sense what is truly meant by miracles is God's direct activity within the universe. Belief in miracles, thus understood, presupposes belief in God. He is taken to be not a part or the whole of reality but one who stands in a relation of independence on the universe, while it depends upon him as its ground. As noted above, the mechanist, since he denies that there is anything or anyone above or beyond mechanical nature, will deny this basic belief and consequently the possibility of miracles.

The true problem therefore centres in the question whether God can himself operate freely in the world, not in the problem of whether exceptions to natural law ever occur. This approach places the emphasis where it properly belongs. Those who dogmatically deny such a possibility do so because they are convinced, of course without any proof, that nature is a closed system, self-dependent and self-explanatory. They believe that there is no breaking into this system from beyond it—even if there were a beyond, which is also denied. Consequently, even if there were a God, he could not intervene.

One school of thought which did believe in God's existence used to insist that God is best thought of in his activity as creator as a sort of clockmaker who, having made the clock of nature, withdraws to let it tick out its own history. Interference takes place only when minor repairs are found necessary. An opposing school inquired whether God was to be thought of as an imperfect clockmaker. Rather, it was suggested, any "clock" he would make would need no repairs and would act perfectly by itself. Having once made the machine, he has retired out of it entirely and has become an "absentee" God. These views are both more certain of the mechanism of nature than they are of the creative power and reality of God. Both hold a dualism of the world and God, as though God were removed from and out of contact with his world, much like the separation that might exist between two physical bodies or objects.

A positive approach to the problem of the possibility of control in mechanical nature by a God who is beyond nature can be made as follows. The relation of God to the world is not that of separateness or isolation. A more true, though still a deficient, analogy can be drawn from the relation of man's personality to his body. In some way the two are most intimately associated, yet the personality can maintain a control and direction of the body, using it as its servant. Having created nature, God cannot logically be supposed to be unable to work in it. There is no conclusive reason for thinking that this cosmos was made into some sort of closed unit in which the maker himself cannot act. He created freely. He can operate freely within his creation. Human beings who make

machines do not find themselves excluded from control of those machines. They do not find them to be independent, impenetrable unities. To change the analogy, if it were to be thought that one's personality in some way creates the body, then it would be strange indeed to suggest that that same personality would find it impossible to operate in and through that body. This idea does not require any thought of God's destroying or setting aside the laws of his machine, nature. It insists only that God as creator is able to work out his will through the use of the laws upon which he has established order.

The chief problem immediately presenting itself at this point concerns the method of such activity. How is it possible or conceivable that God might act in nature without breaking its laws? To reply to this critical question we look to ordinary human activity for an analogy. Man, too, lives in the world of nature and of natural laws. Yet man is continuously interfering with nature, arranging it for his ends, not by opposing or trying to destroy its principles, but by using them. First come man's purposes; then through knowledge of nature means for realizing them by the use of natural entities and forces are sought. Exactly how man's purposes affect the world of natural law is a mystery. How, for instance, man's desire to have a house and his plan of the sort of house he wishes are transmuted into muscular and nerve activity which brings in turn effects upon nature is not known. The connection between ideas and physical activity, between mind and body, is an ancient and still unsolved philosophical problem. No conclusive and generally acceptable solution has been found, and dualism seems to many to be still the best answer. Yet despite the mystery of this relationship no one doubts for a moment, really, that what is first an idea, a wish, a desire, in some way initiates physical activities, thus moving into the field of nature with its laws from an area of experience that seems to be beyond the mechanical aspects of nature. Believing that man is both physical body and consciousness, we find this mystery of how conscious purpose or idea becomes an activity operating within law-abiding nature insolvable. Yet that it does so act and does bring such effects is, practically, indisputable. It is such a common occurrence, so much a part of the everyday experiences of men, that we scarcely regard it. We certainly do not think it miraculous.

Using this analogy, we suggest that God's activity within the world is no less possible, even while it is no less mysterious. The problem merely *seems* more difficult because there is no distinct organism, corresponding to the body of men, through which God's ideas and purposes are activated. This merely implies, however, that our concept of God is deficient. We ought perhaps to think of the universe as a whole being his body if we wish a better understanding. In this suggestion we find a way of com-

prehending the possibility of God's activity in the world as something admittedly mysterious but yet not unique in its mystery, since it parallels in general form the commonplace mystery of man's everyday activity. They are similar, since both use the principles and operations of nature for the achievement of purposes.

To illustrate the point further: as a man builds a house, he does not at any point break or put aside natural laws. The one point at which nature and its laws fail to explain the existence of the completed house is at the motivating point of the idea and purpose of the builder. This is, in some mysterious way, not within the working of physical law itself; yet it uses laws for its realization. To make the idea effective, the human body through its muscles begins to bring about changes in the order of nature and through these reaches the goal.

A visit to a famous American factory where a familiar breakfast cereal is made, "untouched by human hands," shows many machines all doing their work according to the laws of mechanics. Every mechanist finds his heart gladdened by the order and mechanical perfection about him, and in them he sees a model of the universe. This is the way things ought to be and are, he thinks. Yet to give a complete explanation of that factory and its endless procession of boxes of cereal requires more than investigation of the machinery of the factory alone. The idea of the man or men who decided that it was desirable to make such a product and then proceeded to work out the plans for doing so, came first and is the basic explanation. Without it the factory with its machines would not have been constructed, the ore would not have been mined, or the trees felled. The purpose of it all is most basically related to all that follows, and that purpose stands outside the purely mechanical processes through which it was brought to realization. And who is there to say that if some day the directors or owners of that factory should decide to change the form of the product from biscuits to flakes they could not do so without performing a miracle by "breaking the laws" of their factory!

The conscious mind, the will and purpose, are in human experience the most significant factors of reality. Here, one might say, stands man's conscious mind, knowing, aware, and purposeful. It finds itself in the midst of mechanically controlled objects and forces ready to be used, by means of the intermediate body, by that conscious purpose. Through experience the rules by which the materials can be controlled and exploited are learned. At the end of the process, as at the beginning, as one stands before his newly built house or eats his morning cereal, he has a natural world, proceeding by regular natural law, yet a world in which his desires and purposes have had their way and have interfered successfully to direct nature into desired channels. This, we maintain, is analogous to what

happens continuously with God also. He, too, is to be thought of as not less than conscious, purposive mind. Without being subject to the restrictions placed on man by the possession of a body, he is able to act directly, not mediately, upon nature.

Our concern is not to attempt to establish any particular action as a miracle. From the viewpoint of miracle as God's direct activity within nature, life is shot through with miracles! We *are* concerned to maintain the thesis that such action is not only possible but also likely. We have seen that there is in this notion nothing contradictory to reason or experience, and that the presuppositions of religion lead to it as a conclusion. No event can be proved to be the result of God's activity, of course, for each will fit into the pattern of nature just as thoroughly as do those events which men initiate. Only in so far as divine purposes are being realized in the universe can we point to evidence. Not primarily from the unusual and the unexpected but rather from the ongoing, continuing process of struggle toward values and ideals and from indications of God's love for his world and man do we argue for the actuality of God's activity. Extraordinary events might, however, conceivably happen and in view of the position of man in the purposes of God might be expected to occur.

If it were to be asked why God needs to interfere in his world, the reply follows from the religious understanding of man. As a conscious being he has some degree of freedom from mechanical determination. The universe in which he dwells is, because of him, not to be thought merely mechanical, for man's own activities bring about results that are not mechanically determined. God's love requires to some degree man's active coöperation with him, and this requires in turn God's constant creative activity and coöperation in the process. One thinks in this connection of a machinist who might possibly build a highly complicated machine capable of running on without further attention. This same machinist, as a father, will find it necessary to work constantly and creatively with his own son to bring him to proper manhood.

As we consider the "works of his hands," we are overwhelmed by the greatness, the incomprehensibility of this reality we call the universe. The religious person finds in it not merely chance, or unseeing mechanism, but purposive activity, proceeding out of the love and goodness of God, who is constantly active in the world of nature and man.

# MIRACLES—POSSIBLE OR PROBABLE?

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THE EDITOR has asked me to comment on the subject of miracles which concerns the essay by Professor Keene. I suppose this request is made because of the controversial nature of the subject and because the essay raises questions in the philosophical field. It certainly can do no harm to reconsider the old question of miracles which admittedly has lain dormant as subject matter in liberal journals and been ignored by liberal preachers —as Professor Keene rightly observes. Liberalism means open-mindedness to all views—and in this case, by readmitting the subject (however brief the discussion) to this journal, the editor shows himself to be made of the stuff for which he is widely known to be champion.

Now, one of the tests of a truly philosophical mind is that any view is open for consideration, however traditional, conservative, or sacred it may be. When Professor Keene suggests that miracles, even the biblical miracles, are a real possibility, the truly genuine philosopher must agree with him. It is sheer dogmatism to deny anything as a possibility—certainly with our limited knowledge. Even a square circle might be considered a possibility if one wished to launch out on a new set of geometrical premises. Much of the new geometry is, in fact, built upon what, in the Euclidean tradition, was regarded as altogether impossible. The Einsteinian physics would have been considered by disciples of Newton as a fantastic impossibility. That miracles could have happened and do happen is, philosophically, a genuine and open possibility—even such biblical miracles as water made into wine, the parting of the waves by human command, the raising of the dead, or walking upon unfrozen water. Moreover, any conceivable kind of philosophy is a possibility—from a carpenter theory of cosmology to that of a universe as a self-running machine.

The issue is not (as suggested in the essay) that of the *possibility* of any type of miracle but rather that of *probability*. Probability is quite a different matter from possibility. What is possible may or may not be probable; what is probable may range from the highest to the lowest of degrees. There are, of course, many tests to determine the degrees of probability. In matters of religious faith, one recalls, for example, the test of William James in his famous live-option theory: that view, he said, may be (and must be) believed and acted upon which is of a momentous nature, lively and not dead, and forced and not avoidable. The belief in miracles, on the level of *probability*, may well be considered in the light

of such criteria and thus philosophical debate moved up to a plane where the issue is made meaningful. At the level of *possibility,* the debate moves into a stalemate in which all sides must eventually agree.

Professor Keene seems to deplore (at least at the outset) the fact that the belief in miracles is fading out among liberals. It is true that one hears very little nowadays about them from these quarters. But is this a sign of religious degeneracy? I think not. Rather, it is the mark of spiritual maturity. If miracles are to be reëmployed in modern Christian apologetics (as they were traditionally) to bolster faith in religious realities, would this not be the sign of weakness in faith in great spiritual values capable of standing on their own support? Certainly this would be true of those biblical miracles which dazzle the ordinary understanding of physical events. Was not the tenor of Jesus' whole ministry set on a level higher than outward physical demonstration, and did he not seem to create the distinct impression that the kind of faith he called forth was to rest not upon works of wonder but upon a profound *insight?* It is, indeed, a curious paradox that those who insist upon the reality of the realm of spirit are often the very ones whose faith demands something beyond spirit or something bizarre—such as wonder-miracles or physical demonstrations (*e.g.,* spiritualists and many traditional Christians). Paul, it may be noted, believed in the miracle of the physical resurrection (if he did) only after he had come to terms with himself in what was an inner spiritual struggle and then a spiritual insight. I submit that the prevailing silence about miracles in modern liberal apologetics is a sign of spiritual maturity far beyond the type evidenced by the traditional apologetics of the fathers.

Professor Keene is right when he says that biblical scholars approach the study of the records with a bias. But the bias is that of *method* and not of conclusion. Without a *disciplined* method, there could be no biblical scholarship; there could be only another disguised type of apologetics (so characteristic of the older traditional biblical student). When a biblical scholar approaches his studies, as a scientist, he looks for the immediate chain of natural causes. This is his legitimate bias. It is the one approved method, and no offence can come from it, judging by the enormous fruits of understanding. What he may conclude from that method in regard to ultimate explanations constitutes his own philosophical and religious views. But the method need not constrict the conclusions on wider issues. The bias of the scholar is to find the truth by the most promising methods. What is claimed to be a miracle he must fearlessly examine in the light of all possible natural factors. He must not allow a miracle-explanation to stand in his way to prejudge the truth. This is the legitimate method to which he is committed. It is his "privileged bias."

Professor Keene is profoundly right when he says that a mechanistic

philosophy of the world blots out a way of looking at the universe which is out of line with the Christian pattern and a normative religious faith. But, it should always be kept clear, that mechanism as a *method* is one thing and mechanism as a comprehensive conclusion or *philosophy* is another. All natural scientists try to be mechanistic in method—in the sense that one event follows inevitably upon another. Up until recently this method has proved itself fruitful beyond measure although now it is recognized as having its limitations. (Recent psychologists, biologists, physicists, and others are now accepting the teleological factor as a principle necessary to fuller explanations of events.) Nevertheless, the mechanistic principle is being pressed on because the victories have been so great. It would be tragic were it abandoned.

If one holds to a *philosophy* of the universe that is sheerly mechanistic, then there is no room for what may be truly called the Christian pattern of the world. On this point, liberals must agree with conservatives of whatever school of thought. An ordered universe may be closed or open. It may be both mechanistic *and* teleological. The one is complementary to the other. Most liberal thinkers today hold that our world is quite open to possibilities now undreamed of. Miracle in the sense of the entrance into orders of existence of new and unpredictable factors which may change such orders—the view which Professor Keene maintains—is not only a wide-open possibility but of the greatest probability. That the human mind may direct actions by free choice is a philosophy that is highly respected among many if not most liberals. Freedom and successful petitional prayers are highly probable in a world that is open to creative beginnings. Mechanism as a philosophy (not method) is today on the defensive. There is no good reason why we may not believe that a God can perform directive action in a world of order. Professor Keene's analogy on this score is quite defensible—even to the point of highest probability.

But the question still remains—how true and necessary are the biblical miracles? Did Jesus actually walk on water? Was water actually turned to wine? One does not settle these questions as truth *philosophically* or even *apologetically*. They are questions of fact, and only the historian (including the qualified biblical scholar) can give answer (if ever he can get back to the basic situations). Whether belief in these claims are *necessary* ingredients to a full Christian faith is a question of value not of fact.

When all is said and done, the whole matter of Christian apologetics is not so much a matter of trying to sustain any particular *species* of doctrines —however traditional—but rather of setting up a scheme of values so that what is most important gets a place of priority and, conversely, what is less may take its humbler place. The biblical miracles may well belong

to that end of the line which Plato in his analysis of knowledge happily called mere opinion or conjecture. Certainly, we need not deny them if we do not affirm them. There are other considerations which come first in the scale of values, without which we could hardly claim spiritual kinship with what we know to be in line with the spirit of Christ and the other great prophets of God. In Plato's same line, he had at the farthest end (opposite from conjecture) what he called the perfect light or wisdom, the insights into values which lie beyond physical demonstration. This is the higher type of apologetics. It would be a sin against the gains which modern liberals have achieved were we to attempt a return to the older type of apologetics which insists upon the unusual or bizarre or some physical demonstration to support the faith.

A concluding word. The whole matter of belief in miracles depends upon definition. A miracle may mean the upsetting of the order of nature. It may mean, secondly, that which is inexplicable by any known set of reasons or standards or that which is mysterious. It may mean, again, some particular event in history not now or ever repeatable. Professor Keene is right in saying that many of the so-called New Testament miracles (such as healing) may or could be explained later by laws which, at the time, were not understood. But this explanation fails to take into account certain classes of miracles such as the withering effect of a curse or the raising of the dead. Belief in miracle as an upsetting of order can also be maintained on the ground that one level of existence such as intelligence can interfere with and change the ongoing process of a physical sequence (which is on another level of existence). It is even possible to hold the third meaning: that events which once happened—even extraordinary and rare—may not happen again (such as the appearance of a most remarkable person). And Professor Keene is right also in saying that there is an element of mystery throughout all of life and that thus miracles, in that sense, are still at hand.

But, is it not true that in the common experiences of common everyday life—wherein most of us find ourselves—there is to be found the attestation and confirmation of those beliefs that should matter the most—that Christian apologetics rests more securely on the foundation of the ordinary ongoing events of life than upon some extraordinary theophanies? Professor Keene seems to hold this view when he affirms that a living God can still interfere, even today, (as he must) in the ofttimes disheartening affairs of men to keep straight and secure the path of a good destiny. With this I heartily agree, and if that is to be called a miracle, how can we deny it as the highest of probabilities or, in the pattern of the fathers, as fundamental to our Christian *faith?*

# THE FALLACY OF NEGATION

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IF ONE WERE to give uncritical assent to the conclusions of Professor W. T. Stace, whose article entitled "Man Against Darkness" appeared in the *Atlantic Monthly* for September, 1948, then suicide might appear as a logical conclusion to a hopeless and meaningless struggle for existence. According to the dogmatic pronouncements of this learned and apparently sincere philosopher, there is no God, and the foundations upon which man has erected his religion are mere illusions which cannot any longer withstand the erosive effect of the scientific method.

> . . . for the past three hundred years [writes Professor Stace] there has been growing up in men's minds, dominated as they are by science, a new imaginative picture of the world. The world, according to this new picture, is purposeless, senseless, meaningless. Nature is nothing but matter in motion. The motions of matter are governed, not by any purpose, but by blind forces and laws. . . .
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> . . . It is this which has killed religion. Religion could survive the discoveries that the sun, not the earth, is the center; that men are descended from simian ancestors; that the earth is hundreds of millions of years old. . . . But it cannot get on with a purposeless and meaningless universe.
>
> If the scheme of things is purposeless and meaningless, then the life of man is purposeless and meaningless too. Everything is futile, all effort is in the end worthless.[1]

So it would appear that those who are mature enough intellectually to appreciate the implications of the scientific account of man and the universe can no longer claim to be honest without surrendering faith in God and conceding that meaning and purpose are sadly lacking from the life of humanity. Even the Kantian concept of the *moral imperative* ceases to have any *a priori* foundation, and any drive toward goodness or self-mastery that has been observed in man must be regarded as stemming from the inventive genius of *homo sapiens* rather than from a cosmic moral purpose operating through him.

If such news of the demise of religion were authenticated by the foremost leaders in the fields both of science and philosophy, it might indeed herald the coming of an Age of Darkness. Man could only hope to postpone his inevitable destruction by attempting, as Professor Stace blandly suggests, to achieve a moral society against the background of a nonmoral and meaningless universe. In fact, it might be argued that the part of wisdom in such an atheistic crisis would be to by-pass such so-called

[1] W. T. Stace, "Man Against Darkness," in the *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 182, No. 3 (Sept., 1948), pp. 53-58. The *Atlantic Monthly* has granted permission to make this quotation, which appears on p. 54 of this essay.

illusions as morality, freedom, and truth, and choose instead the leadership of those present-day Marxian Titans whose atheism is militant and whose program is revolution.

But the great names in the realms of science and philosophy do not appear on the list of those who substantiate the atheistic dictum of Professor Stace. He calls M. Jean-Paul Sartre as a witness who shares his depressing conclusions with him, and he quotes from Bertrand Russell's *A Free Man's Worship* to bolster his position, but he only implies that scientists and philosophers in general share with him in his intellectual pessimism. Joseph Wood Krutch, Professor Ames, Eustace Haydon, Irving Babbitt, to mention only a few humanists or naturalists, might have been called by Professor Stace as confreres in his gloom, but it is quite probable that most scientists would disclaim the position that science and theism are incompatible, and most philosophers would protest against writing the word *futile* over their efforts to interpret the universe.

Professor Stace, like most humanists, uncritically overestimates the authority and function of natural science in the vast area of human knowledge, and takes for granted that the tremendous magnitude of scientific discovery is solidly behind his philosophical conclusions. Since science makes no mention of God or his purposes, but rather confines itself to facts which can be measured, weighed, or analyzed by its uniform processes, the humanist conclusion is that theism is intellectually untenable and that cosmic purpose can be sustained only by wishful thinking. However, the omission of God and cosmic purpose from the manuals and textbooks of science is explained by men of science on purely methodological grounds, and is not to be taken as a confession of unbelief.

As Sir J. Arthur Thomson puts it,

> Science fishes in the sea of reality with particular kinds of net—called scientific methods—and there may be much in the unfathomed sea which the meshes of the scientific net cannot catch. Thus the geologist as geologist does not consider the beauty of the country-side, though that is as real to us as its mineralogy. The astronomer, as astronomer, aims at a chemico-physical account of the nebular mass that gave rise to our Solar System, but he does not raise the point that from out of it there somehow emerged on our earth a complex world of life, including the astronomer himself. He abstracts the nebula from its remote results. . . . [Scientists] are not concerned with anything ultimate, or with any question of the beginning or the ending, or with the purpose or meaning of it all. Science makes the world increasingly intelligible; but it does not even ask whether it is or is not rationalisable.[2]

All of which is an admirable way of saying that there is no rational connection between science and atheism unless it can be demonstrated that science and science alone can give a complete and final account of reality.

Indeed, the critical movement within the field of science in the past

[2] *Science and Religion*, p. 25.

quarter of a century has largely discredited the idea that the scientific approach is the only pathway to the discovery of reality. In the days of Charles Darwin it was generally conceived that science was the discovery of the laws of nature, and that by the determination of these laws the actual existing structure of the universe could be directly known. But a quarter of a century ago this opinion began to undergo a sea change. Scientists began to reflect upon their own work and began to take the position that their labors were directed, not to the attainment of absolute reality, but rather to abstractions of that reality, and that consequently their findings could not be credited with giving a complete account of the truth. For this reason, modern scientists disclaim the naïveté of the Victorian men who never doubted that science could give us a complete and authoritative picture of reality.

At the turn of the century, even the layman who was without a mathematical sense found the scientific account of the universe to be materialistic, but nevertheless reasonably intelligible. He had only to imagine an infinite number of remarkably minute spherical atoms driven by invisible forces, colliding against each other, and then rebounding and reforming into component molecules which united or separated according to fixed laws. In its primeval period the world was thought of as a fiery mist composed of gyrating atoms and molecules which in due time concentrated itself into solar and stellar systems. One planet which evolved from this process of concentration finally took the form of sea, land, and atmosphere, and after many æons brought forth the world of living things. In all of its developments from fiery mist to man the atoms and molecules simply persisted in the process of arrangement and rearrangement, all the time propelled by forces of a purely physical kind. In such a world the atom was indestructible and material, constituting absolute reality.

However, as the basic science of physics became more sweeping in its generalizations, its mathematical abstractions became more difficult for the lay mind to comprehend. Now it becomes quite evident that the universe is being more and more vaguely expressed in diagrams and algebraic formulæ, making most significant the dictum of Sir James Jeans that the universe begins to look more like a great thought than a great machine. This is abstraction carried to the *n*th power, and those who are questing for reality must never forget that the universe which the mathematically minded scientists are describing in algebraic formulæ is still out there doing its cosmic job.

The accomplishments of the Newtonian physics cannot be gainsaid. From the standpoint of practicability no other pursuit of questing intelligence has been so fruitful in the extending of man's advantageous control over the forces of nature. Before the revolutionary effects of nuclear

physics upon the scientific viewpoint began to be exerted, Newtonian physics had all but completed the quantification of the universe. The experimental method proved its efficacy in showing man how to predict, control, and exploit nature's forces, and that efficacy has never been discredited.

But what has been discredited has been the mechanistic interpretation of the universe which arose in the minds of those whose enthusiasm for scientific achievement pushed them to the conclusion that so-called spiritual interpretations were no longer tenable. Strangely enough, it was not the idealistic school of philosophy that won the conflict with the mechanists, but rather the leading scientists themselves who, by a "calibration" of their methods, began to point out the limitations under which all scientific investigators necessarily work.

First of all, the method of abstraction employed by the scientist to arrive at usable generalizations gives scant recognition to individuality. Early physicists like Laplace were so confident that science could ultimately comprehend in one analytical formula the past and future status of the systems of the universe that they were sure nothing could happen within the causal system which had not been determined by the laws and processes of that system. In fact, they went so far as to assert that what is usually called *the freedom of the human spirit* is a mirage. From their point of view, every thought, feeling, or volition in man is determined by the mechanisms of brain and body. But the modern scientist is veering away from such determinism, not only because he resents the personal implications of so sweeping an absurdity, but also because he has seen the whole structure of physical science undergo revolutionary changes since the theory of relativity has won widespread recognition, not to mention the devastating effects of the study of thermodynamics on the supposed "inexorableness" of "fixed" natural laws.

Now that the atom has been penetrated, a subatomic world has been thrust into the attention of the scientist, and he must deal with electrons, protons, neutrons, et cetera. Moreover, he has found it necessary to restudy the radiation of energy, since the former assumption that all energy radiated in the form of continuous waves has been challenged by the quantum theory. The fact that many waves of radiation are not continuous, but jerky, resembling a series of explosions rather than continuous waves, has resulted in the use of two different and seemingly incompatible conceptions of the nature of energy. The study of thermodynamics has led to replacing the so-called "laws of nature" with laws based upon statistical probability, because it has been observed that the behavior of energy is not absolutely predictable and consequently a large number of quanta must be studied in order to determine the direction of their action. In

fact, many scientists of the calibre of Eddington would share with him in the feeling that "determinism" is being steadily set aside as science advances. Eddington himself writes:

> When Laplace put forward his ideal of a completely deterministic scheme he thought he already had the nucleus of such a scheme in the laws of mechanics and astronomy. That nucleus has now been transferred to the second scheme [*i.e.*, conceived in terms of statistical probabilities]. Nothing is left to the old scheme of causal law, and we have not yet found the beginnings of a new one.[3]

When we inquire of the biologist as to whether science can give a final and complete account of reality, we learn that he, too, has been led to question the validity of the mechanistic interpretation of the universe. In the words of J. S. Haldane, "Neither the physical conception of causation or mutual determination, nor the mathematical conception of mutual externality, fits our experience of life." In other words, the unanimity of opinions held by biologists at the turn of the century to the effect that the phenomena of life could ultimately be analyzed in terms of physical and chemical principles has been challenged by present-day investigators. No longer are the biologists agreed that the mechanistic interpretation of life can be maintained by simply pointing to the process of natural selection as a sufficient source of the characteristic features of life. They freely declare that they have never been able to trace life back to mere mechanism, and that they *never yet* have been able to account satisfactorily for reproduction, self-maintenance, or adjustability to environment from the physical standpoint alone.

If physics is recognized as the basic science, then biology must be regarded as an independent science, for physical interpretation affords the biologist only an imperfect outline of what he studies. Behind that outline he discerns a life force which does not fit in the causal system because it manifests itself through continuity by way of self-reproduction, and maintains itself in a coördinated unity. A full description of the physical and chemical properties of the amœba does not give a complete understanding of it. What prompts it to reproduce itself? What causes it to move in the direction of food and to envelop that food by means of its fingerlike processes? Surely there is something here which is more than a series of purposeless causes and effects. Life, therefore, operates through the physical and chemical elements but is more than they, for in organic bodies it integrates the parts into a unity and maintains that unity through time and circumstance. In fact, it is difficult to consider life processes without thinking of values, goals, or even purposes.

The study of conscious behavior, which is the special domain of the psychologist, creates a demand for a type of interpretation, which, though based upon the biological account of the human organism, is not satisfied

[3] A. S. Eddington, *New Pathways in Science*, p. 78.

to think of perceptions and voluntary responses as mere expressions of life resulting from a blindly maintained unity. Just as biology has gone beyond the physical interpretation in order to give an account of organisms activated by the life principle, so does psychology move beyond the biological interpretation to describe conscious behavior in terms of personality. Thus, it would seem that the farther we move from the abstract, mechanistic interpretation of the physical sciences the nearer we come to think of reality in terms of meaning and purpose. If, as Professor Stace has maintained, there is no meaning or purpose in the universe or in the life of man, then psychology is truly a pseudo science and the concept of personality is merely a romantic notion.

Very evidently Professor Stace has succumbed to the intellectual malady which is so prevalent among those thinkers who give uncritical assent to the implications of scientific investigation. In other words, he is the victim of "abstractionism," which was the chief obsession of nineteenth-century science. Of necessity the scientist assumes a perspective which is partial. His task is to analyze, classify, and then generalize. He must divide his material into small units for the purpose of study. He must exercise the principle of abstraction by ignoring those facts which do not appear germane to his immediate concern. The danger for the layman lies in the temptation to interpret the whole of reality according to the results of an abstract and specific investigation. As Professor A. N. Whitehead has stated, "An abstraction is nothing else than an omission of the truth."[4]

The kind of dogmatism which Professor Stace employs when he denies the existence of God dates him as belonging to the pre-Einstein period when many argued that the universe was a closed system, mechanically constructed and thoroughly fixed in its routine by inexorable laws. Whether Dr. Stace rejects relativity because, like most of us, he finds himself unable to comprehend its proofs is not indicated in his article. It would seem reasonable, however, to expect that a man of his professional standing would by now have been more conscious than he seems to be of the changes wrought by the new science upon the world view of the nineteenth century.

Sir Arthur Eddington's Gifford Lectures summarize the new view of science so admirably that they should be "required reading" for all professors of philosophy. Whether or not one agrees with Eddington's own interpretations, his summary is significant. Not only is the atom no longer thought of as indestructible and indivisible, but measurement must now be regarded as relative to the measurer. Moreover, two alternate theories of light are now in use and their divergence is only beginning to be resolved. Determinism has been denied both qualitatively and quanti-

[4] A. N. Whitehead, *Nature and Life*, p. 32.

tatively, and formulæ have been developed which purport to compute how far the course of events will vary from complete predictability. Man is seen to be so limited in his power of observation that the universe vastly transcends his powers of analysis, appreciation, or control. All of which is cause for humility and open-mindedness. As Charles E. Raven has put the case, "It *is* a mysterious universe, and dogmatism is indecent."

Not only do we take issue with Professor Stace in his implication that science pursues the only pathway to reality, but we also challenge his inference that morality and religion are in ruin because science has failed to validate them. It is to be conceded that neither the beauty of the universe, nor the evolution of man's religion, nor the growth of moral conviction has been accounted for by the measuring processes of science, but is that sufficient justification for regarding them as merely illusory? Is the poet, the saint, or the moral teacher to be discredited simply because he deals with that which is intangible and therefore unmeasurable? Did Phidias, or Michelangelo, or Rembrandt create beauty without having contact with reality? Were Moses, Confucius, and Gautama simply inventors of moral maxims? Must we regard Iknaton, Zoroaster, Jesus, and St. Francis as victims of illusion?

It is probably true, as Charles Grey Shaw used to tell us, that no categorical imperative impelled Michelangelo to fresco the Sistine Chapel, but it is also true that beauty beckons with an unseen hand to those who have eyes to see. The *Mona Lisa* is more than pigment. The *Fifth Symphony* transcends the laws of sound. Mere words do not account for the *Sonnets from the Portuguese.* Reality from the realm of beauty impinges on the mind of man defying any scientific yardstick.

By the same token morality imbeds itself within the life of man and will not be denied reality. When Thomas Hobbes, whom Professor Stace quotes, said, "Every man calleth that which pleaseth him, good; and that which displeaseth him, evil," he did not succeed in making morality a mere illusion. After full allowance has been made for the diversity of moral standards to which men propose to give their allegiance, the fact remains that when we do detect the good in considering two alternatives of action, it ceases to be a mere alternative and becomes something formidable and imperative. No effort to explain, either historically or psychologically, how men came to imagine that goodness ought to be revered can transform the steel of moral imperative into a racial illusion. When "conscience makes cowards of us all," it demonstrates that we are moral beings who are not fully explained as "space-time patterns differing only in conformation, location, duration, and degree of nisus." When it is proposed that *moral law* is only an hypothesis, we counter that *natural law* is only an hypothesis, too, and there is just as much convincing evidence in the struggle of man for goodness as there is in his struggle for existence. Surely, man's

reverence for justice, sincerity, and humanity charts a pathway to reality even if that pathway does not appear on "scientific maps."

The most flagrant assertion made by Professor Stace is that religion has been done to death by the rise of the "scientific spirit," which is only another way of saying that religion could only maintain itself so long as her superstitions remained unchallenged. Are we then to suppose that belief in God, the age-old experience of prayer, and the meanings wrought out by religion through millennia of spiritual striving are no longer valid because three hundred years ago Galileo discovered the scientific method? Is it reasonable to assume that those spiritual disciplines, which through countless ages showed men how to live and taught them how to die, were founded on a tissue of lies which now has been dissolved by the factual methods of science? Surely it is irrational and unscientific to claim that there is no reality behind the phenomena of nature simply because science has no tangible evidence of such reality.

In his Terry Lectures, delivered a generation ago, Robert Andrews Millikan made an observation which bears repeating here.

> There are two sorts of dogmatists in the field of religion. One calls himself a fundamentalist; the other calls himself an atheist. They seem to me to represent much the same type of thinking. Each asserts a definite knowledge of the ultimate *which he does not possess.* Each has closed his mind to any future truth. Each has a religion that is fixed. Each is, I think, irrational and unscientific.[5]

Many years ago Gilbert K. Chesterton pointed out that if the scientific view of the world is taught more widely and more efficiently than the religious view, it is a foregone conclusion that the thought of God will be thinned down to a mere transparency and the hope of a life to come will be made dim and shadowy in the minds of our people. Since the day when Chesterton made that observation, the popularization of science has far exceeded the popularization of religion. Consequently, the abstract, impersonal view of the universe has often been accepted to the exclusion of the definite and personal view taken by religion, and probably the fault lies with the church. It is not that science has discredited religion as a pathway to reality, but rather that its progress and achievements have captured the popular attention. But man's need of religion is reasserting itself on every hand, and it may be hoped that the chaos and bewilderment of the modern world, to which Professor Stace refers in his opening paragraph, may of necessity be dispelled by a recrudescence of faith in God and in the values of religion. That there is nothing in the findings of modern science which gives a rational basis for atheism may be affirmed without fear of contradiction from those in the forefront of scientific inquiry. Those with the will to believe can readily find it possible to be good scientists and good religionists without compromising their reason.

[5] R. A. Millikan, *Evolution in Science and Religion,* p. 87.

# THE CONFESSIONS OF A BIBLIOPHILE

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My father always had his nose in a book. That is one of the few recollections I have of him. He left a considerable library, which my mother had the good sense to keep together. I grew up among his books. They revealed him to me. I knew that he had loved them; so they were half sacred to me. I tried to read them before I could read, and then before I could understand them. Thus, if I am a bookworm, heredity enters in.

Back there, and in a small place such as my home town was, a book was a book. If you came into possession of one, it was yours; and to keep. You wrote your name in it. This aforetime valuableness of books is one of the reasons why so many of them have come down to us from the past, heirlooms, or treasured in libraries and museums, in spite of mold and fire and worms. We had no public library; few villages did. The scarcity of books in the old days, however, made for selection. In my father's libarary, for example, there was almost no trash; and many classics. Is not this, indeed, what we mean by "classics"? Today the publishers not only overwhelm us with books, they engulf us in them. We used to talk of "keeping up" with the new books; now that is unthinkable.

The nucleus of my own library was a classic, if in attenuated form: a red-covered, colored-pictured *Robinson Crusoe in Words of One Syllable.* It was a great event in my life, to become the owner, all by myself, of a real, live, bound book. You may be sure that after that I lived much on the Island of Juan Fernandez, with Crusoe and Man Friday. It has nonplused me that my small grandsons take no great account of this greatest of all boys' books. They pass by, also, *Gulliver's Travels* and *The Story of a Bad Boy.* Doubtless listening to Captain Midnight and Jack Armstrong on the radio has vitiated their juvenile literary taste.

The mother invariably made books our birthday and Christmas gifts, and so that Crusoe began to have companions: blue Mayne Reids and red Oliver Optics, and the *Whispering Pine* series of Elijah Kellogg and the *Camping Out* series of C. A. Stephens. Schoolbooks, after their study days were over, helped augment my collection; several of which are still in use as books of reference; the Greek and Latin grammars, for instance, that we had loved so little when their use was obligatory. I pity the boys and girls of today who learn their lessons from impersonal municipal-supplied textbooks, and so will never have the privilege of senti-

mentalizing over a bag of old schoolbooks, dog-eared and written all over with the foolishness of immaturity.

In my part of the country the *Sanders Readers,* and not those of W. H. McGuffey, were widely used. The *Sanders Sixth Reader,* in especial, was a notable book; it was really a chrestomathy of the best of English literature. Our "reading class," with this book, became a fine drill in both elocution and letters. One time in a magazine article I alluded to the *Reader,* and its worth. A letter came from a woman out in Iowa, saying that they had seen the article and that the mention of the *Sixth Reader* had aroused her father's memories. It had been one of his schoolbooks when he was a schoolboy, in the sixties. He was now seriously ill; in fact dying. He so longed to see one of those old *Sixth Readers* again. Could I get them one, at any cost? I did. The daughter afterwards wrote me that it gave her father no little pleasure during the closing days of his life. There came another letter, from a retired army officer in Washington. His memories had likewise been aroused by that reference in my article. If I had a copy of the *Reader,* would I loan it to him? He had used it as a boy, in a district school in New Hampshire, and longed to see it again. He had offered as high as twenty-five dollars for a copy, but Leary in Philadelphia, and Schulte in New York, and Williams in Boston had been unable to locate one.

The next stage in the building of my little library was when I began to buy books myself, with money I had earned: picking berries, husking corn, or other suchlike odd jobs for our neighbors—which, of course, made the books doubly precious. There is a French lexicon, bought with funds earned lathing for the village builder, which I never open without tasting again the flavor of lath nails and feeling again the smart of pounded fingers. Another time I emptied a tin savings bank for a history of early England. Ever since I unconsciously associate Saxon kings with coppers and nickels. A gaudy-covered, hideously illustrated, but serviceable Tennyson brings back to my mind, whenever I glance at it, a Fourth of July that I did not celebrate. I had seen this Tennyson on the shelves of a Canandaigua bookstore, had coveted it exceedingly, but discerned nowhere in sight the dollar and a half that was its price. There was to be a big celebration of the Fourth at the county seat. Everybody was going; and I was. The mother's allowance for the day was just the cost of that book. After a couple of days of hesitation, I decided in favor of—Tennyson. Thus early in life I learned that the desired object, and especially if it be a book, usually has to be acquired by giving up some other desired object. That was a lonesome, dreary Fourth of July for me, but it was followed by many boyhood golden hours, wandering through the romantic, melodi-

ous verse of the Victorian laureate. Being so young, I was not able to distinguish how very saccharine that verse is, in places.

This deprecatory reference to Tennyson reminds me of the half-shame I experienced the other day in noticing how the most of my boyish enthusiasms have been relegated to inaccessible, humiliating top shelves. Do I ever open that Tennyson? I should need to fetch a stepladder to do it. In college days Browning and Whitman pushed him aside, as later, Robinson and Eliot did the two just mentioned. For years I was crazy about Ibsen; I even learned Norwegian to be able to read him in the original; now I must resort to a lot of recalling when *Peer Gynt* and *A Doll's House* are up for discussion. But that's what we are all the time doing, every one of us, and with our beliefs and friends, as well as our books. You weed out your library today, retaining only the volumes you think you could not get along without, or would not part with for love or money; yet many books that have withstood this winnowing will go to the junk heap next house-cleaning time, certainly, next moving time. Our loves do not last; that's all; and not our "favorite author" loves.

The clergyman is embarrassed because his library so soon gets out of date; for theological books are almost as ephemeral as lending-library fiction. When I was starting out, Meyer's *Commentaries* were the thing; now I never hear of them, or see one, except in a secondhand store. William Newton Clarke's *Outline of Christian Theology* was a best seller with ministers and theological students in the first decade of this century: now, a forgotten book—which distresses me, so highly I rate the book and so fond I was of Dr. Clarke. My college professors were constantly quoting Herbert Spencer, or talking about him: they tell me in the old bookshops that they don't buy Herbert Spencer, because they can't sell him. How eagerly we used to grab up the new books of Lyman Abbott, Amory Bradford, L. P. Jacks, and Shailer Mathews: today they are nowhere but in *Who Was Who*.

Allusion has been made to the fact that the private librarian will be always discarding. This, however, is not so simple a procedure as one might think. The books have been given you, presented to you, bequeathed to you, or surreptiously left on your hands; and the next thing is to get rid of them—for superfluous books are impedimenta. The donator may be your guest some day and will then be sure to scrutinize your shelves to see how you have placed his gift; or he is your dear friend, and the thought of junking his present pains you; and so you keep putting off the necessitated, honest, if ungracious, procedure.

Ministers, who are bookmen—at least they are supposed to be—have been great sufferers from the presentation and book-unloading business. In the old days, when, as we have said, books were books, and there were

few of them, and ministers lived in roomy manses, and stayed on in a parish year after year, why, it was all right for people to make their pastor's study the dumping ground for their superfluous literature. But times have changed: and publishing, and housing, and preaching have.

As we were *in transitu*—that's the way the clerical registers put it—packing up to move to another parish, and I was wishing I didn't have so many books—just as my wife was wishing we didn't have so many dishes—I happened to pass the home of a Mrs. Benedict. She was not one of my flock, but had been friendly, and interested in my work, because I had kept hold of her son. She saw me passing and asked me to come in. "Dr. Bronk, I want to make you a parting gift, one that I think you will value and that will be useful to you. It is a set of Scott's *Commentaries,* that belonged to my father." They were big books, leather-bound, five volumes, and it required two journeys to lug them to the church—where I hid them in a closet in the vestry. Maybe they are there to this day.

A whim of mine, a rite of my bibliolatry, has been to purchase a famous writer's book in the town, or at least the country, that he immortalized. I have a copy of *Frithiofs Saga* that I brought from Lund, in whose university Esaias Tegner was for years a professor. For my *Divina Commedia* and *Vita Nuova* I haggled—one does that in Italian bookshops —not a stone's throw from the traditional house of Dante's birth; and I care all the more for a cherished set of Molière because the binder who dressed them up so tastily for me pointed out, from his workshop window, the house in the Rue de Richelieu where the great dramatist lived.

One of the customers of the bookshop in E. V. Lucas' *Over Bemberton's* wanted "slender and pocketable books." I, too, confess to a fondness for little books; such as the Elzevirs and Philipp Reclam manufactured. The traditional picture of the bookman represents him as bent over a huge tome, spread out on a table or desk. Few books, however, are read in that fashion. Macaulay defines a scholar as a man "who reads Plato with his feet on the fender." It would need to be a small edition, if his scholar is as comfort-loving as those I know.

Some of my most prized books are miniatures. There is a Gospel of John, 48mo, in 7-point type, that was given me when I was a very small boy. Because it can easily be slipped into the vest pocket, it has been read from in many sickrooms and at many a deathbed. Sacred to my own devotions, and still more diminutive in size, is another detached book of the Bible, a Hebrew Psalter, that I picked up in the Hamburg ghetto. In the same category should be included a morocco-bound, red-edged *De Imitatione Christi,* very small, but very legible. Properly, it lacks the name of Thomas à Kempis. There is also a *Fioretti di San Francesco,* in two tiny volumes, the sight of which always makes me

homesick for the Umbrian hillside where first I read them. On the reverse of the title page stands printed the church's sanction. It looks out of place. Why should Rome not give her approval to these memorabilia of her greatest saint? I could not find a bookshop in Assisi; so I bought it in near-by Perugia.

One sometimes has the feeling that it is indecently intrusive, or at least bad form, to inspect a private library in the owner's absence, or uninvited by him. It is like going through his private papers, or wardrobe. Notice the words, "private library." Why then shouldn't it be private? A book collection is about the most telltale thing imaginable. It reveals character and tastes and whims. Some men would do well, before setting out on a long and dangerous journey, or getting married, or committing suicide, to burn certain of their books, just as they burn letters. The most of us have volumes that we hide away, back of those we want to show off.

It has been my fortune to visit many churches, as guest preacher and for nondescript addresses. Not infrequently I have had to entertain myself, of the Sunday afternoon, in the pastor's study—and so in the face of his books. Now, from them I was usually able to read a considerable chapter of the said pastor's life—though he was a stranger to me. Incidentally, I could guess the theological seminary where he had studied: whether Crozer, or Rochester, or Union, or Moody Bible Institute.

The question is sometimes raised, Will the private library ever pass? It is suggested that in an era of housing shortage, and diminutive apartments, no one except the plutocrat booklover is going to have room for even a moderate-sized collection of books; and that, anyhow, since the state—that is, the public—is doing, and is going to do, everything else for us, why shouldn't we depend upon the public library for books? I remember that Barrie said that he never bought a book that he could "borrow, or steal, or draw from a public library." The point is, however, that books are friends, the friends of man—like dogs—and no matter how crowded and narrow the domicile, people will always manage to find room for at least a few books. And that is a private library. To some persons, moreover, books are furniture; at least bric-a-brac. They look artistic—when not disfigured by glaring jackets—refined, aristocratic—pretentious! Even the man who never reads likes to see a few of them lying around. We bibliophiles like to see them lying around everywhere: on the chairs, on the piano, on the floor. No, it isn't likely that the private library will ever be a thing of the past.

# THE RECKONING OF THE DAY IN THE GOSPELS AND IN ACTS

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In a previous study[1] I have established, with abundant evidence gathered from various parts of the Old Testament, that in early Israel the day was reckoned regularly from morning to morning, *i.e.*, it began at sunrise and ended at the following sunrise, when the new day began. However, in the latest portions of the Old Testament the day is reckoned regularly from evening to evening, *i.e.*, from sunset to sunset. It is obvious from this that at a certain moment in the life of ancient Israel a drastic change was made in this very vital matter of the manner of reckoning the day. The evidence establishes further, with reasonable certainty, that this change was made during the course of the late postexilic period, probably at some moment during the second half of the fourth century B.C.

What authoritative body within the organized Jewish community may have inaugurated this significant change we do not know. But it must have been a body with far-reaching and decisive power; for immediately, so it seems, the new system of reckoning the day became the official practice of Normative Judaism. Very speedily the Jewish festival calendar was adjusted to this change, with not a few interesting results.[2] Only in relation to the sacrificial ritual within the temple the day continued to be reckoned from morning to morning, due, in some measure perhaps, to the natural conservatism of religion, but, undoubtedly in larger measure, also to the specific character and precise time-reckoning of the sacrificial legislation in Lev. 7:15 and 22:30. Otherwise, and especially in all the affairs of ordinary, daily life, under the circumstances and regular procedures of Normative Judaism, beginning, as has been said, in the second half of the fourth century B.C., the day was reckoned from evening to evening.

It is therefore surprising indeed, in fact almost startling, to note that in the Synoptic gospels and in Acts the day is still reckoned from morning to morning.

In Acts 4:3-5 we read: "And they laid hands on them, and put them in ward unto the next day: for it was now eventide. . . . And it came to pass on the morrow," etc. It is readily apparent that here the evening, and with it the night, are reckoned to the old day, and that the

[1] "Supplementary Studies in the Calendars of Ancient Israel," *Hebrew Union College Annual*, X (1935), pp. 15-28.

[2] *Cf.* "The Chanukkah Festival and the Calendar of Ancient Israel," *Hebrew Union College Annual*, XX (1947), pp. 34-40.

new day, the morrow of the night before, begins with the morning. Even more manifest is this in Acts 20:7-11. Verse 7 reads: "And upon the first day of the week, when we were gathered together to break bread, Paul discoursed with them, intending to depart on the morrow; and prolonged his speech until midnight." Then follows, in the ensuing verses, the narrative of the fall of Eutychus from the window of the upper chamber where the assembly had gathered. After recounting Paul's revival of Eutychus, the narrative continues in v. 11: "And when he was gone up, and had broken the bread, and eaten, and had talked with them a long while, even till break of day, so he departed." Here it is stated almost directly that the new day, again called, with relation to the night preceding, "the morrow," begins with daybreak.

This same system of reckoning the day seems to underlie one other passage in Acts, although the data here are by no means as clear and convincing as in the two passages already considered. Acts 10:3 ff. tells that Cornelius, the centurion, beheld a vision at about the ninth hour of the day, *i.e.*, about the middle of the afternoon. In fulfillment of the instructions given to him by the angel in the vision, he summoned men to send them from Cæsarea to Joppa, to Peter, who was lodging[3] with Simon, the tanner. They come to Joppa "on the morrow" about the sixth hour, *i.e.*, about noon. Apparently they had set out upon their journey shortly after sunrise. Moreover, v. 23 of the same chapter tells that Peter "called them in and lodged them. And on the morrow he arose and went forth with them." Here the "lodging" would scarcely have been for the relatively brief period of a half day, *i.e.*, from noon until some moment preceding sunset. The clear implication here is that the men remained with Peter overnight. Accordingly, in this passage once again the morrow, *i.e.*, the new day, seems to begin with sunrise.

Likewise in Acts 23:15, 20, 23 the night seems to be reckoned to the day preceding, and the new day, "the morrow" (*αὔριον*), to begin at dawn.

The evidence seems conclusive that in Acts the day was reckoned from sunrise to sunrise.

But since this is the case in Acts, it is not at all surprising that the same system of reckoning the day is found in Luke. Luke 10:34-35 tells that the Samaritan brought the wounded man to an inn[4] and took care

[3] The verb used here, *ξενίζω*, actually means no more than "to reside with a stranger or in a strange habitation," and does not necessarily have the specific connotation, "to pass the night," as does apparently *καταλύω*, the customary equivalent, at least in Greek manuscripts of the Pentateuch, of the Hebrew, לוּן (*cf.* Gen. 19:2 and Luke 9:12; 19:7, and also *κατάλυμα*, "inn," the equivalent of the Hebrew, מָלוֹן; *cf.* Exod. 4:24 and Mark 14:14; Luke 2:7; 22:11). However, in v. 23, as the context indicates, *ἐξένισε* certainly means specifically, "he lodged them over night."

[4] The word used here for "inn" is not *κατάλυμα* but *πανδοχεῖον*.

of him. "And on the morrow," as he was leaving, he made further arrangements for him. This passage implies clearly that "the morrow," the new day, began only after the period of sojourn in the inn had come to an end; and certainly this sojourn in the inn was during the night. Accordingly, here, too, the day begins at sunrise. Likewise the unmistakable implication of ἐπιφώσχω in both Luke 23:54 and Matt. 28:1 and also of the context of both passages is that the day begins with sunrise.

Mark 11:11-12 states that, after Jesus' preliminary visit to the temple, "it being now eventide, he went out unto Bethany with the twelve. And on the morrow, when they were come out from Bethany," etc. Here the fact is patent that the new day began with the morning and that the night period was counted to the preceding day. This is the clear implication also of the dramatic episode, recorded in all three of the Synoptic gospels, of Peter thrice denying Jesus before the crowing of the cock during the night preceding the crucifixion. For our purpose the narrative is most explicit in Mark 14:30 ff. Verse 31 reads, "Verily I say unto thee, that thou today, even this night, before the cock crow twice, shalt deny me thrice." The parallel versions of the same narrative, in Matt. 26:34 ff. and Luke 22:34 ff., are not quite so explicit; but the implication of all three versions is the same. The incident would lose much of its significance and dramatic force were the period of time assigned by Jesus for Peter's threefold denial a protracted one. Certainly the narrative means to say that within the relatively brief period, the few short hours remaining of this eventful day, before cockcrow, shortly before dawn, Peter would have acted in the manner predicted. Therefore the full import of the wording of the narrative in Mark 14:30, "today, even this night, before the cock crow twice." The clear implication here, and therefore likewise in all three versions of this narrative, is that with sunrise, following very shortly upon cockcrow,[5] this one, eventful day will end and the new, tragedy-laden day will begin.

This seems to be the implication also of the practice of weather prognostication recorded in Matt. 16:2-3: "When it is evening, ye say, It will be fair weather: for the heaven is red. And in the morning, It will be foul weather today: for the heaven is red and lowering." Manifestly, the practice here recorded was widely observed, at least among the Galilean peasants, if not also among those of Judæa, in order to forecast the weather upon the very next day. It is significant therefore that the word, "today," is appended only to the description of the heavens in the early morning, *i.e.*, just at sunrise, in v. 3, but does not occur in v. 2 in connection with the description of the heavens in the evening, *i.e.*, just at

[5] Cockcrow does not itself mark the beginning of the new day, but only heralds its coming at sunrise; *cf.* Mark 14:72–15:1. This latter verse seems, in its turn, to imply that with the morning, *i.e.*, with sunrise, a new day, the last day of the earthly existence of Jesus, had begun.

sunset. Here, too, so it seems, "today," *i.e.*, the new day, is thought to begin with sunrise.

This seems to be the manner of reckoning the day also in Mark 4:35: "And on that day, when even was come." Here the evening, the period at sunset, seems to be still a part of the day which had begun at sunrise. Actually, however, while this does seem to be the case, it is not altogether certain, since, as is well known, in the gospels, or at least in Matthew and Mark, ἡ ὀψία is used with considerable latitude of meaning. Occasionally it connotes the last portion of the daylight period, just preceding sunset,[6] but elsewhere the early portion of the night, following immediately after sunset.[7]

The evidence is thus cumulative and conclusive that in the Synoptic gospels and in Acts the day is regularly reckoned as beginning in the morning, at sunrise, and extending to the following sunrise. The only passage which might seem to challenge this conclusion is Matt. 27:19. There the wife of Pilate says to her husband: "Have thou nothing to do with that righteous man; for I have suffered many things this day in a dream because of him." This conversation occurred quite early in the morning. Presumably then the dream came to Pilate's wife during the course of the preceding night, while she slept. Here then, apparently, the night preceding the day was considered a part of that day; and this implies, in turn, that the day was reckoned from sunset to sunset. However, even assuming that this interpretation be correct, as indeed it seems to be, it has no necessary bearing upon our general conclusion. Here Pilate's wife is the speaker; her actual words, real or presumptive, are quoted; and it may well be assumed that they reflect the system of reckoning the day to which she was accustomed, the system current in Jerusalem and vicinity, probably even in Cæsarea, the system regularly employed by Normative Judaism. On the other hand, all the other passages in the Synoptic gospels and in Acts cited thus far reflect the point of view and practice of Jesus and his disciples and of the groups to whom they min-

[6] Matt. 14:15, and note that in v. 23 of the same chapter the evening is spoken of as coming on a second time upon the very same day. Note also that instead of ἡ ὀψία in Matt. 14:23, the parallel passage in Mark 6:35 reads, "and when the day was now far spent." In both Matt. 14:15 and 23 the same noun, ἡ ὀψία, designates the period of the day. Plainly, the passage conceives of there being two evenings in the day, one early and one late, precisely as is implicit in the biblical Hebrew term, בֵּין הָעַרְבַּיִם, "the two evenings" (Exod. 12:6; 16:12; *et passim*). Other gospel passages in which ἡ ὀψία designates that portion of the day which immediately precedes sunset are Matt. 27:57; Mark 15:42.

[7] The gospel passages in which ἡ ὀψία designates the early period of the night, immediately following sunset, are Matt. 8:16 (note that the parallel passages are more explicit; Mark 1:32, "And at even, when the sun did set"; Luke 4:40, "And when the sun was setting"); Matt. 16:2 (here the precise period of time designated by ἡ ὀψία is that brief moment, immediately after sunset, when clouds on the western horizon are reddened by the rays of the sun, already sunk below the horizon); Matt. 20:8 (*cf.* vv. 6, 9, 12; ἡ ὀψία is at the twelfth hour of the day, *i.e.*, about 6:00 p.m.); Matt. 26:20; Mark 6:47 (*cf.* vv. 35 and 48 and also the parallel version in John 6:16-17); Mark 14:17; John 6:16; John 20:19. *Cf.* also Robinson, *A Greek and English Lexicon of the New Testament*, p. 538b.

istered. The narratives are all told from this standpoint. And in all of them there is perfect unity of concept; the day is reckoned throughout from sunrise to sunrise. In direct contrast to the practice of Normative Judaism, this seems to have been the Galilean practice, or, at least if not generally so, then the practice of certain sections of the Galilean Jewish community, sections to which Jesus and his disciples belonged.

All four gospels seem to agree as to the time of day when the body of Jesus was removed from the cross. According to Matt. 27:57 and Mark 15:42 this was just at eventide. Here as we have indicated, ἡ ὀψία seems to designate that late portion of the day which immediately precedes sunset. Luke gives no intimation of the precise moment of the removal of the body from the cross, but in 23:54 he states very clearly that the burial of Jesus in the tomb continued through the night and was concluded shortly before sunrise, before the Sabbath dawned. This period, *i.e.*, the entire night, he regards as still a part of Friday, the Day of Preparation, the day preceding the Sabbath. Obviously, here, too, Luke reckons the day from morning to morning. Matthew and Mark are not quite so explicit as to the duration of the burial of Jesus, but they, too, give the impression that there was no hurry with regard to it and that it continued well into the night.

John 19:31 ff., however, conveys just the opposite impression. It states explicitly that the body of Jesus was removed from the cross, not by Joseph of Arimathæa, as do the Synoptists (Mark 15:46; Matt. 27:59 f.; and Luke 23:53), but at the request of the Jews, so that the oncoming Sabbath might not be profaned by the presence of the corpse upon the cross. Here, manifestly, the moment of beginning the Sabbath is imminent, quite as if the new day began with the sunset. Moreover, the narrative in John 19:38-42 conveys the impression that the entire burial procedure was hurried, seemingly as if it had to be concluded within a very narrow period of time, before the advent of the Sabbath, as v. 42 states specifically. This, too, accords with the conclusion that with John the day began, not at sunrise, but at sunset, and extended from sunset to sunset, precisely as was the practice of contemporary Normative Judaism.

This conclusion is confirmed definitively by the precise timing of the resurrection in John 20:1, while the complementary conclusion, that the Synoptic gospels reckoned the day from morning to morning, is confirmed just as absolutely by their timing of this same incident.

John 20:1 reads: "Now on the first day of the week cometh Mary Magdalene early, while it was yet dark." Very plainly Mary's coming to the tomb of Jesus was shortly before sunrise: yet the day is called explicitly "the first day of the week," *i.e.*, Sunday. The conclusion is

unmistakable that this day, Sunday, had begun before sunrise, that the dark period, preceding sunrise, was already reckoned to Sunday; and this, in turn, makes altogether unavoidable the conclusion that, according to the reckoning of John, the day began at sunset.

On the other hand, Mark and Luke state very explicitly, Matthew less precisely, but none the less clearly by implication, that the resurrection took place after sunrise, in fact almost immediately thereafter. Mark 16:1-2 reads: "And when the Sabbath was past . . . very early on the first day of the week, they come to the tomb when the sun was risen." Just as precisely Luke 23:56–24:1 says: "And on the Sabbath they rested. . . . But on the first day of the week, at early dawn, they came unto the tomb." Less precisely, and perhaps with a slight measure of confusion as to the timing, Matthew 28:1 records: "Now late.on the Sabbath day, as it began to dawn toward the first day of the week, came Mary Magdalene and the other Mary to see the sepulchre." What Matthew seems partly to say and partly to imply, is that the two Marys began their visit to the sepulchre while it was still dark, and therefore was still the Sabbath day, but their arrival there and the experiences which they there underwent took place just at sunrise and shortly thereafter, *i.e.*, on Sunday. This interpretation brings Matthew, despite the vagueness of language, into complete agreement with Mark and Luke as to the timing of all that transpired at the tomb.

But disregarding this issue for the moment, in one respect the language of Matthew is perfectly clear, *viz.*, that the Sabbath, the old day, continued until sunrise, and only with the rising of the sun did the new day, Sunday, begin. If anything, this one fact is more explicit in Matthew than in the two other Synoptics. But even here Mark lags but little behind Matthew in explicitness; for he, too, says plainly that the Sabbath ended and Sunday began with the rising of the sun. And even Luke states this same fact almost as clearly when he says that they came to the tomb "on the first day of the week, at early dawn."

Furthermore, we must bear in mind that two all-important considerations determined the timing of these events in the various gospels. According to the practice, and even the rule, of Normative Judaism, it was strictly forbidden to come into contact with a corpse or the tomb in which a corpse lay upon the Sabbath, for this would have defiled the persons who made such contact, would have therefore disqualified them from Sabbath worship, and would thus have profaned the Sabbath. And since all three Synoptics agreed in reckoning the day from sunrise to sunrise, and so set the close of the Sabbath and the beginning of Sunday at sunrise, they had, accordingly, to time the arrival of the visitors at the tomb and the events which transpired there after sunrise, in fact

almost immediately thereafter. On the other hand, John, who reckoned the day from sunset to sunset, naturally regarded the Sabbath as ended completely and Sunday as begun with the preceding sunset. Therefore he could time the resurrection and the arrival of the visitors at the tomb still during the dark, before the rising of the sun, for, according to his reckoning, the new day, Sunday, had begun some hours before all this.

The second consideration is in many respects even more important and compelling. The tradition was firmly established, and had even been announced in advance by Jesus himself, that he would remain in the tomb for three days.[8] In fact his resurrection from the dead upon the third day was to be the definitive proof of his divine nature. Of course this did not mean that he would have to remain within the tomb for three complete days, for the exact period of seventy-two hours. According to Jewish practice in matters of death, burial, and mourning, as well as in other comparable matters, a part of a day, no matter how small, is reckoned as a full day.[9] Therefore the reckoning of the three days of Jesus' stay in the tomb according to the Synoptic gospels was as follows: on Friday, at eventide[10] the body of Jesus was taken from the cross and was laid in the tomb. As we have learned, according to all three gospels this task was not completed in all its details until well after nightfall. We have already taken note of the fact that the Synoptic accounts of the burial convey the impression of unhurriedness and decorum in the entire procedure. The reason for this is self-apparent. The Synoptics could well tell, or at least imply, that the burial ceremonies were not completed until quite some time after night had fallen, for with them Friday continued for some hours thereafter, even until sunrise on the next morning.

According to the Synoptics therefore, the body of Jesus was in the tomb during the entire night portion of Friday, which, according to their system of reckoning the day, was the second and latter half of that day, all of Saturday, and a brief, almost infinitesimal, portion of Sunday. But with them the moment of the resurrection had to be set after sunrise, even though very shortly thereafter, for not until sunrise, according to their reckoning, did Sunday begin. Accordingly, the insistent reference of all three gospels to the dawn or the sunrise, in their accounts of the resurrection, becomes fully comprehensible.

Just the reverse procedure obtained in John's record of this same event. According to John's system of reckoning the day, *i.e.*, from sunset to sunset, Friday came to an end and the Sabbath set in with sunset. Therefore the entire procedure of the removal of Jesus' body from the

[8] Matt. 12:38-40 (*cf.* Luke 11:29-32); 16:21; 17:23; 20:19; 27:63 f.; Mark 8:31; 9:31; 10:34; Luke 9:22; 18:33; 24:7, 21, 46; John 2:18-22; *cf.* Hos. 6:2.

[9] *Cf. Jewish Encyclopedia*, IV, 475, under "Day."

[10] So Matt. 27:57; Mark 15:42.

cross, its preparation for burial and the carrying of it to and the depositing of it in the tomb, had to be performed completely within the comparatively brief period intervening between the moment of the death of Jesus, quite late in the day,[11] and sunset. At the most this could have been a period of only a few hours, not over three; for, as John 19:42 states explicitly, the body of Jesus had to be deposited in the tomb before the advent of the Sabbath. It is therefore quite comprehensible why the account of the burial in John gives the impression of hurriedness. Certainly the implication of the otherwise meaningless statement in John 19:42, that "the tomb was nigh at hand," is that it required but a few moments to carry the body thither, and, furthermore, that, had the tomb been located at a distance, it would have been impossible to complete the burial act before the setting-in of the Sabbath.

According to John, therefore, the body of Jesus rested in the tomb for but the relatively brief period, amounting apparently to only a few minutes, perhaps a half hour at the most, which remained of Friday, the whole of Saturday, and a good portion of Sunday, practically the entire night period. That is why John can, without any hesitation, fix the time of the resurrection at, "while it was yet dark," since, according to his system of reckoning the day, Sunday had begun already at the preceding sunset, a half day, or almost a half day, earlier.

According, then, to the Synoptics, the body of Jesus reposed in the tomb approximately half, *i.e.*, the second, the night half, of the day of Friday, all of Saturday, and for a few minutes of Sunday, the few minutes following immediately upon the beginning of that day, at sunrise. According to John the period of repose of the body in the tomb was a few minutes of Friday, the last few minutes of that day, the whole of Saturday, and practically the first half, the night half, of Sunday. In this manner, according to each of the two systems of reckoning the day, the traditional and predicted three days in the tomb were completed.

From all this evidence it follows with certainty that John reckoned the day from sunset to sunset, precisely as was the practice of Normative Judaism, and as had been its practice for approximately the three and one half centuries preceding the crucifixion. What the import of this circumstance may be must be left to New Testament scholars to determine. But it follows equally from all this evidence that the Synoptic gospels and Acts reckoned the day from sunrise to sunrise, precisely as had been the practice in ancient Israel previous to the last half of the fourth century B.C., when the new manner of reckoning the day was inaugurated. This was obviously the system of reckoning the day employed by Jesus himself

[11] According to the Synoptics, at about the ninth hour, *i.e.*, at about 3:00 p.m. John does not record the exact time of the death of Jesus.

and by his disciples and early followers. Apparently it was, as has been said already, the system of reckoning the day current in Galilee either generally or else among certain sections of the Galilean Jewish community. Manifestly it represents the persistence of an archaic practice.

But the establishing of this surprising fact immediately raises the question: Just why should the Galilean Jewish community, or at least a certain section thereof, have adhered to this very archaic practice, so completely at variance with that which was current in the Normative Judaism of Jesus' day? And this study raises at the same time other closely related and equally cogent questions, such as, for example, the import of these two divergent systems of reckoning the day for the precise dating of the crucifixion of Jesus and all the circumstances attendant thereupon, such as, for instance, the dating and manner of celebration of the Passover. However, it suffices merely to raise these questions here. To endeavor to answer them would lead far afield, far beyond the limits and potentialities of this paper. This task must therefore be left for some other favorable occasion.

# Where Ignorance Is Bliss, 'Tis Folly

FEW READERS, if any, there probably are who have not at one time or another made use of the old saying, "The exception proves the rule." They might, however, find considerable difficulty in justifying it. As popularly, and thoughtlessly, employed, it is very much like such overworked terms as "obvious" and "obviously." How easy it is to say that a thing is "*obviously* true," or "*obviously* false." It is often a bit disconcerting when someone to whom we have made that pontifical remark challenges it and asks for the evidence. For too often the beauty of the word *obvious* is that it allows us to dispense with evidence hard or impossible to procure. When we have evidence, we have a tendency to cite it; when we have none but are at the same time very sure that we are right, it is then that we dub our contention "obvious" or "self-evident."

In passing it may be remarked that a close relative to *Mr. Obvious* is "We have reason to believe." That is superficially a very satisfying phrase, especially for pulpit use. It stamps us as among those who have toiled long in the deep mines of truth and who thus can speak with a confidence and authority denied to lesser minds. And by the the use of the plural—be it, as such plurals usually are, not a sign of modesty but of vagueness, if not of bluff—we seem to associate to ourselves an impressive group of others who can thus attest that we too belong. All that might be said of the "obvious" habit can be said of its five-word equivalent. When a man has facts which really buttress his contention, he can usually dispense with these subterfuges.

But to return to the old saying. Its origin would probably be hard to trace. Lord Byron remarked in his *Letters and Journal* that "exceptions only prove the rule." The seventeenth-century John Wilson makes use of it in *The Cheats:* "The exception proves the rule." Forty years earlier Robert Burton, in his *Anatomy of Melancholy,* had opened his discussion of "Custom of Diet, Delight, Appetite, Necessity, how they cause or hinder," with the remark: "No rule is so general, which admits not some exception." A somewhat similar, though scarcely identical, word is to be found in de la Veprie's *Les Proverbes Communes,* which was printed in Paris at the end of the fifteenth century: "Il n'est règle qui ne faille" ("there is no rule which does not fail"). How much further back into the misty past it could be traced, I do not know.

Two things may be said with some degree of likelihood. If "proves" means *establishes, guarantees, demonstrates, attests,* and the like, as the phrase is popularly used today, it is untrue and mischievous. Exceptions, violations, do nothing of the sort. Instead they make perfectly clear that the rule thus violated is only an approximation or hypothesis. It is extremely unlikely, were the sun tomorrow morning to rise in the west or an occasional stone to fall up, that folk—to say nothing of physicists and astronomers—would placidly continue their confidence about the laws of celestial mechanics. One exception would be quite sufficient to invalidate, and properly, the whole confidence.

But very possibly this is not the meaning of "proves" in the old saying. It may very well be that "proves" means simply *brings to the test* or *examines.* Thus the author of I John in his oft misquoted word enjoins: "Beloved, believe not every spirit, but prove [that is, test, examine] the spirits, whether they are of God." In this connection the old maxim is sound: Exceptions do *prove,* that is, *test* the accuracy or trustworthiness of our rules of life. There are but few rules of the exactness of that of gravity, where one definitely proved violation is fatal. The proximate accuracy or usefulness of the multifarious rules and courses of action produced through the centuries depends upon the percentage which they can score from the constant testing and proving. Each exception weakens the probability of the principle involved; if there are too many exceptions, common sense demands a revision or restatement or abandonment of the older provisional confidence. Thus there would seem little justification for the common smugness too frequently evidenced when the exception shows up. It may be that most so-called rules or laws are such, as Burton sagely remarked about habits of diet, that it were folly to demand a hundred per cent performance; it is equally true that each violation should be carefully studied as an evidence of its weakness, not as the guarantee of its strength.

# From Off the Campus and On

Dr. Buckler is an historian and orientalist of international distinction. Born in England, he was educated at Cambridge (A.B., 1913; A.M., 1920). For several years he was in India on the faculties of Christian College at Madras and of Muir Central College at Allahabad. In 1925 he joined the faculty of the Graduate School of Theology, Oberlin, as professor of church history. During the first world war he was for four years a lieutenant in the Indian Army Reserve, serving in India, Egypt, and Palestine. He is a past president of the American Church History Society, and a member of other learned societies including the American Oriental Society and the Mediæval Academy. He is the author of several books and many articles and critical reviews. His present essay was read before the Rowfant Club, Cleveland. Together with a second essay, "The Tragedy of Education," to appear at an early date in these pages, it forms what the author styles "The Twin Tragedy of Today."

Readers of Crozer Quarterly will remember Professor Keene's earlier article, "A Christian Approach to the Problem of Human Suffering," which appeared in July, 1948. He is associate professor of the history and philosophy of religion in the Howard University School of Religion and book editor of the *Journal of Religious Thought.* For three years he taught at International College, Smyrna, and for six years at Colgate. He went to Howard in 1943. He is leaving for Beirut, Lebanon, early in July for a sabbatical year of leave.

Vergilus Ferm needs no formal introduction to Crozer readers since he has been a frequent and always welcome contributor. He is a distinguished philosopher who realizes that words are properly a medium to reveal, not to obscure, thought. He graciously accepted the invitation of the editor to prepare a companion article to the one by Professor Keene. This was done with the full approval of Professor Keene. Among other notable books by Dr. Ferm is *What Can We Believe?* which is reviewed in this issue. He has been for many years head of the department of philosophy at the College of Wooster.

Mr. Westphal has been for twenty-five years minister of the Lansdowne (Pa.) Baptist Church. He holds degrees from Cornell, Colgate-Rochester, and Crozer. He will be remembered by our readers as the author of the arresting essay "Why Not Be Intelligent Too?" which appeared in these pages, July, 1945. He has been a member of the faculty

of the Baptist Institute (Philadelphia) for several years. During the spring term of this year he was a visiting lecturer at Crozer.

It is with particular pleasure that we welcome back to our pages Dr. Mitchell Bronk, a distinguished Baptist minister and editor. He is a graduate of the University of Rochester and of Crozer. Following many years of service in the pastorate he joined the staff of the American Baptist Publication Society from which he retired in 1940. His present article, "The Confessions of a Bibliophile," will strike too many responsive chords in the reader to require any build-up in this column.

Dr. Morgenstern is an eminent Hebraist and biblical scholar. Following his graduation from the University of Cincinnati and from Hebrew Union College he spent two years of study in Germany, resulting in a Ph.D. In 1907 he joined the faculty of Hebrew Union College, where he still teaches with distinction. For twenty-five years he was president of its faculty. He is a prodigious worker and has many books and scholarly articles to his credit. It is a pleasure to welcome this mature scholar to our pages.

Dr. McCasland, of the University of Virginia, needs no introduction to our readers. His provocative article, "The Jews and Palestine," which appeared in the last issue, has aroused much interest and prompted some correspondence. Due to his desire to be scrupulously fair in a controversial issue, he has requested space to correct a slight inadvertence in his article.

Letters of appreciation for our book reviews and book notices continue to rejoice the editor. Once again we can provide a generous portion—forty-nine reviews and notices by thirty-four scholars. And again we can do nothing more, unfortunately, than call the roll. Dr. Allen is coördinator of students' religious activities at the University of Minnesota. Dr. Aubrey, for five years president of Crozer, is now head of the department of religious thought at the University of Pennsylvania. Mr. Batten is dean of Crozer Theological Seminary. Professor Bower was until his retirement professor of religious education at the University of Chicago. Dr. Brightman is professor of philosophy at Boston University. Professor Brown is an indologist on the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania. Professor Buckler has already been introduced. Professor Burtt is a professor of philosophy at Cornell University. Mr. Carpenter is director of the Wilmington (Del.) Public Library. Mr. Clayton is an executive of the Pullman Company and an active churchman. Dr. Dauerty is a Presbyterian minister, now residing in Florida. Dr. Davis is professor of theology

at Crozer. Dr. Enslin is professor of New Testament at Crozer. Mr. Gehr is a Universalist minister in Philadelphia. Dr. Havighurst is a member of the faculty of the University of Chicago in the field of human development. Dr. Herrick is president *emeritus* of Andover Newton. Dr. Hershey is minister of the Church of the Holy Communion (Lutheran), Philadelphia. Dr. Hudson is professor of American church history at Colgate-Rochester. Dr. Ivey is minister of the Second Baptist Church, Richmond, Va. Mr. Keighton is professor of preaching and worship at Crozer. Dr. King was until his recent retirement dean of United College, Winnipeg. Dr. Knudson is dean *emeritus* of Boston University School of Theology. Professor Marcus is a member of the department of oriental languages and literatures of the University of Chicago. Dr. McCasland has already been introduced. Dr. Morrison is professor of homiletics at Colgate-Rochester. Dr. Pritchard is professor of Old Testament at Crozer. Dr. Schneider is professor of philosophy at Columbia and editor of the *Journal of Philosophy*. Mr. Skillington is minister of the First Methodist Church, York, Pa. Dr. Sperry is the distinguished dean of the Harvard Divinity School. Mr. Starr is librarian of the Crozer Theological Seminary and the American Baptist Historical Society. Dr. Steere is professor of theology at Haverford College. Mrs. Swain is president of the Woman's American Baptist Foreign Mission Society and a former president of the Northern Baptist Convention. Mr. Thomas is a secretary of the Ministers and Missionaries Benefit Board of the Northern Baptist Convention. Mr. Westphal has already been introduced.

## THE JEWS AND PALESTINE: A CORRECTION

My essay under the above caption in CROZER QUARTERLY, XXVI, 2 (April, 1949), in the section dealing with Moslem hospitality toward Jews on p. 123, contains the inaccurate statement that Moses Maimonides was driven out of Spain not by Moslems, but by his Jewish coreligionists. The fact is that his migration first to Fez, then to Palestine, and finally to Cairo, where he was welcomed by the great Moslem Saladin, was caused by oppressive measures of the fanatical Almohades, a Moslem regime which seized power first in Morocco and then in part of Spain. For a time this government made life exceedingly hard for all who refused to accept Islam.

Maimonides, who now is regarded by Jews as the greatest authority of the Middle Ages, aroused bitter opposition on the part of all orthodox Jews of his own time because he applied the rationalism of Aristotle to Jewish theology; yet it was not this opposition of Jews which caused his migration. I make the correction not only because of the inaccuracy, which, I think I may be allowed to assume, any scholar would regret, but because one Zionist reader has accused me of deliberately twisting the facts in order to slander the Jews. The point does not invalidate the view presented in the paper that throughout their history Moslems have generally been hospitable to Jews; that Jews have been more kindly treated by Moslems than by Christians; and that the present opposition of Arabs of the Near East to the Zionist state cannot be explained as only traditional hostility coming to expression. There have been temporary lapses from the Moslem policy of hospitality, but they are exceptions, not the rule.

S. VERNON MC CASLAND

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## A REQUEST

Rarely does a week go by that copies of CROZER QUARTERLY are not returned by the postal authorities with some such annotation as "Address Unknown." Invariably we try to get the copy through, often writing a letter to the subscriber at this address, with the envelope marked "Please Forward." Not infrequently they come back too. That circumstance tends to arouse philosophical lines of thought as to the make-up of said subscriber—and to waste time. To insure prompt reception of your copy, *please* keep the business office informed of your correct *current* address. CROZER QUARTERLY will do all in its power to get your copy to you; mind reading, however, is unfortunately not one of our accomplishments.

# BOOK REVIEWS

*American Freedom and Catholic Power,* by Paul Blanshard, Boston, Beacon, 1949, pp. 350, $3.50.

This is a real book. It is a terribly important book. It must be reckoned with. It cannot be ignored. Many book reviewers like to conclude their discussions with some variant of the old and reliable "this is a must book." To be sure, that phrase is not overcommon in these columns for several reasons, the chief of which we hope is that our reviewers are realistic folk who feel a sense of responsibility to their readers. Their prime function is not to sell books. This wholesome policy of the years is not being casually overturned by the one who should be most zealous in preserving it. Nevertheless I frankly state at the very beginning that I think this is a book which should have a very wide reading. And in the opening paragraph I recommend it as the most important and challenging book which has come across my desk in a long time.

It will receive a deal of abuse. That is to be expected. The author knew what he was up against when he wrote it. The publishers—and our editorial eyeshade is doffed to the Beacon Press—have showed themselves to be courageously public spirited when they accepted this hot potato. There are very few houses which would dare to have their impress on it, for, as the author has proved in one of the most devastating chapters, "Censorship and Boycott," reprisals are swift and sure. He is well within his facts when he writes: "As a result . . . scarcely any publishers in the United States will even consider any manuscript that might expose them and their textbooks to a Catholic boycott." If this book does not achieve that fate, what book will? In fact, the heat is already on to smother it. Pressure is being put on newspapers to exclude all mention of it from their review columns or, if that is impossible, to dismiss it with a few lines of abuse. It is to be hoped that this conspiracy of silence—the only comeback seemingly possible—will prove utterly unsuccessful. There are such things as boomerangs.

From the first page to the final footnote, of which there are twenty-nine pages, the volume is a hard-hitting but scientifically restrained appraisal of the nature, working, and outlook of the Roman Catholic hierarchy. It is not primarily a book about Catholic faith; instead it is concerned with the cultural, political, and economic policies of the Catholic Church, especially as these affect the rights and liberties of all Americans, not of Roman Catholics alone. To say the Roman Catholic Church is *in* politics is an unwarrantably mild understatement; instead, as the book makes crystal clear, it *is* political from *A* to *Z*.

This volume is not to be dismissed as "another anti-Catholic alarum" of the sort of *Why Priests Should Wed,* stemming from the days of the A.P.A., and encouraging the mobbing of nunneries as particularly vicious and interesting brothels. Instead it is the work of a trained investigator who knows at first hand Catholic participation in big-city politics. Furthermore almost every statement in the book is buttressed, not by partisan or irresponsible hearsay, but by quotations from Catholic firsthand sources bearing the *imprimatur* of the hierarchy. More than that, the manuscript has been scrutinized by a panel of experts including such men as Professor George La Piana of Harvard, Giovanni Pioli of Milan (former vice-rector of the Propaganda Pontifical College for Roman Catholic Missions). The result is a sober but terrific stream of seemingly irrefutable facts. The author does not attempt to sway his

readers by partisan bias or eloquence. He presents his facts and leaves his reader in the good old American way to reach his own conclusions.

The picture he draws is one which will be hard to ignore or to forget. In thirteen chapters he sets forth what may well be called—the phrase is mine, not his—the American peril, that is, the constant and calculated attempt of the Roman hierarchy to superimpose its foreign and mediæval structure upon the American way of life. The peril is not from individual Catholics or even from many of the priests themselves. Had the former a voice, they would undoubtedly protest against many of the abuses to which they are subject; were the latter free to express themselves without fear of reparation, they, too, would oppose many of the absurd and vicious edicts and demands under which they suffer. But that is the point. The people have no voice whatsoever. Literally they do not own one brick in any church, cathedral, parochial school, or hospital. They have no slightest voice as to who shall be their priest, their bishop, or their children's teachers. They are told what to do, what to pay, and they do it or else. All the decisions are made in Rome; but the money flows out from America to perpetuate a system which is opposed in essence to almost all for which our nation stands.

The chapters devoted to education—the cold-blooded and inexorable attempt to destroy the public-school system—are among the most important in the book. It is hard to see how his evidence can be refuted or explained away. Brick by brick he has built a structure which should give us pause and make us hesitate to play into the hand of the adversary by our own ill-advised prating about the godless and secular educational system. The author is fundamentally correct in his repeated insistence that the outcome of the struggle between American democracy and the Catholic hierarchy depends upon the survival and expansion of the public school. The greatest menace, correspondingly, lies in the un-American, divisive, and often subversive parochial schools, where in addition to notoriously low standards the emphasis is constant and hostile to what Americans have long considered their genius and their security.

Another devastating section is that concerning the church and medicine, the subordination of surgeons and doctors to the dictates of the priests who can and do constantly hamper and endanger the health and even life of patients by their arbitrary and unwarranted interference in realms where at best they are incompetent. It will be a good experience for Protestant women—especially those of the more liberal type who deplore intolerance and who are inclined to prefer to ignore Catholic bigotry and arrogance and to hope that in the future all will be well in consequence of living sweetly with their Catholic friends—to read the sections having to do with the approved and required homicidal Catholic doctrine and practice that the life of a mother in childbirth must always be sacrificed to avoid therapeutic abortion; that "an innocent fetus *an hour old* may not be directly killed to save the lives of all the mothers in the world." And let her read the quoted excerpts from the approved handbooks for Catholic nurses insisting upon baptism by stealth of babes—born and unborn—of non-Catholic mothers who chance to be in a Catholic hospital.

Again the sections having to do with sex, birth control, and eugenics will make revealing reading. The implacable hatred of planned parenthood, the hostility to all attempts to make possible scientific instruction concerning sexual problems and venereal disease—these are not easily forgotten. It will be hard to minimize the evidence, for it is buttressed sentence by sentence by the authoritative utterances of clerical dignitaries, all approved and bearing the episcopal *imprimatur*.

The utterly arrogant attitude of the hierarchy to marriage and divorce, as it

affects non-Catholics, may be reasonably well known to the average reader. It is safe to say, however, that he will learn considerable with regard to the church's position to the laws of the land in these respects and what would happen were the Catholic minority to become the dominant factor. Again the scandalous situation of annulments, the financial elements involved in holy matrimony, especially if one of the faithful is so insane as to wish to marry a Jew—these pretty important matters may not be quite so well known; but they should be.

I have already referred to the section on censorship and boycott. The chapters are well worth careful reading and study. Read what happened to the San Francisco *News* for printing a brief news item saying that a Roman Catholic priest had been arrested for drunken driving with a woman companion and had pleaded guilty and had been fined $250 in Madera, California. Read the matter-of-fact point-by-point description of how effectively to terrorize any editor with the spectre of Catholic indignation. The description is not the brain child of Mr. Blanshard but is outlined by Father Mullaly in the Jesuit magazine *America*. Before considering the attempts of the Legion of Decency noble efforts to prevent the public wearing of "translucent drawers," read the evidence, and you will likely agree that "Catholic Political and Doctrinal Censorship" would be a fairer name for the movement.

"Fascism, Communism and Labor" is a chapter that may well be pondered, especially by those who deplore doing anything at this time which might rock the boat. Are we not confronted by the great spectre of communism? Is not the Roman Catholic Church dedicated to this battle? Probably many readers will be less sure of themselves after studying Mr. Blanshard's arguments. The chapter, "The Catholic Plan for America," may seem to some at first a bit fantastic. If they know history, their confidence may be lessened as they read. The final chapter, with its sensible, unecstatic, solid suggestions for what he styles a "resistance movement" to prevent the hierarchy from imposing its social policies upon our schools, hospitals, government, and family organizations, may be studied with profit.

And so I end where I began. This is a tremendously important book. It is not intended for bigots or for enemies of the Catholic *people*. It has no slightest interest in curtailing the rights of the Catholic Church as a *religious institution*. It is, however, a hard-hitting, honest, and devastating attack on the antidemocratic social policies of this essentially foreign and mediæval hierarchy and a challenge to every thinking man and woman—Catholic and non-Catholic alike—to fight against every intolerant or separatist or un-American feature of their policies.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

*Faith and History: A Comparison of Christian and Modern Views of History*, by Reinhold Niebuhr, New York, Scribner, 1949, pp. ix, 257, $3.50.

Needless to say, Reinhold Niebuhr is the most widely read theologian in America, and one of the most influential in the world. A Gifford lecturer, the absence of whose name from a single issue of *Time* causes a reader to write a wail of complaint, he cannot be brushed off as of no consequence merely because you and I may find him in error at certain points. The subject which he has chosen for his new book is in the very centre of modern thought. How can we face history and keep our faith? What does Christian faith make of history? What a combination! The central problem of modern tragedy and despair treated by the central theologian of modern America!

The argument turns, as the subtitle suggests, on the contrast between the Chris-

tian and the modern view of history. The "modern view" is that history itself is the redeemer (see p. 34). This is Niebuhr's way of expressing the idea that man can help himself to progress, and unless he helps himself, he is helpless. The Christian view is that history is an inadequate Christ, that man's history is a history of guilt, and that meaning can be found only in repentance. Only after repentance is man able to receive the Christian revelation (p. 140). This revelation is not a "rationally compelling philosophy of history"; it is rather "a faith prompted by repentance."

The argument of the book does not advance by clear, logical steps. It does not pretend to be logical. Rather, the thought is to be compared with the onward sweep of a river, with eddies, backwaters, rapids, shallows, and falls—the waters now clear, now muddy—yet all moving in the general direction of the sea.

The reader will justly expect much from the scholarly, brilliant, transparently sincere author. But he should not expect too much; for example, he should not expect an actual analysis of empirical history. Save for some biblical and recent history, there is a shortage of historical facts. Nor should he expect a wrestle with the many criticisms which Niebuhr has received. Niebuhr is superbly indifferent to his critics. Again, he should not expect an interpretation of relations between earthly history and life after death. References to the resurrection are vague and taken in an almost Pickwickian sense (pp. 150, 214). Nor should he look for a victory of God in history. The triumph of Christ in history as adumbrated in Rev. 11:15 is taken, it is true, to mean that "the goodness of Christ must be embodied in the stuff of history" (p. 213). But this embodiment is a "contradiction" of history and is due to "divine mercy" rather than to "human achievement." The idea of "fellow laborers together with God" quite vanishes, and human effort seems all but futile. Little positive emphasis on love is to be found, despite its fairly frequent mention (*e.g.* p. 174). The Sermon on the Mount, the Good Samaritan, and even the Prodigal Son—these have little place here.

In fact so much that has hitherto been supposed (at least by American Christians) to be the very warp and woof of Christianity is missing or even denied, that one is tempted to call Niebuhr's a philosophy of fatalism which out-Calvins Calvin. One is not at all surprised to read at the start (p. 18): "Contemporary experience represents a *nemesis* which is justly proportioned in its swiftness and enormity to the degree of *hybris* which had expressed itself in modern life." Here Hellenic fatalism seems almost to obscure Christian faith. The same note is repeated near the end (p. 230).

Yet there is too much sincere Christianity and rich variety in the book to dispose of it under any one category. Niebuhr is, indeed, true to his fundamental convictions. But he has fresh, sometimes surprising, and sometimes contradictory things to say, a few of which will be briefly summarized here.

A personalist welcomes the references in the book to the "total personality." Niebuhr is often inclined to think of reason in the abstract or of guilt in the abstract. Here, however, he speaks of "social wisdom," which involves "the whole of man in the unity of his being." The self is both creature and creator of history (p. 12). This line of thought is in welcome contrast to the fatalistic current mentioned above; and "the unique capacities of human personality" (p. 58) are rightly made the basis for criticism of the Greek cyclical view of history. The unity of personality is the basis for response to Christ (p. 142).

The reader is accustomed to Niebuhr's attacks on "the pride of reason" and its inadequacy for coping with revelation. Similar views occur often enough in this

book. Niebuhr finds "no rational solution" of creation (p. 50); and faith challenges "the self-sufficiency of human reason" (p. 145). The divine mystery is "impenetrable by human reason"—yet at the same time the revelation as historical drama and as person makes history "potentially meaningful." It is true that Niebuhr does not define carefully for his readers the distinction between the reason that fails and the meaning that prevails. When he is speaking of the former, he often sounds like an irrationalist. When he is developing the latter, he often avows meaning and coherence just like any Hegelian rationalist. For example: "human thought and action are not possible in chaos, but only in a system of coherence" (p. 37). This concept of coherence is treated on pp. 50-52, almost in Blanshard's manner, as generating "little islands of meaning . . . related to larger and larger realms of coherence." In fact, "the Christian philosophy of history is rational, therefore, only in the sense that it is possible to prove that alternatives to it fail to do justice to all aspects of human experience" (p. 138; *cf.* p. 141). Why the pejorative "only"? What more could reason want? Niebuhr is also among the prophets of reason!

When, however, Niebuhr treats the crucial problem of freedom, the common reader finds himself in a quandary. It is clear that the author does not wish us to find the meaning of history in the advance of freedom, in view of the sins and abuses generated by freedom. But when the reader asks the author what manner of thing this delusive freedom is, he is not rewarded by a completely definite answer. Human freedom is unique, but not absolute (p. 56); so far, so good. History must have some meaning beyond what man can give it (freely) by developing rational structures (p. 57). Still good. Man's conquest of nature produces patterns which "dwarf the human will" (p. 83). Who can deny this, remembering Hiroshima? Even so, "our contemporary situation, while desperate, is not a hopeless one" (p. 79). Thank God! There is hope for freedom still.

Now, once more, what is freedom? "The self finds itself free; but, as Augustine suggested, not free to do good" (p. 94). Here the Augustinian view is frankly avowed. Yet, on the opposite page (p. 95), one reads of "the ridiculous denial of a unique freedom in human life and of a consequent responsibility and guilt in human action," and of "praise or blame." If Augustine be right, freedom merits blame, but never praise; here, it merits both.

We have in this book a theological philosophy of history. Ethical considerations recede in the presence of the transcendent and mysterious. "The drama," we are told, "is, in essence, not so much a contest between good and evil forces as a contest between all men and God" (p. 125). Such a statement is polyvalent, to say the least. True it is that all men have sinned. But is there no difference among sinners? Are not repentant sinners, men of good will and Christian charity, working with God rather than against him? Niebuhr's utterance, taken strictly, is antinomian, and runs counter to the ethical teachings of the prophets, of Jesus, and of Paul himself. Were St. Paul, St. Francis, Martin Luther, John Wesley, Gandhi, and Rufus M. Jones all engaged in a war against God? If ethical distinctions among men are relatively unimportant, why has Christian teaching emphasized them so much?

For Niebuhr, the "goodness of Christ" can "become the completion of history only by divine mercy rather than by human achievement" (p. 213). Such an assertion is very strongly on the Augustinian side, and denies all human will for good. Niebuhr is very much afraid of all perfectionist doctrines. He forgets that, if man is uniquely free, God cannot make man good without man's free coöperation, any more than man can be free in a vacuum without God's merciful and effective coöperation.

Error does not lie in human striving for perfection in history; error lies rather in Niebuhr's forgetfulness of the religious dignity of human will. "Choose ye this day whom ye shall serve. . . . If any man willeth to do his will, he shall know."

When Niebuhr concedes the place of love in Christianity, he feels constrained to call it a "scandal" in the field of ethics (p. 171), although Immanuel Kant conceived his categorical imperative as a rational statement of the golden rule. Be that as it may, if there is an ethics of "sacrificial suffering and self-giving love," one would suppose that it is to some slight extent an expression of free will, or else it is devoid of ethical value. Niebuhr does not grapple with such questions.

The discussion of other philosophies of history is sometimes very cavalier. Hegel and Comte (pp. 108-109) are disposed of in ten lines. Toynbee is treated more respectfully. It is doubtless an advantage to have a book which develops one view constructively without too many skirmishes with the enemy. It is sin, pride, human self-centredness, that Niebuhr is concerned to attack, rather than this or that theory. Such narrowness of method enhances intensity.

There are some pretty bad typographical errors, which should be noted without any attempt to assign the blame for them. *"Duré"* (for *durée*) appears consistently (pp. 30, 43, 249). "De civitas dei" (p. 50, n. 20), "casuality" (p. 92), "periphera" (p. 96), "perfectability" (p. 157), "proletariats (p. 210), and the book of "Revelations" (p. 226, but correct on p. 245) speak for themselves. The hybrid "ahistorical" is an *adatum* in some lexica, such as Webster's. "Judgement," with British *e,* is questionable taste in an American book.

To have the reviewer's colleague, Dean *emeritus* Albert Cornelius Knudson, boiled down to "Dean A. Knudson" (pp. 177, 252) is careless; and the context in which he is mentioned is one which should lead Niebuhr to think twice. Dr. Knudson, it seems, was embarrassed because the ethic of the Sermon on the Mount seems to "negate the right to self-defense." At least Dr. Knudson was embarrassed. The vigorous militarism of Dr. Niebuhr suggests that he might well have been somewhat more embarrassed.

No review can cover all of the issues raised in this brilliant and paradoxical volume. Those who are smugly content or who are asleep in Zion may well leave it alone. Those who are willing to learn, whether through agreement or disagreement, will be stirred to thought by every chapter of this provocative—and sometimes provoking—book.

EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN

*A Short History of the Middle East,* by George E. Kirk, Washington, Public Affairs Press, ©1949, pp. 301, $3.75.

This short history of the Middle East begins with the rise of Islam at the beginning of the seventh century and brings the story of the historic lands adjacent to the east and south of the Mediterranean up to 1948. In earlier days it was customary to call these areas the Near East, but during the second world war the British forces stationed in Egypt were designated the Middle East Command, and so Near East appears to be yielding to Middle East as a geographical designation. This account therefore deals with Arabia and the Arabic-speaking lands on its northern border, Iraq and North Africa, as well as Asia Minor and Persia. The importance which this part of the world has assumed during our time is ample justification for the appearance of a book which attempts to make events there intelligible, and this history is especially welcome because of the spirit of fairness and objectivity with which it presents the complicated problems. Whether dealing with

the history of struggles between Moslems and Christians, American and British foreign policy, or the struggle of Zionists to transform Palestine into a Jewish state, the author has no ax to grind, but as an honest and experienced woodsman he drives home his skillful and effective blows, allowing the chips to fall where they will.

Naturally, the most interesting part of the book is that which analyzes the present situation in the Middle East, but the story of the rise and decline of the Moslem civilization and the Ottoman and Persian empires provides a readable and helpful background. The Moslems receive a sympathetic treatment, and one gains a heightened respect for them. The traditional Christian account that Moslem conquerors gave conquered Christians and Jews the choice only of conversion to Islam or the sword, writes the author, is totally erroneous. On the contrary, the general policy of the Moslems was to permit conquered religious minorities to continue to live under their own religious and civil law, and to retain in Moslem hands only the military administration. One reason for this was that Moslems appear to have developed little aptitude for government. Another and probably more effective reason was that only non-Moslems had to pay taxes. The more non-Moslems in a country, the greater the source of taxation. "The conquered peoples were regularly employed in commerce and industry, banking, the arts, as architects, engineers, and irrigation-specialists, as schoolmasters and secretaries, even as court physicians and political advisers." Nevertheless, there were temporary lapses from this tolerant policy on the part of certain fanatical Moslem regimes, as in the case of the Almohades dynasty in Spain during the twelfth century.

One of the greatest contributions of Arabs to the world was the older learning of Greeks and Romans at a time when Western Europe was still ignorant of it; yet the Moslems themselves were able to add little to that which they had received. The Moslem mind, like the Hebrew, was focused mainly on God rather than on man; so there was little interest in science as such, but much in religion. The Al Azhar University at Cairo was founded in 972 and the University of Bagdad in A.D. 1066.

The Ottoman Turks must have been one of the oddest peoples of the Near East. They were good soldiers, but rapacious and inefficient in administration, and victims of a pompous vanity. Until around 1830 a foreign ambassador was kept waiting on a bench in a courtyard at the temperamental pleasure of the grand vizir, who would finally introduce him to the sultan as "the naked and hungry barbarian who has ventured to rub his brow upon the Sublime Porte!"

A notable characteristic of our times is the rise of ardent nationalisms in all parts of the Middle East, but the struggles for independence have not met with a great measure of success up to the present time. Political independence is a very relative term in that area. Turkey and Iran have achieved the largest measure of independence; then come Saudi Arabia and Yemen; Egypt and Iraq are still held in line by Britain, and the same is true of Transjordan. Palestine has been a British mandate up to its ambiguous situation at present. The other North African countries have been colonies of France, Italy, or England. Lebanon and Syria have struggled in vain to throw off French rule. For a half century also Germany and Russia have kept a wary and covetous eye on these lands and laid plans to get footholds there, but up to the present without important success. The economic and educational improvement which European nations have brought to their subject peoples of the Near East has in turn kindled fires of political unrest and complicated the problems of government.

The phenomenal growth of Jewish Zionism in the modern world has created one of the most difficult problems that the Near East has ever had to face. The fanatical antisemitism of Hitler gave a tremendous impetus to this development. All over the world Jews have become fearful of their security and have turned with pathetic fervor to the fantastic dream that a Jewish state in tiny Palestine, with its slight natural resources exhausted by the wars of three thousand years, can solve their problems. The irresponsibility of American politicians who have encouraged this unrealistic venture in order to get Jewish votes is in no small measure the cause of what is taking place. Zionists themselves have resorted to all the methods of propaganda and violence of the totalitarian dictators to achieve their ends.

Another complicating factor in the politics of the Middle East is oil. Russia owns nine per cent of the world's oil. American, British, and Dutch interests control eighty-six per cent. Thirty per cent of the world's total oil reserves are said to lie in South Persia and the Persian Gulf area. Britain has long been the dominant power in these regions, but in recent decades the United States has been playing an ever more decisive rôle there. The trend of our commercial interests as well as our foreign policy at present is to share control of these fields with Britain, if not to supplant her. As Britain was so greatly weakened in the last war, it now looks as if the United States might consider it necessary to play a leading rôle in the Middle East even in a military sense.

A final mighty factor in the Middle East today is the emergence of Russian communism with its dynamic forces of world revolution and its seductive promise of better times for the poverty-stricken masses of the Orient. Russia desperately needs Middle East oil and naturally she hopes that political and military victories in the Near East, like those she is now winning in China, will one day bring that oil within her reach.

S. VERNON MC CASLAND

*Hasidism,* by Martin Buber, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1948, pp. ix, 208, $3.75.

For more than forty years Martin Buber has been the most eloquent and most effective interpreter of Hasidism, a pietistic movement that assumed definite form among the Jews of Galicia and neighboring provinces in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Although for the next century and a half Hasidism was regarded with disfavor by the other two great schools of traditional Judaism, the Talmudists and the Maskilim (those oriented toward Western culture), it has recently found admirers not only among Jewish theologians of all schools but also among Christian theologians, including so influential a religious philosopher as Paul Tillich. Through a regrettable oversight Aldous Huxley has failed to include Hasidism in his anthology of mystical thought, *The Perennial Philosophy.* For this rehabilitation of Hasidism Buber is more fully responsible than any other Jewish thinker. To those readers who wish to have an adequate exposition of Buber's contributions to modern Jewish theology the reviewer would recommend the recent study by Professor Joseph Blau, "Martin Buber's Religious Philosophy," *Review of Religion,* XIII (1948-1949), pp. 48-64.

The present volume is made up of seven essays, previously published in German or Hebrew; four of them were previously translated into English and published in the volume of essays entitled *Mamre* (Melbourne University Press, 1946). Although *Hasidism* is not a new book or produced *aus einem Guss,* it has a remarkable unity and continuity, and will serve very well as a summary of this notable religious movement as well as a condensed interpretation of Buber's own philosophy of religion.

Since it is impossible within the limits of space suggested to the reviewer to write a detailed criticism of this work, it seems best to single out those passages which most impressively illustrate Buber's insight into the nature of Hasidism and its relations to Judaism and to other mystical traditions. Almost all of the passages to be cited seem to the reviewer to be both profound and essentially true; he will therefore content himself with two introductory critical remarks. One is that Buber has not quite fairly balanced the sociological against the spiritual factors in his account of the origins of Hasidism, although he has shown himself to be aware of the existence of the former. The other is that he has not been fully conscious of the extent to which both Hasidism and his own theology have been influenced by Christianity. With these two reservations the reviewer would like to present what seem to him the most illuminating and challenging observations made by Buber.

In the chapter, "The Beginnings of Hasidism," the author convincingly shows that Hasidism is an intensification of one of the most pervasive attitudes of Judaism. "That the togetherness of man with God, who 'dwells with them in the midst of their uncleanness' purifies and hallows all; that man must serve God with the evil impulse too; that the redemption overcomes the division between clean and unclean, holy and profane; that *all* becomes pure and holy—this we must regard as an autochthonous possession of the Jewish faith."

One of the most vulnerable elements in Hasidism is the institution of Zaddikim, the spiritual leaders of small groups of Hasidim, who enjoy enormous prestige in the community. Even in this sphere, unfortunately, Lord Acton's principle seems to hold, for even spiritual power, like secular power, can and does corrupt. Buber does not deny this but is more concerned to define the religious significance of the idea than the concrete manifestation of the Zaddikim. "These men mediated between God and man, but at the same time they insisted on the importance of the immediate relationship to God, which cannot be replaced by any mediator."

In tracing the relation of Hasidism to preceding movements, such as the religious excitement attendant upon the appearance of the pseudo Messiah Sabbetai Zevi in the seventeenth century, Buber remarks, in the second essay, "The Foundation Stone," that "The Sabbatian theology preached the conquest of sin through the holy; now the demonic character of this preaching is shown by the simple Hasidic commandment that penetrated the heart of the simple believer, the commandment to do all that he does with the whole of his being. For sin is just this, what man cannot by its very nature do with his whole being; it is possible to silence the conflict in the soul, but it is not possible to uproot it."

One of the most perceptive studies in the book, "The Spirit of the Hasidic Movement," traces the development of certain mystical concepts formulated in early rabbinic and in mediæval kabbalistic literature, and shows how they were subtly transformed by the genius of the less scholastic and less esoteric Hasidic teachers. "Hasidism took over two traditions and united them without essentially adding anything to them beyond a new light and a new strength; they were, that tradition of religious commandments which is, next to the Vedic sacrificial teachings, the most gigantic construction of spiritual precepts—the ritual formation of Judaism; and that tradition of religious science which is second only to gnosis in image-making power, and superior to it in systematisation—the Kabbalah. The two traditions were naturally in personal union with each other in the kabbalists but they did not experience the full union of one reality of life and community, until they were taken up into Hasidism."

As a striking illustration of the Hasidic genius in transforming simple legends

into profound theology, Buber cites their use of the Enoch-Metatron theme. " 'Enoch was a cobbler; with each stitch of his awl that drew together the top and bottom leather, he joined God and His Shekhinah.' Hasidic teaching loved to vary this strange contribution of the legend of the patriarch, who was favored with divine companionship, and was taken away from this earth to undergo the transformation into Metatron with his demiurgic powers, the fire-bodied 'Prince of the Countenance.' For the legend expresses by its image, which keeps so close to the earth, what is the essential point to Hasidism, that man exerts influence on the eternal, and that this is not done by any special works, but by the intention with which he does all his works. It is the teaching of the hallowing of the everyday."

In the fourth essay on Spinoza, Sabbetai Zevi, and the Baalshem (the founder of Hasidism) Buber daringly and inspiringly struggles with three great themes: union of man with God, free will and grace, continuous as opposed to unique redemption. "The original evil of all 'religion,' the separation of 'living in God' from 'living in the world' is overcome in the Hasidic message, and a true, concrete unity takes its place; moreover, the Hasidic message gives also the answer to that false mastering of the distinction between God and man which consists in an abstract abolition of it." . . . "It would be senseless to try to measure how great is man's part in the redemption of the world. There is not any part that belongs to God; there is no 'as far as here' and there is no 'from there on'; there is nothing here that can be measured and weighed. This applies to all human life and perhaps to all life of the created world; it is senseless to ask how far my action reaches, and where God's grace begins; there is no common border-line; what concerns me alone, before I bring something about, is my action, and what concerns me alone, when the action is successfully done, is God's grace. The one is no less real than the other, and neither is a part cause." . . . "The Hasidic message of redemption should be understood in connection with the attitude of the Baalshem to redemption. It rises against the messianic self-differentiation between one man and other men, between one age and other ages, between one act and other acts. To the whole of mankind is given the power to co-operate, all ages stand immediately face to face with redemption, all action for God's sake may be called messianic action. But only unpremeditated action can be action for God's sake."

Most regretfully the reviewer, nearing the prescribed limit of this critical notice, must conclude his scant selection of memorable passages with Buber's masterly characterization of Hasidic sacramentalism in his study, "Symbolical and Sacramental Existence in Judaism." "The great movement of which I speak, the Hasidic movement, arose two centuries ago in a dark corner of Eastern Europe, and there—degenerated, but still able to be regenerated—it remained. But the movement must be taken up into the history of religion as an incomparable attempt to rescue the sacramental life of man from being corrupted by facile routine. To Hasidic pansacramentalism the holy in things is not, as it is to primitive pansacramentalism, a force which one takes possession of, a power which one can overpower, but it is laid in the things as sparks, and waits for its liberation and fulfilment through the human being who gives himself completely. The man of sacramental existence is not a magician; he does not merely put himself at stake on it; he exercises no power, but a service, the service; he gives himself really and unreservedly. He gives himself up in service, that is to say, every time anew . . . and there is no not-holy, there is only that which has not yet been hallowed, which has not yet been redeemed to its holiness, that which he shall hallow."

RALPH MARCUS

*Kingship and the Gods: a Study of Ancient Near Eastern Religion as the Integration of Society & Nature,* by H. Frankfort, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, ©1948, pp. xxiii, 444, $5.

This book is a delight to read. Yet, a reviewer who would be fair must approach his task with despair. Ostensibly the volume deals with a single concept, kingship as it is related to the gods; actually—as its subtitle indicates—the study encompasses many phases of life in the ancient Near East. Merely to mention the subjects treated in detail—there are sixty-six pages of footnotes—would quickly exhaust the space allowed for the review.

The author is a well-known archæologist, who has worked extensively in both Egypt and Mesopotamia. He has long been a student of the art and culture of these two regions. From this more technical interest in the minutiæ of the cultural pattern of the ancient Near East he has now turned to the task of interpreting the thought of the two major areas of civilization, Egypt and Mesopotamia. Professor Frankfort has had to rely upon his former colleague, Thorkild Jacobsen, for the translation of many of the cuneiform texts; in the field of Egyptian literature he disavows a knowledge which would entitle him to independent judgment of moot points of grammar. This latter deficiency is filled by the expert help of a competent Egyptologist, John A. Wilson. As a result of this collaboration on the part of an extremely able archæologist, a cuneiformist, and an Egyptologist, there has come a volume which is rich with insights and observations about ancient life. Yet another source has been utilized. Frequent reference is made to customs and practices found among modern East African peoples, the successors of the ancient Hamites. This illuminating evidence reveals a wide knowledge of the anthropological literature from this area.

The first half of the book deals with the institution of kingship in Egypt. Here kingship was ordained by the gods from the very beginning and lay, throughout all periods of Egyptian history, at the very core of religion. The very earliest evidence makes clear that the pharaoh was essentially divine, a god incarnate. Frankfort discusses in great detail the festivals and ceremonies which took place at all the important phases of the king's life, and attempts to get at the way of thinking which characterized the observers at these significant occasions. Particularly interesting is his schematization of Egyptian religion. From the religious texts he concludes that there are three areas of special importance as manifestations of the divine: "the power in the sun, the power in the earth, and the power in that class of animals which formed early man's most precious possession—cattle." Further, the divine power in the sun is associated with creation; the divine power in the earth, with resurrection; and the divine power in the cattle, primarily with procreation. On the basis of these generalizations Frankfort finds in Egyptian religious texts not a chaos but a license to speak of Egyptian religion as a "distinctive creed." With a chapter on each of these phases of divine manifestations, Frankfort closes his section on Egypt.

Evidence from Mesopotamia indicates that there kingship was something quite different. Originally there was a kind of "primitive democracy" which served as a means for the ordering of society. Under pressure of the necessity for quick and decisive action this institution gave way to kingship, but the latter remained as a limited institution which differed essentially from the divinely instituted counterpart in Egypt. In the Tigris-Euphrates area only a few kings were considered divine; generally the monarch was thought of as the "great man." A search for what the people of Mesopotamia thought about kingship leads the author into a discussion of creation, of divination, of the celebration of festivals, and of a number of subjects, which, in our departmentalized way of thinking, would seem quite remote from the

subject of the study. So broad is the base of the inquiry that the section on Mesopotamia will serve for the student as an introduction to Mesopotamian life and thought.

The final eight pages constitute an epilogue on the Hebrews. Unfortunately, this brief section is not characterized by the same thoroughgoing review of the evidence as was detailed for the other two areas. For this reason the generalizations which are presented here with regard to the essential differences between kingship in Israel and elsewhere are less convincing. While students of Hebrew thought may enter a demurrer at many points to the conclusions within these eight pages, most of them will be grateful for the stimulation which Professor Frankfort supplies by attempting a comparison of the ideas which prevailed in the three areas.

This illuminating study by Professor Frankfort of an important concept of ancient Near Eastern life will prove to be of interest and use to all those who are concerned with the history and development of ideas. Unfortunately, it may lend itself to abuse by those whose purpose is polemical and whose practice it is to quote theories as gospel. To make such a use of some of the conclusions of this study would do great disservice to the true purpose of the work which Professor Frankfort has made available to all students of the ancient world.

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

*What Can We Believe?* by Vergilus Ferm, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1948, pp. xi, 211, $3.

This, I think is a most important book and should be widely read by all people honestly concerned with the problems of religion and who have honest doubts and fears about their religion and belief. In it Professor Ferm meets squarely the many questions that arise to perplex us and makes an exhaustive attempt to find an answer that will satisfy all of us. That is, of course, if you are one of those who are not just looking for a formula or creedal statement that will fit any and all cases.

It is clearly written and for me leaves no doubt about what he has to say and the way he wants to say it; I am particularly pleased with the absence of footnotes, which for me often break the thread of thought and retard my progress. I like the method he uses when there could be more than one interpretation of the meaning of the word he has used; in these cases he uses a parenthesis to make absolutely clear his meaning, as, for example, in a sentence taken from chapter xiii: "The practice of such type of thinking will give one the eery feeling of the transcendental (transcendental, that is, beyond the physical level); and it will not be long before one, thus acquainted with his real self, will catch the gleam; that our Destiny reaches out and out and out and beyond and beyond and beyond."

He insists on a firmly grounded belief that is developed only on carefully worked-out convictions, but he also insists that there are at least two sides to every question raised. However, we do not get final answers here, rather beliefs that seem to us, at this stage of our development and experience, most adequate now, and, of course, subject to revision in the light of our latest information and experience. We are, after all, not gods but finite beings and therefore limited. A clear statement is made of many of the ideas which stand in the way of belief, such as the traditional concepts of God, heaven, hell, rewards and punishments. He pleads for a stimulating type of church service and a first-class type of adult class to help people reframe antiquated ideas when they have so little time and discipline to think through for themselves the questions which arise in connection with the great

themes about the universe. This, I think, is a longfelt need that our clergy are not filling. Many are saying that their congregations are not yet at the point where they would accept this or that, and take refuge in some ritual which has little or no meaning for themselves or their congregation.

I was particularly interested and impressed by the discussion and diagram in the chapter entitled, "What Can We Believe about Religion?" Here he asks the question, "Am I religious?" and uses concentric circles labeled: 1. Some things matter to me. 2. Some things matter most to me. 3. Some things I find ought to matter most for me in the long run of things. 4. Some things which I find ought to matter most for me, do matter so much that they reach beyond my sphere to an ulterior—they affect a destiny. The answer, then, is: Yes, if I fulfill all conditions.

I was also greatly interested in his analysis of the institutional church and its place in the scheme of things and in the conclusion he reaches that while we can not have perfection we could have great reform. "The possibility of the realization of objectives beyond the abilities of a single individual as in any other social unit is the function of the institutional church," says Dr. Ferm, and I heartily agree. It may fail here and there, but it has potentialities for power which the individual as such cannot bring to bear. He brings out many other values which I have not the space here to mention and which should not be excerpted but read in their entirety.

I will, however, mention some of the reforms which he proposes: There should be adequate support of two ministers, who should be on the same level—that is, not one as assistant but both equal in all things. One is to do the preaching, the other the pastoral work. It should have a director of religious education, adequately trained and with a qualified degree, to run the Sunday school as a part, and highly effective part, of the whole program. It should also have an administrator who is not a minister, but a salaried executive, who would manage the finance and business details and so free the ministers to perform their specialized functions.

These are specific things and, to my mind, would be of great benefit to our institutional churches. They are, however, although important, secondary to the great "message" of this book which is, as I see it, an honest and sincere effort to help us to come to grips with our beliefs and our lives in terms of religion and God. There are no easy answers; he insists that only our experience is valid. Man is man and cannot be expected to be God; always is he seeking for the higher and better as opposed to the lower and worse. He does not always reach them; usually it is only after many stumbles and falls, for he does not have a direct line to the Almighty but must follow a zigzag and often obscure course. He is helped in many ways by the valid experiences of those who have traveled this way before, but is ever at grips with his own world and time—limited, but always striving.

I think that it is not too much to say that this is modern "scripture."

JOHN L. CLAYTON, JR.

*The Book of the Twelve Prophets:* Volume I—Amos, Hosea and Micah, by Julius A. Bewer, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. 79, fifty cents.

The text of three of the Minor Prophets is given here in the King James Version—a translation made more than three hundred years ago. To each of the three books is attached a short introduction written by Professor Bewer. It is as though the reader has said to the editor, "Tell me in ten minutes all I need to know about this

book." The reply is a highly compressed essay displaying unobtrusively the results of several hundred years of criticism by scores of scholars. These introductory essays will bear careful reading and rereading. Approximately one fourth of each page of text is given over to footnotes in smaller type. This feature, too, is a happy compression of *multum in parvo*. Unfamiliar names and places are explained, cross references are listed, better translations are suggested, so that the interested reader is saved the effort of looking into a dictionary of the Bible and much labor with a commentary. Much of the pedantry, so frequently tolerated in a commentary, is happily excluded. Succinct notes have displaced long and sometimes tedious discussions of complicated problems. No credit is given to the former commentators or the originators of the emendations, a detail which is not likely to interest the average reader of the volume.

The criticism offered in the introductions and in the footnotes is pertinent and honest. Attention is called to the results of literary criticism. Changes in the text are proposed. Admission is frequently made that additions were made to the prophetic writings long after the prophet's death. For example, the editor is frank in admitting that Amos 2:4-5 is "probably an insertion by a Judean editor who missed Judah in the list of the nations. . . ." Yet, in his comment on Amos 1:6-8, he does not suggest that this oracle may have been inserted after Amos' day; he merely calls attention to the omission of Gath from the Philistine pentapolis without noting that Gath was destroyed in 711 B.C. Perhaps this is a becoming conservatism in a place where the limitations of space rule out the giving of reasons. On the whole, the notes at the bottom of the pages constitute a most useful commentary, one designed especially for the general reader. There is no pulling of punches, or fear of giving offense to those prejudiced by widespread beliefs in infallibility. Yet the criticism is sensitive and reverent.

With all the above to be said on the credit side of the ledger, I feel obliged to raise one question with regard to this otherwise admirable work. What is to be gained by the use of the King James Version in a Bible designed for study? As the editor states in his Preface, this version has become "a part of the life of English-speaking people," yet one wonders if this homage to an archaic literary form, even at the cost of accuracy in meaning at many points, is worth the paying. Is it not possible, even likely, that the average reader may think that the translation found in the larger-point text is really more authoritative than the italicized suggestions in a small font at the bottom of the page? For example, in Amos 4:3 the larger print of the text has, "And ye shall go out at the breaches, every cow at that which is before her; and ye shall cast them into the palace." In the footnote, however, Bewer says to read in its place: "ye shall be forced to go out at the breaches, everyone straight before her and ye shall be cast upon the dunghill." This latter translation, one of many possible suggestions, is in line with the better translations of the past seventy-five years. Yet, because of the prominence given to the King James Version the reader may be led to think that the passage does contain some reference to a cow and to a palace. Neither is referred to in the Hebrew text. Many other examples could be given—especially in Hosea—in which the better understanding of the Hebrew text is to be found on the less prominent part of the page.

This modestly priced booklet of three Minor Prophets will be used widely in classes for Bible study, as it well deserves to be. This reviewer sincerely hopes that the same level of scholarship may be maintained in the subsequent volumes of Harper's Annotated Bible Series, of which this is the first issue.

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

*Jesus, Son of Man,* by George S. Duncan, New York, Macmillan, 1949, pp. xvi, 290, $3.50.

This new treatment of the exceedingly complex problems involved in attempting to understand the personality of Jesus, by the principal of St. Mary's College and Regius Professor of biblical criticism in the University of St. Andrews, is written with an uncommon measure of originality and insight. It sets many aspects of the question in new perspectives which throw light on the story of Jesus. The comprehensive study deals in turn with the historical problem, the person of Jesus, and Jesus and the church.

The author is fully conversant with the historical and literary criticism of the gospels that European scholars have produced and he makes a judicious use of both documentary and form analysis, although there is little evidence of acquaintance with American scholarship in these fields. The book maintains the European tradition of self-sufficiency in this respect.

The main thesis of the book is touched upon in the statement that although the disciples of Jesus "hailed Him as Messiah and after His death and resurrection publicly proclaimed Him as such, it was not as Messiah that He thought of Himself or directed His appeal to men. This line of argument is not to be confused with the contention which lies at the base of much 'liberal' thinking, that the faith of the disciples in the Messiahship of Jesus represents a development for which there is no adequate justification in the life of Jesus for the honours which were paid to Him in the faith of the church, but that Jesus preferred to avoid the ascription of titles to Himself, including some of those (like Messiah) which the Church rightly came to ascribe to Him."

The church was right, therefore, in regarding Jesus as the Messiah, although Jesus had not thought of himself in that rôle. Jesus chose as a title for himself instead the Son of Man, a phrase which in itself was not messianic, but meant that Jesus was the Man, that he represented the fullness of moral and spiritual development which should become the ideal and goal of all mankind. In this respect he was preëminently God's Son.

Jesus took this title from Ezekiel, where the prophet is so frequently addressed by the Lord as "son of man." Thus the view of a generation of scholars that the phrase came into the gospels out of the apocalyptic writings such as Daniel and Enoch is rejected. Jesus was no apocalyptist proclaiming the imminent coming of the Day of Judgment and the end of the age. Instead his purpose was to emphasize the right apprehension of God, on the one hand, and a grasp of the true nature of man, on the other, and to bring man into a living, redeeming fellowship with God. In line with this argument, many of the sayings of Jesus are given most suggestive interpretations.

One is left, however, with tantalizing unanswered questions, when he reaches the end of the book. What real evidence is there that Jesus drew the title, Son of Man, from Ezekiel rather than from the current apocalyptic thought? If the view is sound, why are there so few definite quotations and reflections of Ezekiel in the New Testament writings as compared with undoubted kinship with the Enoch type of writings? Is it true that *son of man* in the gospels means the ideal Man morally and spiritually? Can it be established that this was the current meaning of the term? Can it be shown, moreover, that *son of man* did not mean *Messiah?*

S. VERNON MC CASLAND

*The Cost of Discipleship,* by Dietrich Bonhoeffer, New York, Macmillan, 1949, pp. 199, $2.50.

Some thirty years ago the Oxford University Press published its "Edith Cavell Edition" of *The Imitation of Christ.* This edition is a facsimile of that belonging to Nurse Cavell, which she had with her in the prison of St. Gilles in Brussels and given to her English chaplain the night before the Germans shot her. The book carries many entries and markings in her own hand: the dates of her arrest, court-martial, sentence, and prophetically her execution "at 7 A.M. on Oct. 12, 1915." The pages of the text carry on their margin heavy lines indicating the passages which gave her spiritual companionship, comfort, and courage. Those who have and know this edition count it one of the most precious of all works of Christian devotion.

And now Dietrich Bonhoeffer's book takes its place beside that Edith Cavell *Imitation.* As authors, many of the Christian mystics practiced the cult of anonymity. It is possible that the author of the *Imitation* should be numbered in this company, since the traditional ascription to à Kempis is by no means proven, for he bids us attend to what is said and not who said it.

But in spite of this wholly laudable zeal for selflessness life cannot be wholly depersonalized and when, as in this instance, a man lays down his life for his faith his words gain the authority of his example. There is no doubt that Bonhoeffer knew only too well what he was doing when he set his face steadily to go to his death in Nazi Germany.

Bonhoeffer's own words are anticipated by a preface by Reinhold Niebuhr, a foreword by the Bishop of Chichester, and a memoir by Dr. Liebholz. Dietrich Bonhoeffer was the son of a university professor at Breslau, brought up in a liberal and humanitarian tradition. He was gay, chivalrous, and altogether lovely. He was fond of music and nature and his friends. At the age of fourteen he decided to read theology and studied at Tübingen and Berlin; in the latter place under Harnack and Lietzmann. He spent one year in this country at Union Theological Seminary where his memory will always be treasured as a very precious possession. On his return to Germany he soon gave up his academic career to become one of the leaders of the Confessional movement. Forbidden to preach in Berlin, he started a little underground seminary of his own. American friends got him out of Germany in 1939, but he insisted on going back to share the lot of his oppressed and persecuted fellow citizens, saying, "I shall have no right to participate in the reconstruction of Christian life in Germany after the war if I do not share the trials of this time with my people." As party to the plot on Hitler's life he was arrested in 1943 and as a prisoner "stood like a giant" beside and before his fellow prisoners. By special order of Himmler he was shot at the concentration camp of Flossenberg on April 9, 1945, only a few days before the camp was liberated by the Allies.

Bonhoeffer's sermons, addresses and papers, collected here, are classified under three general heads: I, Grace and Discipleship; II, The Sermon on the Mount; III, The Church of Jesus Christ and the Life of Discipleship. Niebuhr has spoken of him as a "brilliant and theologically sophisticated young man." If these chapters are sophisticated, one can only say that the world needs nothing so much as just such sophistication. Personally I should have thought of Bonhoeffer, as seen and known here, as a mature and essentially simple Christian.

He is said to have been much influenced at one time by Barth, but there is little sign of it here, or at least of many of the run-of-the-mill forms of neoörthodoxy. Brunner says that the Sermon on the Mount is nothing that we can do, only God

can do what it proposes. With such passivity Bonhoeffer has nothing to do. The injunctions of the Sermon are our obligation and our opportunity. The whole tone of the book is set in its first sentences, "Cheap grace is the deadly enemy of our Church. We are fighting today for costly grace." And again, "We Lutherans have gathered like eagles around the carcase of cheap grace." The spiritual and moral discipline which lies behind this book had already been costly, and its author had anticipated from the first what was to be the final cost of his own discipleship. The book is a challenge to orthodoxy, neoörthodoxy, and liberalism alike in its insistence upon the costliness of a truly Christian life. And in its pages we "stand on holy ground."

WILLARD L. SPERRY

*Reconstruction in Philosophy,* by John Dewey, Boston, Beacon, ©1948, pp. xlvi, 224, $2.75.

Professor Dewey has been persuaded to issue a reprinting of his lectures at the Imperial University of Japan, which were originally published under the above title in 1920 and have long been out of print. The only and interesting change is a new introduction of thirty-seven pages which reveals how the problem of philosophic reconstruction is now conceived by the author.

The reader's appetite is whetted by the opening paragraph; he learns that the intervening years have created a more urgent philosophic situation than was confronted thirty years ago, and that the title should be "Reconstruction *of* Philosophy" rather than "Reconstruction *in* Philosophy." But when he has covered the remainder of the introduction his anticipatory hopes have been dashed. It is the same Dewey as of yore, treating one of his favorite themes in the same way as of yore, that these pages disclose. He is delighted to discover, however, that the honored sage of American philosophy, who will reach his ninetieth birthday next October, is still able to give trenchant expression to ideas that have always been distinctive of his philosophic position.

Physical science, Dewey tells us, has remade the world in which we live, and has plunged all aspects of human life into the crisis which we must find some way of adequately resolving. The only key to a sound resolution is to apply to morals—and especially to its ideal ends—the method of inquiry which has proved so undeniably successful in dealing with physical nature. We live amid social institutions and practices which perpetuate the moral ideas of a prescientific and predemocratic age; this fact is the source of the tensions and dangers that fill us today with anxiety and foreboding. Let us boldly criticize and revise them so that they will no longer be out of harmony with the method of science and the faith of democracy. "In short, the problem of reconstruction in philosophy, from whatever angle it is approached, turns out to have its inception in the endeavor to discover how the new movements in science and in the industrial and political conditions which have issued from it, that are as yet only inchoate and confused, shall be carried to completion. For a fulfillment that is consonant with their own, their proper direction and momentum of movement, can be achieved only in terms of ends and of standards so distinctively human as to constitute a new moral order" (p. xxxix).

There is no hint in these pages that Professor Dewey sees significance in the reconstruction of philosophy that has actually been going on since 1920, and which has given his instrumentalism a different rôle and prospect than almost anyone would have accorded it thirty years ago.

E. A. BURTT

*Man's Disorder and God's Design: Amsterdam Assembly Series,* New York, Harper, no date, pp. 210, 218, 197, 228, $5.

*Man's Disorder and God's Design,* the omnibus volume of the Amsterdam Assembly Series, is really four volumes in one, and unfortunately paged as separate volumes with no adequate index either at the beginning or end to make clear the plan of the book. Had not this reviewer been very familiar with the first Assembly of the World Council of Churches, she would have spent some time in discovering that the book is the preliminary work of four commissions.

Briefly, the plan is this: Volume I includes the papers prepared for Amsterdam on "The Universal Church in God's Design," together with the names of those serving on the Commission of the Assembly and the final findings on the subject, which were *"received by the Assembly and commended to the churches for their serious consideration and appropriate action."* (The foregoing quotation represents the action taken in reference to the findings of all four sections.) The other three volumes follow the pattern of Volume I and treat successively of "The Church's Witness to God's Design," "The Church and the Disorder of Society," and "The Church and the International Disorder." The omnibus volume ends with the "Message" (unpaged) of the first Assembly.

This more than 1850-page volume will go on the shelves of all who are vitally interested in the future of the Church Universal, beside the reports from other historic conferences such as Oxford, Edinburgh, Jerusalem, and Madras. It will call for immediate and careful reading, owing both to its importance and to the fact that in many cases it is being badly misquoted. In addition, it will be invaluable for reference in the years to come, especially as the churches find their place in this world in which they are being so seriously challenged.

It could be wished that more of the papers could have been written in a terminology more easily understood by laymen—especially at a time when the churches claim that the active participation of the laity is not only wanted but needed. If Amsterdam really means what it said, more care will be given to this matter when the Second Assembly of the World Council meets five years hence.

Although she is not a feminist, perhaps this woman reviewer will be forgiven if she particularly mentions the only papers by women in the four volumes. (It is a little disappointing that more women were not invited to write. One notes especially the omission of such capable religious writers as Suzanne de Dietrich and Georgia Harkness.) Olive Wyon has written a very readable paper in the first volume on "Evidences of New Life in the Church Universal." Not only does it make interesting and hopeful reading but it reminds us of the remarkable ways in which the Kingdom comes. The other woman author, Kathleen Bliss, editor of the *Christian News Letter,* as always, writes well and authoritatively. Her paper, "Personal Relations in a Technical Society," is all too short as she briefly summarizes relations between the sexes both in work and in marriage, relations between generations and between neighbors.

All four commissions have not only called on such outstanding theological writers as the Niebuhrs (both Richard and Reinhold), Walter Horton, Karl Barth, Father Florovsky, John Bennett, Bishop Stephen Neill, Paul Tillich and many others, but in addition they have drafted many who are not only strong churchmen but are conversant with the political, social, and economic world. In this category we find, among others: C. L. Patijn and Baron F. M. Van Asbeck of Holland, J. H. Oldham and Kenneth Grubb of Great Britain, Professor J. L. Hromodka of

Czecho-Slovakia, and O. F. Nolde and John Foster Dulles of the United States of America.

That there are differences of opinion expressed, both theologically and politically, is not strange, but, as Karl Barth remarked, the differences were within the areas of fundamental agreements. Despite the differences, the Message was correct when it affirmed, "We intend to stay together."

Running through the entire volume is a note of urgency that Christians everywhere unite, not organically, but in fresh dedication of themselves to the discovery of God's will. Again the message gives us these words: "We have to learn afresh together to speak boldly in Christ's name both to those in power and to the people, to oppose terror, cruelty and race discrimination, to stand by the outcast, the prisoner and the refugee. We have to make of the Church in every place a voice for those who have no voice, and a home where every man will be at home. We have to learn afresh together what is the duty of the Christian man or woman in industry, in politics, in the professions and in the home."

Such is a bit of the challenge presented to the Christians of today from those who were their representatives at Amsterdam.

ANNA CANADA SWAIN

*Mass Man and Religion,* by E. G. Lee, New York, Harper, no date, pp. 160, $2.50.

This book by an English editor, novelist, and lay theologian was the prize-winning essay in the United Nations Literary Competition. There is a forthrightness and vitality about it that commands serious attention, for it deals with a hackneyed theme in a fresh and arresting fashion.

The crushing blows that have come to Christian dogma (and dogmatism) in the last thirty years are, in the author's judgment, only part of a general disintegration of accepted faiths. Curiously enough, the external conventional acceptance of Christianity persists, but with little commanding power. It has become another ideology, and a profound resurrection of spiritual force is required. The failure of Christianity lies in the fact that modern men ignore it as they develop their ethical norms and attack their social problems, while "the language of the Church is becoming more and more esoteric."

Meanwhile in modern life men are more and more thrown together and at the same time are more and more lonely. The welfare state takes charity out of the realm of personal Christian action, while science with its atomic bomb has taken away all security about the future. Men try to find in the immediate community about them the satisfaction of their loneliness and uncertainty, but are haunted by a beyond that they cannot define. When the state steps in to furnish a new absolute, men turn to the dream of an international order; while all the time they are aware of its unreality and its unmanageable complexity.

Thus suffering itself makes the world alive because it arises from man's reflection on his life, and drives him to assert the possibility of some sort of victory for the spirit, of some intellectual harmony. This in turn calls for some "effort to distinguish between the sham and the true." If it be found that the true lies beyond the relativities and uncertainties and shams of life, then men begin to be guided by a vision that passes beyond time. Attempts are made to state the meaning of history. Some will accept despair with Bertrand Russell. Some will declare a faith in evolution. Some will see the clue to history in Jesus Christ. All seek some inclusive vision that brings history and the self into a unity.

There is a universal note in religious experience, and when this universalism is denied religion fails. But at the same time there is a personal note in the

interpretation of the universal, and this leads men to seek a centre of personal being in the universe, a God. Spiritual striving here goes beyond the goodness of morality, and furnishes the energy that transforms morals. "Faith is the exercise of the human spirit in the world of the intangible."

Such faith often finds itself handicapped by the theological notions taught by the churches and tries to go behind them to some living reality, to the historic figure of Jesus which is not really given even in the New Testament. And so men today must work out their own faith even as Jesus himself did in his day; and in the process they reinterpret him. By the same token we cannot "without exceeding the bounds of decent spiritual humility" confine the revelation of God to Christianity. "Faith must have done with systems that proclaim their own infallibility. . . ." Such claims are signs of decay, and men must fight their way through them to a higher truth.

So runs the argument, and its freedom from cant is evident throughout. Theological speculation keeps time with social and psychological analysis throughout the volume; and faith becomes lively and relevant. If more of our preachers talked like this and avoided the platitudinous language of Zion, laymen would listen oftener and more closely. The book has the tang of honest thought and forthright speech. The format is unfortunately British austerity printing, and a real handicap for the reader. So good a book deserved a better introduction to the American public.

EDWIN E. AUBREY

*The Audacity of Faith,* by Allan A. Hunter, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. 154, $1.75.

Dr. Allan A. Hunter, the minister of the Mount Hollywood Congregational Church, Los Angeles, has written another thought-provoking and stimulating book which will appeal both to ministers and to laymen. While the book readily reveals the scholarly background of the author, the style is popular and the pungency of words and phrases is unescapable. The chapter titles are indicative of the author's freshness and adeptness: Life as a Delivery Room, Behind the Show Window, The Athletic Way, Faith Is No Private Affair, and "Do It First" being good examples of his skill.

The masses of the people live on two levels, which he describes on the one hand as a picnic ground and on the other hand as a psychopathic ward. They are known in more formal terms as pleasure and cynicism. The majority of people rarely reach in their living a third level of life which faith and vital religion offer. It is this third level which he presents and challenges his readers to try in this world with its problems and possibilities. This third level he does not leave as a generality but makes it specific with innumerable applications.

The author offers us *The Audacity of Faith* as the means to rise above the doldrums of our common way, to outmanœuvre this world's present impasse and to achieve the more abundant life about which Jesus spoke. He presents the matter in this striking fashion: "There is nothing in our human nature that compels us to be victims of catastrophe. We are human beings, able to face truth, choose alternatives and break the deadlock between life and death that now confronts us—make right adjustment to those high-tension wires called moral laws and you will find they do not destroy. Primarily the high tension wires are there to transmit energy. Whether for doom or welfare—that's up to you."

The author has a genius for giving life to trite and dog-eared theological ideas. Grace he refers to as "Energy of the Spirit." Conscience he likens to the doctor

in the delivery room who administers the slap which causes the newborn baby to catch its breath and live. He points out that conscience in the average person functions like an "underactive thyroid." Awakened in many people, it becomes "overactive and inflamed." Properly developed, it is an educated voice. Evil is traced to our own inner citadel where it has to be fought to a finish. Fighting it, many people try "to overcome evil with evil methods in which case they may become what they oppose." Others try to whitewash evil or deny its existence. "Our hope," he argues, "is in recognizing our hopelessness" and putting our trust in him, from whom we may be far but who is never far from us. Saints, he describes, as this world's "supreme experimenters."

Many people turning to religion give it a saccharine taste which is nauseating. The author cryptically warns, one of the most treacherous quicksands of the spiritual life is the emotional glow into which the immature sink themselves. Then he goes on to point out that the third level in vital religious living leads to self-discipline, to a type of sharing which liberates strength, to the development of a masterful quality of forgiveness, and to the practice of a self-sacrifice in which the better self can develop and come to maturity. Such is the spiritual athlete which he sets before us as our model.

The latter portion of the book deals with specific techniques. The value of prayer is emphasized. Our prayers should progress from self to others until at top level they become God centred. Touching the old problem of faith and works, the reader is warned against making his religion a purely private affair. One's faith must be nurtured in public worship and ultimately take expression in good will toward our enemies and in a stand for the disinherited which will build up in our world "a stockpile of international good will."

This is a book which will prove inspirational for the layman and which will provide many good sermon starters for the ministers. JAMES HOUSTON IVEY

*A Greater Generation*, by Ernest M. Ligon, New York, Macmillan, 1948, pp. xii, 157, $2.50.

The cold war which has placed religion and psychology on opposite sides of their iron curtain has not been beneficial to either contestant. Worst of all, the children of our land, whose lives should be improved by the ministrations of sacred and secular education, have suffered by this tragic bifurcation to a point where educational schizophrenia is imminent. It is high time that churchmen and scientists concerned with the psyche buried the hatchet and joined forces to make character education a reality. The work of Professor Ligon in his character research project at Union College as described in this challenging volume shows how the curtain can be removed. Using the scientific techniques of psychology, Dr. Ligon suggests how Protestant church schools, if they really mean business, can build Christian principles into the habit patterns of their pupils.

Parents, pastors, and Sunday-school teachers who make the effort to read Dr. Ligon's book will find not only a shocking analysis of the futility of much that is being done in the name of religious education, but a clear and logical blueprint of the steps which any church group can take to replace it with a program which will build the ideals of the Sermon on the Mount into the day to day lives of boys and girls.

How many church school leaders have made a serious attempt to list the objectives of their efforts in terms of the principles of Jesus, then laid out a systematic course of instruction geared to the ability of the pupils to absorb and put to use

what has been taught? And of this select company, how many have won the cooperation of parents and community agencies in seeing that the lessons of forgiveness and love are presented to the children for more than a brief hour once a week? Dr. Ligon, through his character research project at Union College in coöperation with numerous church groups, provides evidence of what can be done when religious leaders decide to employ the methods made available by science for the inculcation of Christian virtues. His book warrants the attention of every church member alarmed by the hold taken on young people by appeals to vanity, acquisitiveness, and indulgence in much that they see and hear from morning to night. Mammon quite obviously has been utilizing to the limit what psychology has to reveal regarding the development of human character. No longer can churches say the path has not been made clear to them.

This book and its message must permeate the minds and hearts of clergymen and responsible laymen. Psychology and religion, forgetting their feud, must work together for a kingdom of God by changing lives in their formative years. If we can learn to apply such a law as that of vicarious sacrifice in our personal contacts, our social institutions, and our international relationships, it may, in Dr. Ligon's words, "prove to be as powerful as the natural laws underlying gravitation, electricity and atomic energy. If our children learn it, they may come to be the first Christian generation, and the one to make atomic power our servant, not our destroyer."

HENRY E. ALLEN

*The Inquisition at Albi, 1299-1300,* by Georgene W. Davis, New York, Columbia University Press, 1948, pp. 322, $4.

The spread of the followers of the cult of St. Paul in protest against the domination of the cult of St. Peter provides Gibbon with the theme of one of his most daring chapters (LIV) and the occasion of some of his most superb irony. The essay of Dr. Davis provides a critical edition of the story of the last lap of the journey from the rivers of Babylon to the Bay of Biscay. The whole story of the Paulicians is a record of prohibitionist persecution of the forerunners of the puritan reformation of the sixteenth and seventeenth century. The fear of the East is the beginning of Western political wisdom, which reveals itself in the strangest savagery towards simple piety which needs no ritual basis for its differentiation, but is prepared to recognize the existence of the powers of darkness and the powers of light. It was reserved for the city of Albi and its people—the Albigeois—to provide the sacrifice to Simon de Montfort, the father of the "Father of Parliaments," as well as to his *Manes.*

The record of the trials contained in this volume is derived from a manuscript in the Bibliothèque Nationale (*ms. lat.* 11847). The work of editing the manuscript appears to have been done with great care. The introduction of ninety-nine pages is adequate, but lacks a chapter on the nature of the heresy of the Cathari, and it is only by means of the index and the text that one can judge even the externals, and then only as a *farrago.* The appendices contain summaries of the main cases and a number of explanatory additions under the names of the victims, (App. I); App. II is a summary of court proceedings; App. III a list of place names, and then follows a selected bibliography of works—mainly modern.

The irony—which is not brought out by the editor—is that the year selected (1299-1300) is the crisis and turning point of the pontificate of Boniface VIII, who was posthumously arraigned before the Council of Vienne in 1311-1312.

The conclusion (pp. 83-91) is a judicious assessment of the value of the docu-

ment, but it leaves the reader with an unnecessary sense of uncertainty, which the text does not.

The book is to be commended as a useful commentary on the relations between Boniface VIII and Philip IV of France, who does not emerge by any means entirely unscathed. He could have stopped the whole scandal, but for political reasons, it would appear, he refrained. The whole transaction has acquired in these latter days a modern echo—in the opposite direction.

F. W. BUCKLER

*Pastoral Counseling*, by Seward Hiltner, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1949, pp. 291, $3.

Counseling in one form or another has long been an essential part of the pastoral function, whether in the public confession and discipline of the primitive church, the confessional of the Roman Catholic Church, the Methodist class meeting, or the various types of work with individuals by the Protestant clergy. But in the light of the findings of modern cultural anthropology, psychology, the social sciences, and psychoanalysis and psychiatry its fundamental importance has not only been immensely heightened, but it is well on the way to become a science and an art.

Mr. Hiltner, whose training and experience have given him unusual competence in this field, has in this book made an important contribution to an understanding and practice of the art of pastoral counseling. His treatment has the excellence of combining theory and practice so that theory is practical and practice intelligent. He holds counseling steadily in the focus of the pastor's total and many-sided function. The ample use of case records of actual counseling procedures not only gives precision, concreteness, and poignancy to the presentation, but offers an effective method for the pastor's improvement of his own counseling technique. The author's insistence that the function of counseling is to help the counselee to define his own problem, to face it frankly, and to find his own solution is sound psychologically, sound religiously, and creative.

The discussion is limited, for the most part, to the technique of the interview which is without doubt the basic consideration in counseling. From this reviewer's point of view, however, an effective program of counseling involves many other elements than the interview itself, such as an analysis and reconstruction of environmental conditions, making available resources beyond the limited experience of the distraught individual, and the use of the results of the social sciences in the understanding and control of the human relations in which the counselee is involved.

What this reviewer misses most is a critical analysis of religion as a resource in counseling. Certain forms of theologized religion have been the cause of deep intellectual and emotional frustration, arising from an extreme tension between the modern understanding of the nature of man and the world and the authoritative traditional dogmas of the church. This is notably true of unexamined theological notions of sin, human depravity, and the operation of divine grace. Religion functionally understood offers an incalculable resource for resolving human conflict. Dogmatically conceived, it is a dangerous instrument in the hands of the counselor, and has often been a factor of personal and social disintegration. Since religion is the speciality of the minister, he needs as much guidance in helping the counselee in examining his religious concepts as in the technique of the interview.

WILLIAM CLAYTON BOWER

*Older People and the Church,* by Paul B. Maves and J. Lennart Cedarleaf, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1949, pp. 272, $2.50.

This book is the result of two years' study and experience of two Protestant ministers in finding out how the pastor and the church can best serve people over sixty. It is written for pastors, other church workers, and for people who are interested in the work of the church. Cedarleaf studied pastoral care, with special reference to counseling; Maves studied group work, and also studied the general sociology and psychology of aging, so as to provide a social-psychological setting for the book.

Part I, entitled *Aging and the Church,* gives a readable and accurate survey of sociological and psychological knowledge in the fast developing field of gerontology. It closes with a statement of two functions of the church with respect to old people: 1. to foster personality growth in old people, and 2. to bring about changes in society which will make old age a more satisfying period of life.

Part II, entitled *Pastoral Care of Older People,* is the most novel and concrete and controversial section. Cedarleaf, the author of this section, worked for eighteen months with some seventy people from sixty-one to ninety-five years old, half of them living in Old Peoples' Homes, where he was chaplain, and the other half being members of an ordinary Protestant urban church, of which he was associate pastor. He defines the essential conditions for successful pastoral care as "some degree of receptivity in the parishioner; an attitude and approach characterized at root by understanding-love on the part of the pastor; and a consequent dynamic relationship in which, as the parishioner is accepted and understood, he gains in capacity to face and understand and eventually to handle the conflicts and problems within or without." He kept verbatim records of his calls, what he said and what the parishioner said; and he reproduces a number of these records, analyzing them in detail. Cedarleaf uses an approach to the nondirective method of counseling, but makes more attempts at interpreting the client's situation and attitudes than would most nondirective counselors. His analyses of his pastoral calls are good teaching material for a course in pastoral counseling. Cedarleaf also draws up a "program for pastoral care" of such a group as his seventy. They fall into three categories: 1. successfully creative (twenty-six per cent); 2. persons struggling toward creativity (thirty-four per cent); 3. persons whose creativity has been submerged (forty per cent). His use of the term "creativity" here would permit the substitution of the terms "integration" or "adjustment." The group which can profit most from pastoral counseling he believes to be those who are "struggling toward creativity." In a hypothetical program of four hours per week of pastoral counseling for old people, he recommends that fifteen per cent of the time be given to the first group, forty-two per cent to the second group, and twenty-nine per cent to the third group, with fourteen per cent for contingencies. This is notable for his contention that the worst-adjusted people cannot be helped by the pastor and should receive help only in a "symbolic sense," to the extent of semiannual calls.

Part III, on *Group Work with Older People,* is Maves' report of an experiment with thirteen Methodist churches in an eastern State. The author supervised the project, but the pastors did the work as group leaders. Their churches and their experiences are described and analyzed. On the controversial question of whether groups should be formed for old people alone in churches, or whether old people should be brought into mixed-age groups, Maves says:

> The kind of grouping which should be established for older people can be decided only in the light of the needs of the constituency and the pattern of group association which prevails in the community. We have noted many of the differences between urban and rural churches in this

respect. Speaking generally we may say that older people need some opportunity to participate with persons of all age groups, and some chance to develop association with one another. If local conditions permit there are some advantages in having a special group for older people. They are likely to have certain interests more in common with their own generation than with a younger generation. Older people tend to move at a slower tempo, and in groups of their own they can set the pace free from the competition of more quickly moving, energetic, and aggressive younger people. Older people in their own groups may have opportunities to take responsibility that is often denied them in mixed age groups. In some communities older people can meet most conveniently in the afternoons, just when church facilities are more likely to be free.

The number of older people in a church will help to determine whether or not there ought to be a separate group. Usually a group of fewer than ten persons loses interest and momentum unless the persons involved are quite secure and adequate in themselves. The tendency in most churches seems to be to have separate groups for each sex. In contrast, the experience of clubs and centers for older people shows much value in mixed groups. The churches would be well to promote more mixed groups among older people, especially because they are often single or widowed.

Part IV, entitled *Social Resources and the Church*, suggests that the churches should take part in forming social policy and in promoting legislation for social and economic security, and occasionally should engage directly in providing welfare services for the aged.

All in all, it is a highly satisfactory book, and will doubtless be widely read and widely practiced by church workers.

ROBERT J. HAVIGHURST

*Transformation in Christ*, by Dietrich von Hildebrand, New York, Longmans Green, 1948, pp. ix, 406, $4.50.

It is refreshing for a Protestant reviewer to discover at how many points he is in agreement with a Roman Catholic author. Dietrich von Hildebrand is a member of the faculty of Fordham University. A political refugee from Germany, he came to the United States in 1938, a country of which he is now a citizen. To be sure, there are many basic differences between the reviewer and the author. He cannot accept his view of the church, or of revelation as rigidly determined by the church, or of the sacraments. Most Protestants would have difficulty at these points. Yet in the basic philosophy and practice of religion suggested in the volume he finds strong similarities between much Protestant and Catholic religion at their best. He laid down the volume with the thought, "We are closer than we think in the basic matters of spiritual concern."

The volume starts with the assumption that no man can really be a Christian unless he manifests a readiness to change. Life is a process of growth, and that is true of the Christian life in particular. That life is inseparable from the deep yearning to become a "new man" in Christ. The complementary phase of that mood lies in the willingness to "put off the old man" that the new man may take form within us. The book is an endeavor to suggest the steps through which that desirable transformation takes place, bringing into the consideration a sound supernaturalism, untinctured by excessive mysticism, plus contemporary psychological insights which throw much light upon the problem of growth. The steps enumerated in the progress of the spiritual life, which ends in transformation in Christ, can only be enumerated in this review. They are contrition, self-knowledge, true consciousness, true simplicity, recollection, contemplation, humility, confidence in God, striving for perfection, and true freedom.

The whole wisdom of the Christian life is caught for the author in the call of Christ, *"Sequere me,"* "Follow me." His attempt is to show what the countenance of the new man is like who is obedient to that command. He is a man renewed unto knowledge according to the image of the God who created him. The supernatural beauty of Christ gradually infuses him, transforming his life since he reflects the

holiness of "the God-Man," radiating that light to mankind. The attitudes which are engendered through this quest are discussed at length and are, basically, those referred to in the Beatitudes. They are a hunger and thirst after justice, holy patience, peace, meekness, mercy, sorrow, and sobriety, with a culminating surrender of self.

The book should prove to many readers a stimulating devotional classic. Indeed, an earlier German edition has been called "a modern *Imitation of Christ.*"

GEORGE W. DAVIS

*Power for Action:* an Introduction to Christian Ethics, by William A. Spurrier, New York, Scribner, 1948, pp. xii, 200, $2.50.

The author, who is at present an instructor in religion and director of the Christian Association at Wesleyan University, is of the opinion that there is now "a regrettable chasm" between books on Christian ethics that are "superficial and popular" in character and those that are "advanced and highly technical." So he has sought to fill in this chasm by writing an introduction to Christian ethics for "the general public" and more particularly for "college youth." Both its style and contents are adapted to this purpose. The book does not aim at systematic completeness. The most accurate title for it, the author says, would perhaps be "A *Sample* Introduction to Christian Ethics and a Sample Application to Sample Modern Problems."

The book consists of four parts. In the first, emphasis is laid on the doctrine of sin, and the doctrine here expounded and adopted is that associated with neo-orthodoxy. In this doctrine, there are two fundamental fallacies, but neither of them is here recognized as such. It is, for instance, said that "we do not do good because we do not have the power to do it" (p. 14). If this be strictly true, it is obvious that in moral matters we do not have the power of contrary choice and hence are not truly moral beings. Sin that we cannot avoid is not sin in the ethical sense of the term. To call it such runs counter to a basic moral conviction of mankind. And furthermore to ascribe man's moral incapacity to his "natural" state or to his own unaided strength, as is here done, is to be guilty of an illicit abstraction. There is, as Wesley said, no such person as a purely "natural man" in the older theological sense of the term. For there is a light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world. Man in total separation from God is nonexistent.

Part II moves on a different plane. It deals with practical problems, with war and peace, and with economic, political, and social problems in general. Its treatment of these subjects is for the most part excellent. It is scholarly, almost wholly free from the theological irrationalism of Part I, and as comprehensive and thorough as the size of the book could well permit.

In Part III two topics receive special attention: personal goodness, and sex and marriage. The latter subject is treated with the utmost frankness, but always in good taste, and helpfully. In discussing personal goodness the author reverts more or less to his neoörthodox theology, but on the whole deals in a vital and stimulating way with conversion and the relation of ethics and religion to each other. At one point he says that "God is neither just another person nor an object" (p. 122), and in the concluding summary of the book he tells us that the broad general principles of creative love and righteousness are "what we mean by God. They are impersonal in the sense that they are the creative form, order, structure and power in life, and they are personal in the sense that they are available to individual persons and can be expressed through the individual personality" (pp. 187 f.). This would seem clearly

to imply a pantheistic conception of Deity. But in view of the personalistic terms applied to the Deity throughout most of the book it may be that the author here simply slipped a cog.

In the fourth part of the book we come across the statement that "it should be obvious that we cannot be held guilty for failing to achieve something which by definition we cannot achieve" (p. 167). But if so, what becomes of the doctrine of original sin? "The answer," we are told, "is a paradoxical one. We are guilty for our imperfect ethical decisions and we are not." This paradox is not particularly illuminating, and the author's attempted explanation of it does not relieve the inherent contradiction in it.

But despite its uncritical Niebuhrizing in the speculative field, the book has much to commend it as a direct, interesting, and informing introduction to the practical problems of Chrisian ethics.

ALBERT C. KNUDSON

*The Bhagavadgītā,* edited by S. Radhakrishnan, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. 388, $3.50.

Of the great volume of Hindu religious literature, starting with the *Rig Veda,* the most widely used single work in India today is probably the poem known as the *Bhagavadgītā* ("Song of the Blessed One"), often called merely the *Gītā* ("Song"). It is especially the devotional book of the sectaries of Vishnu; it was the favorite text of Gandhi. The *Gītā* appears to have been composed, or at least to have assumed its present form, at some time in the two or three centuries preceding the beginning of our era, and, like many other small works, was interpolated in the great epic known as the *Mahābhārata,* where it appears now.

The ideas of the *Gītā* are based upon ideas appearing in literature which preceded it, especially in the philosophic and theosophic treatises known as the Upanishads; through them it has a tradition continuing back to the *Rig Veda* itself. These ideas concern the nature of the universe and its animating reality, the nature of the human soul, the constitution of the human psychical mechanism; the relation of the individual to ultimate reality. In most points the *Gītā* has older authority to support its statements; its individuality lies in its particular synthesis and balance of older ideas and final weightage of values. Hence it does not argue by dialectic method; it makes affirmations of accepted notions and gives them applications.

The main doctrine of the *Gītā* is that reality is single, and that it is expressed in Vishnu, who appears in the text incarnated as the Lord Krishna, the "Blessed One," the reciter of the work. The *Gītā* specifies that one has open to him three ways of approach to Deity—namely, that of work, that of knowledge, and that of devotion—and that of these the most preferred is devotion.

This important work has been rendered into English frequently and, aside from many unscientific renderings, at least four excellent and scholarly translations are available (K. T. Telang, 1882; L. D. Barnett, 1905; W. D. P. Hill, 1928; F. Edgerton, 1944) and a poetic rendition (E. Arnold, first published 1885); in addition there are two good German translations (P. Deussen, 1906; R. Garbe, 1905; second edition, 1921) and one French (E. Senart, 1922). Professor Radhakrishnan's translation, therefore, is not so much inspired by pressing need to make the work available in English as by a desire on his part to have his say, more especially to present a Hindu, rather than Western, interpretation. Hence he provides a long introductory essay and a running commentary on the separate stanzas. Since Professor Radhakrishnan is at once a Sanskritist, a philosopher, and a man of letters, his trans-

lation with commentarial introduction and notes is a work of importance to students of the *Gītā*.

As an interpreter Professor Radhakrishnan represents Hindu tradition combined with modern scientific scholarship. He rejects any notion of separate strata of composition of the *Gītā*, and denies the seriousness of the inner contradictions which have been indicated by western scholars. His attitude is expressed on p. 15:

> These different opinions [concerning the message of the Gītā] seem to arise from the fact that in the Gītā are united currents of philosophical and religious thought diffused along many and devious courses. Many apparently conflicting beliefs are worked into a simple unity to meet the needs of the time, in the true Hindu spirit, that over all of them broods the grace of God. The question whether the Gītā succeeds in reconciling the different tendencies of thought will have to be answered by each reader for himself after he completes the study of the book. The Indian tradition has always felt that the apparently incongruous elements were fused together in the mind of the author and that the brilliant synthesis he suggests and illuminates, though he does not argue and prove it in detail, fosters the true life of spirit.

The running commentary is sometimes suggestive, but often seems unnecessary, since the words of the Sanskrit are used as a starting point for short sermons rather than exposition. In this respect, of course, a westerner gets a demonstration of some of the devotional use which the *Gītā* fills in India.

Since Professor Radhakrishnan's volume is easily procured and is not expensive, as book prices go nowadays, it should be available to many readers heretofore unacquainted with the *Gītā*. And since it is a work of careful scholarship as well as readability, it should be for those readers an attractive guide to one of the world's greatest religious productions.

W. NORMAN BROWN

*The Organization of the Methodist Church,* by Nolan B. Harmon, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1948, pp. 281, $2.75.

Dr. Harman is the book editor of the Methodist Church, the official of the Methodist Publishing House who is directed by his board to "edit all books of our publication except those issued by other agencies of the church, etc." Experience in and observation of the growth and operation of the organization of the Methodist Church in recent years qualifies him to discuss this subject in relation to those years, and in his book are found abundant evidences of thorough research covering the years from the days of John Wesley to the present.

He represents the organization of the Methodist Church as a growth. Believing that the New Testament prescribes no one form of church government, this church has created its own government as emerging needs required, seeking only to make it effective and keep it Christian in character and spirit. He does not disregard the charge of autocracy made against this government from time to time and cites John Wesley's answer as applicable all along the way. When some asked, "Who gave this man authority to reign over us?" Wesley replied that he had "no authority over anyone, save what that person had given to him." In other words, he governed by the consent of the governed. Francis Asbury is clearly shown in this sketch as definitely and of his own choice refusing to accept or exercise the authority Wesley sought to confer upon him until the Conference, composed of all Methodist preachers in America, by formal action freely taken conferred that power on him.

This study is presented in five divisions: Episcopacy, The Conference System, The Jurisdictional Division, Methodist Law and The Judicial Council, and The Executive Agencies. Some will think that logically "The Conference System" should have been the first division and that instead of making "Episcopacy" the subject of a division it should have been a subdivision under a main heading entitled "The

Ministry." The ministry does receive attention in relation to the appointing power of the bishops, but not such attention as many will think it merits. Little is said of "local preachers" who, particularly as supply pastors, constitute such an important factor and always have in the government of the Methodist Church. And the "traveling" ministry with all the word *traveling* implies might well have received more attention than the author gives it.

Episcopacy he recognizes as the most controversial feature of the ministry of his church and traces its evolution most painstakingly and accurately. He makes it withal a story of compelling interest. As the conference system developed, the autocratic powers of the episcopacy diminished with no opposition upon the part of those who held the office generally. Though the episcopacy of today is very different from that of earlier years, especially as respects what were regarded as its autocratic power, Dr. Harmon appears to think its power and certainly its usefulness in the church were never greater and that it has not suffered any diminution of the esteem in which it is held by the people.

The evolution of the General Conference as traced here illustrates impressively the process of growth which produced the organization that is being analyzed. Here again the tendency has been steadily toward more and more democratic forms as the development of the church made it possible to operate the same effectively. The "Quarterly Conference" is not so presented as to be clearly understood by a non-Methodist, we fear, especially in view of its anachronistic name. The fact that the Central Conference in territory outside of the United States corresponds substantially to the Jurisdictional Conference in the United States might also have been made more clear.

The Jurisdictional Division, though new in actuality, is revealed in this historical survey as being anything but a new idea in the thought of those who were studying problems of Methodist organization in the large during the past hundred years. It is treated intelligently and with eminent objectivity and fairness. The Judicial Council, another new feature of Methodist organization, is shown to be meeting a need felt in the church through many decades, and meeting it most satisfactorily. The Methodist law which is referred to this fourth division is that which pertains to the disciplining of the members and ministry of the church. What the author says about it is not very illuminating or interesting. If he had been attempting a critical analysis, he would have been justified in characterizing this segment of his church's organization as a hodgepodge, a growth which ought to have been subjected to more intelligent direction than it has evidently received; but, as he points out, it has commendable features, notably its consistent effort to administer ecclesiastical justice in democratic fashion, even though it does appear to regard bishops, traveling preachers, local preachers, deaconesses, and lay members as so many different castes. The Executive Agencies are the boards, commissions, etc., which the General Conference has created and empowered to execute the program of the church as a whole. Similar boards and agencies of the annual conferences merit mention alongside of the general agencies, though detailed treatment of them, of course, could not have been thought of.

This book is well worth the reading of every member and minister of the Methodist Church and of non-Methodists who care to know about the way this group of Protestant Christians works. It should be read with a copy of the 1944 *Discipline of the Methodist Church* at hand. To be sure there is a later *Discipline, viz.,* 1948, but this latter had not appeared when this book was written and the differences are relatively few and minor.

This work is not free from minor errors, but I have discovered none that need

concern any who do not themselves detect them. That they are so few is creditable in view of the scope of the work. The author proceeds upon the assumption, whose soundness is apparent, that properly to understand and appreciate the merit or demerit of the organization of this church, which is the result of a process of growth, one must be informed concerning that process. He makes the tracing of that process in history an interesting, inspiring, and informing story. J. EDGAR SKILLINGTON

*Religious Trends in English Poetry: 1780-1830, Romantic Faith,* by Hoxie Neale Fairchild, New York, Columbia University Press, 1949, pp. xi, 549, $6.75.

This is one book which can be bought with trust in the jacket's description and evaluation. It is truly both "the best scholarship in the field" and "a judicious mixture of witty urbanity and imaginative sympathy." The author knows not only the poets and their faith, but what is more rare in a man of letters, he knows religion and theology! Vol. I of this series charts religious ideas in English poetry from 1700 to 1740. Its subtitle is "Protestantism and the Cult of Sentiment." Emphasis is placed upon the historical rather than the æsthetic importance of the poetry of this period. Vol. II, "Religious Sentimentalism in the Age of Johnson," examines the poetic expression of "the religion of sentiment" which looked backward to the Protestantism of the seventeenth century and forward to the religious thought of the great romantic poets. Both volumes are equally indispensable to all students of English literature and to those concerned with the development of religious thought.

Vol. III confines itself to the major romantic poets of this period (1780-1830)—Burns, Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley, Byron, and Keats. In his spiritual biography of each poet, the author traces the development of religious thought through the various phases of the poet's career, with reference to the relationship of his beliefs to his art. In conclusion, Professor Fairchild deduces from the individual experience of these poets the implication of romanticism as a whole, and the significance of "romantic faith" in the history of Western civilization.

It is impossible, within the limits of a brief review, to convey any adequate idea of the breadth of scholarship with which the author studies these poets—their lives and their time. Even those fortunate enough to have studied English literature under the best trained and creative teachers of a quarter century ago, will be struck by the simplicity of that teaching compared with the vastly complex body of knowledge—both biographical and psychological—which are here added. Take, for example, the author's analysis of Burns's religious trend—which in the judgment of the reviewer must stand: "Limited though it was, Burns's spiritual realism might have provided a starting point for an adequate religion, but environmental and personal circumstances stood in the way. Burns did not firmly believe even in such religion as he possessed. It was a self-indulgence of the emotions, not a discipline of the spirit. It has no influence on his conduct, for it exerted no upward pull. It flattered the lower aspects of his nature and tinged the higher aspects with affection, confirming the egotism which tarnished his amiability. He never did anything for his religion and it never did anything for him. Burns is a perfectly clear example of the transformation of Protestant Christianity into the religion of sentiment. He made an important contribution to the early stirrings of the Romantic movement. He exhibits that basic desire for self-sufficiency which more sophisticated romanticists will drape in richer garments of illusion!"

For adults, for those who have not ceased to read upon graduation—especially for the minister who would grow in the knowledge of English poetry—*Religious Trends in English Poetry* will prove more valuable than some postgraduate courses. It is worth many times its price. JAMES SHACKELFORD DAUERTY

*Turns Again Home,* by Everett Carleton Herrick, Boston, Pilgrim, ©1949, pp. 202, $2.50.

This is an unusual book. At first blush this statement may seem inaccurate. Is it not the autobiography of a man recently retired? It most certainly is. Surely there is nothing unusual in that. In addition, that man is a minister. This lessens still more the superficial likelihood of its being very far from the ordinary. But it is nonetheless, and principally because it is the story of a very unusual man, unusually told.

Most autobiographies start with the hero's ancestry, show him, a little self-consciously, "advancing in wisdom and stature, and in favor with God and man," and end with his bearing his blushing honors thick upon him. This book does none of these conventional things. It starts with him in retirement and consistently reverses all usual chronological development by leaving him, so to speak, in diapers on the last page. And more than that, you never would even guess that the author thinks he was "our hero." Thus it definitely is a new adventure in clerical autobiography.

Through his lifetime Dr. Herrick has fooled a good many people. When in 1926 he became president of the then Newton Theological Institution, he found it wise to assure the audience at the inaugural luncheon that he really was in good health and to urge them not to let their sympathy spoil their appetites. A good many people through the course of the subsequent years who have had dealings with him could testify that sympathy was definitely not the necessary quality to have along when dealing with Carl Herrick.

He assumed the direction of Newton at a time when its prospects were not too rosy—and he wrought wonders. The Harvard-Andover divorce case, which resulted in the separation of two congenial and placid spouses, put asunder through the benevolent meddling of a maiden aunt, provided Dr. Herrick with his real chance. And did he grab it! While other institutions and their executives were pontificating and planning, Dr. Herrick stole the show, and the Andover Newton Theological School is the result. One of the most fascinating sections of the book are the chapters devoted to the happy wedding between the two schools. It is by no means a complete story as a Ph. D. in history would be sure to want to tell it; but is a mighty interesting and revealing account, told by the man who saw the opportunity and took it. And it is indicative of why he has been so extraordinary an administrator. Before most people—especially those who bask on the platform and can utter inconsequences with sonorous unction—have waked up to the fact that there was an opportunity, Carl Herrick had seen to it that there wasn't—for any one else!

His previous pastorate—and a notable one it was—in Fall River is another example of his uncanny ability. What he did to that church and the city was the reason he was called to the presidency of Newton. A man that could get a group of a thousand Protestant men together in Fall River, and have an attendance of them well over three hundred at Sunday school month in and month out could do anything, even revitalize Newton.

But why go on? The reviews of novels often spoil them for many readers. It is lots more fun to find the spicy incidents for oneself. So here. There ought to be a lot of people who will want to read this book. Of course Newton men will, even those who were there before Herrick's regime, for his brief pen portraits of the faculty he found and worked with will awake many nostalgic memories. Surely his host of friends, parishioners, and associates will, for it will be found freighted with interest. And that less definite group, easily dubbed the "general reader," can scarcely fail to find its homely, breezy, unpretentious, and never slow style of more than usual appeal. It can be read through in two hours and a half. I know, for I did it. Surely a dollar an hour is not exorbitant in these days.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

# BOOK NOTICES

*The Effective City Church,* by Murray H. Leiffer, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1949, pp. 232, $2.75.

An urban sociologist, convinced that the cities of America are dominating the entire culture of the land, might be expected to write an interesting story of urban life. A church administrator, persuaded that the future of American Protestantism depends largely on what happens in city churches, might be expected to set forth a revealing account of parochial problems. When both sociologist and administrator are found in one person, the result is a detailed analysis and diagnosis of the city church and a concern for its effectiveness. Let no one suppose that all the little ailments as well as the devitalizing diseases of the city church are here disclosed for the first time. Nor is there anything novel about the variety of suggestions for making the urban church more effective. The unique contribution of the author is to relate the facts of urban development and church adjustment. This he does cogently and clearly by categorizing and interpreting a multitude of situations. There are three specific weaknesses in the book—all of which could conceivably be justified either by the author or those interested in the subject. 1. Some sections are unnecessarily lengthy and some reveal superfluous duplication. 2. The table of contents suggests a rather proportionate treatment of both sides of the question, but the text seems to be heavily weighed with the sociologist's concern. 3. There is a recognition of the noumenal element inherent in the city-church problem, but the phenomenal aspects of the situation are treated as if they alone hold the key to the solution. On the other hand, as if to counteract the occasional tediousness, there are frequent statements of axiomatic worth which deserve consideration. For example: The analysis of a situation must be relatively complete if there is to be a proper diagnosis. The diagnosis of a church problem does not provide the answer to the problem. The material deterioration of a community inevitably results in a social erosion. In a changing city area the church must adjust to the change or die. These truths plus the material in the appendix relating to the various methods of analysis are indispensable. To anyone concerned with the interrelation between population trends and institutional life this book will prove interesting. Its story will be most useful to city planners and church extension boards.

ROBERT D. HERSHEY

*The Church's Ministry in Our Time,* by Henry Knox Sherrill, New York, Scribner, 1949, pp. viii, 159, $2.

These Lyman Beecher Lectures for 1948 present a forthright picture of the state of our world, of the church, and the resources of both. The world is disrupted and disillusioned, pessimistic about the future, and belligerent toward the good. The divided and ineffective church has failed to make an impact upon the world. Yet the necessary objectivity of God and the givenness of life have not rescued the world from its impotency in the face of the bankruptcy of humanism. The church, however, has the resources and the guidance of the living spirit of God, which formerly was the spirit of adventure and should continue to stimulate the individual and society. "The times demand a dynamic effort of mind, of heart and of will through the power of the Spirit of God" (p. 133). Therefore, "The clergyman's primary task . . . is to testify to the reality of the living God" (p. 140). Bishop Sherrill

is critical without being caustic, because his criticism is the result of his convictions and his dreams, rather than of his despair—which is just about the last word properly to be used of his lectures. He is kindly in his diagnosis, realistic in his ideals, practical in his prescription. If one is disturbed by the haunting sense of what the church might do for our ailing world, if one is looking for a vital faith in what is unconquerable and inexhaustible, here is a book to send one into the pulpit with a message of faith and a mood of encouragement. No easy acceptance of the situation, no complacent reliance upon God, will follow the reading of its pages. Rather, one will discover the restoration of the true ministry of the church in our time.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

*Religion,* by Nathaniel Micklem, New York, Oxford University Press, 1948, pp. 224, $2.

It is good to note the appearance of this volume of the "Home University Library." That series was one of the best of the many popular series of books of a decade or two ago dealing with "Modern Knowledge." The newer titles of this series that have been recently issued assure us that its high standard is to be maintained. In this compact volume the principal of Mansfield College, Oxford, offers a scientific or comparative study of religions, accepting John Oman's definition of religion as "the story of man's long endeavor to know a higher environment than the world of the senses by learning to live rightly in it." In the volume he shows once again his great powers of assimilation and exposition. One might question the method of his presentation, and prefer that the great religions be studied as units, rather than, as Micklem presents them, piecemeal as they may show elements of prophetic religion, mysticism, myth, etc. At times his conclusions might be questioned. This, however, is a volume designed for the many. It was not intended to be exhaustive, but to be a brief but scholarly presentation of religion as it has appeared among men, and in its main developments. Within the scope of the limits laid upon him, Dr. Micklem has done his work well.

GEORGE B. KING

*Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy,* translated by Lewis White Beck, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1949, pp. xv, 370, $5.

This volume is an excellent version, in excellent English, of Kant's moral philosophy, but it is also an ideal introduction to Kant's philosophy as a whole. Professor Beck's Introduction explains both the central position of rational law in Kant's ethics, and the growth of this idea in Kant's mind. Both the analysis and the history of Kant's system are beautifully executed; it is clear that Professor Beck has profited by the recent commentaries which he lists in his bibliography. But what makes his exposition particularly enjoyable is his skill in relating Kantian methods to our contemporary discussion, without getting Kant out of historical perspective and without seeming to plead for Kant. The most distinctive feature of the anthology is the inclusion of *An Inquiry into the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals,* an essay of particular interest to theologians; of *What is Enlightenment?,* an excellent introduction to Kant and to his age; and of *What is Orientation in Thinking?,* which, though it is but a brief comment on a polemic between Mendelssohn and Jacobi, gives us a clear formulation of how and why Kant emphasized rationality. The inclusion of the *Perpetual Peace* at the end gives the reader the refreshing impression that "Kantian morals are also human" and political. Professor Beck has given us a useful reference work on a very high level of scholarship. He sympathizes with those interpreters who represent Kant

as not an extreme rigorist, but he never loses sight of Kant's legalism and formalism. In fact, he makes these seem more reasonable than Kant himself did.

HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER

*Pastoral Work and Personal Counseling,* by Russell L. Dick, rev. ed., New York, Macmillan, 1949, pp. xii, 195, $2.50.

This is more than a revised edition of the author's earlier work by the same title, published in 1944. While the present volume includes much of the same material, it is reorganized in the light of the author's maturer insights, and parts which were "dated," such as the chapter on wartime counseling have been deleted. Though shorter, and more compact than the earlier volume, it is equally readable and equally practical. Additions include a chapter on the minister and psychiatry, and one on the lay pastoral worker. The former gives, in brief scope, the names and symptoms of those types of mental illness which a pastor is most apt to meet in his parishioners. The latter suggests an area of enlarged usefulness for the layman and gives suggestions for the selection and training of lay workers. Appendix A discusses specialized preparation for pastoral work and counseling. Appendix B gives a greatly enlarged and well-organized bibliography. Like the former volume, this book is based on the author's experience, and is addressed to individuals interested in the work of pastoral ministry. It is not a textbook, and does not promise to provide the reader with a complete knowledge of psychiatry in ten easy lessons. It should be of value to the pastor who wishes to make his work more effective.

JOHN W. THOMAS

*Purity of Heart,* by Soren Kierkegaard, rev. ed., New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. 220, $2.50.

Ten years after his first translation and publication of this little classic, Douglas Steere gives us a revised edition of it, prefacing it with an introductory essay. He contends that the nineteenth century produced nothing of a devotional character seriously to compare with *Purity of Heart.* That statement holds both for Protestant and Catholic literary productions. Primarily written as a preparation for the church's office of confession, this book seeks to show the serious reader what steps are essential when life requires a major operation to set it right spiritually. The present writer reviewed *Purity of Heart* a decade ago in CROZER QUARTERLY for January, 1939, pp. 62 f. He feels that what he said then is still pertinent to the present edition. Suffice it to note here that Kierkegaard's main contention is that to will one thing is to will the good, for only the good is a unity. But more than that, to will one thing is to will the good in truth. That involves the willingness to commit oneself to the truth, to be loyal to it, and to be ready to suffer *all* for it. Without such willingness, one is not pure in heart, for one's motives are mixed. The soul is sundered. Its possessor cannot stand as a single, unified individual before God. One thing to note is that Dr. Steere feels that *Purity of Heart* is the best introduction to Kierkegaard for the beginner. He suggests that it be followed by reading *Training in Christianity* and the excellent *Selections from the Journals* translated by Alexander Dru.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

*Religious Liberty,* by Cecil Northcott, New York, Macmillan, 1949, pp. 128, $2.

This is a vital, if brief, survey of religious liberty throughout the world at the present time. It is also an inquiry into the sources of religious liberty and a statement of the bases for its maintenance. Religious liberty becomes a need when men

seek to worship God in their own ways. Wherever there is honest worship that need is felt, and if no provision is made for the soul to find God in its own way, tension is created. The separation of church and state is one method for making the environment of liberty necessary for sincere worship. This English author feels that this arrangement has been best made in England; indeed, one would hardly know from reading this book that church and state are constitutionally separated in the United States. Apart from such separation, the author feels, there is little chance for recognizable religious liberty in the world today. In most Mohammedan countries, Egypt especially, intolerance is overwhelming. There is no religious freedom whatever in Russia, although religious practices are permitted on a wide scale. In nations where the Roman church is dominant little religious liberty is permitted; where it is in a minority and religious freedom is guaranteed, such freedom is used (and sometimes abused) for the ends of the church. St. Augustine is quoted from Macaulay as saying: "I am in the right, and you are in the wrong. When you are the stronger, you ought to tolerate me, for it is your duty to tolerate truth. But when I am the stronger, I shall persecute you, for it is my duty to persecute error." Speaking for Protestant Christendom, the author is of the opinion that there is an awareness of the importance of religious liberty—even the liberty to be unreligious—such as has not prevailed before. "Only on the grounds of toleration for all religious opinions, and for none, can true religion itself flourish."

HARMON M. GEHR

*Jesus and the Disinherited,* by Howard Thurman, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1949, pp. 112, $1.25.

Howard Thurman in his preface states the question of his little book: "Why is it that Christianity seems impotent to deal radically, and therefore effectively, with the issues of discrimination and injustice on the basis of race, religion and national origin? Is this impotency due to a betrayal of the genius of the religion, or is it due to a basic weakness in the religion itself?" His answer to the question is in terms of a betrayal of the genius of the Christian religion, and Paul is singled out as the first of the long row of betrayers with his mentality of Roman citizenry which even his Christian experience, according to Howard Thurman, was not able to eradicate. Jesus on the other hand was not only a Jew but a poor Jew in an occupied country in a period when hostility and revolt against the occupier was at its height. His own way against the occupier was neither that of an accommodator, nor a deceiver, nor a hater, but rather was in terms of a radical love that brought him back into community with even the oppressor and began the process of creative interaction between them once more. In this message of how to deal with oppression, Howard Thurman finds a message not to the beneficiaries of the present order that encourages them to "be merciful," but a message to the disinherited as to how to bear their disabilities and to become a truly creative force in recovering community and transforming both themselves and the oppressor in the course of this radical adventure. Coming as it does from one who has known the world of the disinherited not from hearsay and yet who has consistently chosen to transpose barriers and to experiment with fellowship across boundaries, the book has a particular ring of the authentic about it. The arguments against Paul and his tradition want a deeper substantiation than is to be found here, and the invitation to adventure across boundaries needs concrete illustration and more tangible suggestions and development. But the approach to Jesus as having a peculiar message for

the disinherited and for the occupied countries, is a fruitful one as thousands of Norwegian and Dutch and at present German Christians can testify.

DOUGLAS V. STEERE

*The Best of John Henry Jowett,* edited by Gerald Kennedy, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. xix, 167, $2.

Dr. Jowett was an English preacher who spoke from the pulpit of the Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church, New York, from 1911 to 1918. This volume of expertly edited sermons, addresses, and prayers will make his memory much more than a name to those who read it; these are far more than examples of an ephemeral literary product called the sermon. This is the burning conviction of an evangelist combined with the consummate craftsmanship of a sincere literary artist—measured, deliberate, and intense. Mastery runs throughout the organization of sermons and it is also apparent in separate sentences. "It is almost incredible what subjects men can discuss when they are returning from a funeral" (p. 17). "I have known people deface other people's property by writing Scriptural texts upon it!" (p. 29). Jowett used a manuscript, but the effect could never have been that of the usual sermonic essay. Indeed one listener later recorded that these sermons produced an almost unbearable sense of tension. The secret seems to lie in part in a subtle but continuous biblical inspiration, apt analogy, complete honesty, conversational style, and a precise use of words. The rest, of course, must have been personality.

HARMON M. GEHR

*William Law,* by Henri Talon, New York, Harper, no date, pp. vii, 106, $2.

With the swelling interest in Christian devotion comes naturally a renewal of attention to William Law. There is a new edition of his *Serious Call,* a new study of Law by A. W. Hopkinson, and, most important, Stephen Hobhouse's *Selected Mystical Writings of William Law* (1938, 1948). Before us now is a little book written in English by a French admirer of Law's spiritual genius. M. Talon professes to write "A Study in Literary Craftsmanship." But even as "the style is the man," so the sincere critic in letters is inescapably the delineator of a soul. The reader will follow here a scholarly study of Law's evolution from his earlier moralism to his ultimate mysticism, from the earlier primness and cold clarity of thought and style to the later glow and "majesty" of the words of a man who lived into the heart of eternal things. The reader will find this a well-packed little volume, a real adventure in Christian literature, biography, and moral philosophy. This reviewer feels that Talon justly estimates Law's enduring significance.

JOHN W. BRUSH

*On Our Own Doorstep,* by Frank S. Mead, New York, Friendship Press, ©1948, pp. viii, 167, $1.50.

Evidently this little book by Frank S. Mead was written to glorify the missionary cause of American Protestantism, and it succeeds in doing so, but not without bias. Like so many tracts of its kind, it views the fields of its concern, namely, Hawaii, Alaska, Panama Canal Zone, the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico, as areas in which the white man has selfishly sought to serve himself by victimizing the natives. One gets the impression that American imperialism, expressed through military occupation, capitalistic exploitation, and political opportunism, is largely to blame for the state in which the peoples in the areas mentioned find themselves to be. The only phase of American participation in the affairs of these territorial possessions which appears really worthy of commendation, in the opinion of the author,

is the valiant work of missionaries. However, apart from the understandable missionary bias of the book, there is much in it to reward the reader, especially if he shares the widespread American ignorance of these peoples over whom the American flag has flown. Historical facts are presented skillfully to lend perspective to the observations, and illustrative material is employed with such effectiveness that the natives themselves storm the doors of the reader's conscience.

MILTON C. WESTPHAL

*The Finances of a Church*, by Robert Cashman, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. 159, $2.

Here is a book which can serve a dual purpose for the pastor of a church. In the first instance it is a handbook of financial plans and procedures which when appropriated by the minister will win for him the respect of the layman. In the second instance it can prove to be a frictionless means of educating church officers to an appreciation of their tasks and responsibilities. Mr. Cashman, who a few years ago gave us the very helpful volume, *The Business Administration of a Church*, has in this new companion book scored an even greater success in his desire to share his long experience and seasoned judgment. There is probably no man in the American church today who can speak with greater authority on these matters than can the author who has been for twenty-six years the business manager of Chicago Theological Seminary.

MILTON C. WESTPHAL

*Resources for Worship*, by A. C. Reid, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1949, pp. 154, $2.

One of the most difficult things to do is to give a good five-minute chapel talk. Professor Reid skillfully conceals this difficulty in the fifty scripture interpretations that here form a companion volume to his *Invitation to Worship*. Both volumes were developed from talks he has given to students at Wake Forest and Harvard. Each address is preceded by the scripture selection upon which it is based, which gives to the reader, as it must have given to the hearers, a sense of inherent relationship between the Bible passage and the exposition. While brevity may be the first impression received, intelligent devotion will be the abiding experience of those who make of these talks "resources for worship."

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

*Things That Matter*, edited by Frederick Ward Kates, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. vii, 132, $1.50.

The presiding bishop's book for Lent is appropriately a collection of excerpts from the writings of Charles Henry Brent, formerly bishop of the Philippine Islands, bishop of Western New York, and a prime mover of the First World Conference on Faith and Order in Lausanne, over which he presided in 1927. The writings gathered here are most properly those that deal with the things that matter most in the Christian life, the urgencies of a world order of faith, the life of prayer and worship, the "the last great adventure." What Bishop Brent wrote and said were not only for his time. His words have a ring of prophecy that still speaks to our own day and its needs of personal religion and social vision.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

*John Milton at St. Paul's School,* by Donald Lemen Clark, New York, Columbia University Press, 1948, pp. x, 269, $3.50.

Dr. Clark, professor of rhetoric at Columbia and a member of the editorial board of *The Works of John Milton,* has in his scholarly study of *John Milton at St. Paul's School* made a contribution to three areas of learning—Miltonic studies, the history of intellectual culture, and the history of education. The aim of the study is to show the influence of ancient rhetoric (one of the linguist arts in the *trivium*) on Milton. The author succeeds well in so doing. He shows the education that Milton received in grammar, rhetoric, and logic at St. Paul's School. From the writings of Milton and from statements of his friends, there is drawn a careful picture of him as a schoolboy. There follows a description of St. Paul's School and of the schoolmasters. A considerable portion of the study has to do with a reconstruction of the curriculum and especially a description of the texts Milton used and the classical authors whose works he studied, memorized, and imitated. There is an interesting comparison of Milton's ideal school as put forth in his *Tractate on Education* and St. Paul's, which it resembled far more than Cambridge. This is a valuable study of early intellectual influences on Milton and once again demonstrates "the child is father to the man." It is as well an interestingly written and meticulously documented statement of education during the English renaissance.

CHARLES E. BATTEN

*The Common Ventures of Life,* by Elton Trueblood, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. 124, $1.

Proceeding upon a conception of the unity of life and the religious character of all things, Trueblood applies the thesis to the four experiences of marriage, birth, work, and death. Religion emerges, not as a single human experience, but as a mood by which a host of common deeds come to have meaning. The book reveals sound insight and observation, without being dogmatic or sectarian; its contention and plea are on a wider plane. The recovery of *wholeness* is the basis upon which the "ventures" are to be made. "The Christian faith must rediscover its own essential genius, which is the union of the secular and the sacred, of matter and of spirit, the common and the divine" (p. 35). Each reader may well choose a particular chapter as being the most practical or the most suggestive to him, but no reader will be unimpressed by the whole book.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

*Bearing Witness to the Truth,* by Harold Cooke Phillips, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1949, pp. 219, $2.50.

Harold Cooke Phillips covers a lot of ground in his Yale Lectures on Preaching, *Bearing Witness to the Truth.* The six titles grow logically out of the topic; they not only serve to remind us of what we have heard, but present new insights which are well worth while. The first two chapters tell what the author means by truth; the third speaks of ways of knowing the truth; the fourth deals with the sermon as a means of interpreting the truth; the fifth treats of the preacher and the truth. The concluding chapter, presenting Jesus as the revelation of truth incarnate, eloquently summarizes and brings unity to the whole series. Needless to say, the lectures are characterized by Dr. Phillips' keen insight, substantial content, and impeccable style.

JAMES D. MORRISON

*In Our Midst,* by Robert Morton Hazelton, New York, Island Press, ©1948, pp. ix, 182, $3.

That which is "in our midst," eternally available and competent eternally, is the heart of the matter for the Friends. With little that is new or freshly stated the author discusses its discovery, the incurred phenomena of personal responsibilities, spiritual worship, obedience, union with truth, and perseverance beyond the experiences of spiritual drought. The book concludes with a case study of James Nailor, the seventeenth-century English Friend, whom the author attempts to present in a way that will somewhat balance the generally unfavorable judgment of history upon his famous messianic behavior; and with case studies of Job Scott and David Sands, whose own writings and lives make his task easier and more intelligible.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

*The Best of G. A. Studdert-Kennedy,* New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. x, 173, $2.

"Woodbine Willie" was a well-loved British chaplain during World War I. G. A. Studdert-Kennedy was well known as a churchman and writer. His prose and poetry ranged from the haunting "Indifference" to the incisive "Democracy and the Dog Collar"; from the practical theology of "Why Aren't All the Best Chaps Christian?" to the moralism of "The Warrior, the Woman and the Christ" and the social concern of "The Wicket Gate." In the present volume the best of these and other writings is collected for the renewed interest of old readers of Kennedy and for the delight of new ones. He emerges as a prophet of courage, strength, and sincerity, a humanitarian against a background of sacramentarianism. ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

*Toward the Great Awakening,* by Sidney W. Powell, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1949, pp. 173, $2.

This is one more book on evangelism. Its warmth and fervor commend it. We realize that there is not any new evangelism as there is no new gospel and we do need to be aroused from indifference and complacency. The evangelism that is able to stand up against the materialism and militarism of our day must have a new awareness of the world in which we are living and of what the gospel means to our generation. The historical allusions and illustrations with which the book abounds are moving but seem often to throw us into the past tense. The most commendable part is the breaking through, especially in the chapter on Mile Stones, of a real social passion and a John the Baptist cry to bring forth the just and difficult fruits of repentance.

E. C. HERRICK

*Seventh Baptist World Congress,* edited by Walter O. Lewis, London, Baptist World Alliance, 1948, pp. x, 171, 12/6d.

It is always a pleasure to have another report volume of the Baptist World Alliance. This report indicates an acute awareness of the world-wide mission of Christians and the particular duties of Baptists in that mission. Social consciousness runs through the volume like the red thread in the royal cordage. Titles of some of the addresses suggest the scope of the conference: "Our Unity in Christ," "The Challenge to World Evangelization," "The Colour Bar in the Light of the New Testament," "The United Nations from a Christian Viewpoint," "Civic, National, and International Responsibility of Christians." Throughout the volume the Baptist flavor is strong, but it is a good spice. The present reviewer was pleased to see that the Conference on Baptist history urged the preparation of an authoritative

Baptist bibliography, a comprehensive history of the Baptist movement, and an international Baptist encyclopædia. This volume should be of use in all reference libraries, theological seminaries, and church libraries.

EDWARD C. STARR

*Tears and Laughter,* by Kahlil Gibran, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1949, pp. 127, $2.75.

Gibran is for the few, for those who absorb the exotic mysticism of things eastern with not too much attention to or concern for the necessary payment of duty upon the imported commodity. *The Prophet* became a "guest room classic," but the present volume will probably be only an influence on former friends of the poet, winning few new people. His philosophy of redemption through the contemplative life is not for the strengthening of those who would return empowered to activism, but rather for those who are easily encouraged to accept retreat and retirement.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

*The Seven Stars,* by Toru Matsumoto, New York, Friendship Press, ©1949, pp. viii, 213, $2.50.

The author's autobiography, *A Brother Is a Stranger,* prompted one reader to suggest another book continuing the story of the seven Japanese schoolboys who pledged themselves to continue their close friendship through a problematic future. The present novel is his answer. Based upon facts, it is nevertheless written with the freedom demanded by a desire to portray the story of Japanese youth in the period from 1928 to 1945. Written primarily for young people—not children, however —*The Seven Stars* tells the story with skill and art.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

*Church in World,* by Edward F. Ouellette, New York, Interseminary Movement, 1947, pp. 79, $1.

This is the story of the North American Interseminary Conference held at Oxford, Ohio, in 1947. It is an interpretive account rather than a report. Its greater value lies in showing the directions of thinking of present-day theological students.

CHARLES E. BATTEN

*Emperor Frederick II,* by David G. Einstein, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1949, pp. 427, $4.50.

A prosaic, uninspired, and superficial account of the life of the Emperor Frederick II (1194-1250). A bibliography of twenty-eight books, mostly outdated, includes Hardy and Gree's *Documents Illustrative of Church History* and Milman's *Latin Christianity.*

WINTHROP S. HUDSON

*A Brief Essay about the Gods and My Friends,* by Louis Aaron Reitmeister, Great Neck (N. Y.), Walden Press, 1948, pp. 56, $2.

In most part a vitriolic attack upon religion, denying the existence of God and blaming religion for the many ills of mankind. Friendship is substituted for religion as the great need of the world. The book offers no reward to the reader for time required to read it.

HARLAND A. CARPENTER

# BOOKS RECEIVED

**Protestant Churches and Industrial America,* by Henry F. May, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. x, 297, $3.50.

**The Meaning of Christ for Paul,* by Elias Andrews, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1949, pp. 266, $3.

**You and Thousands Like You,* by Owen Francis Dudley, New York, Longmans Green, 1949, pp. 157, $2.50.

**Triumphant Personality,* by Robert Clyde Yarborough, New York, Macmillan, 1949, pp. xi, 104, $2.

**The Ethics of Ambiguity,* by Simone de Beauvoir, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1948, pp. 161, $3.

**The Psalms,* by Elmer A. Leslie, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1949, pp. 448, $5.

**Decadence,* by C. E. M. Joad, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1949, pp. 430, $4.75.

*The Faith of an Ex-Agnostic,* by Carol Murphy, Wallingford (Pa.), Pendle Hill, 1949, pp. 46, 40 cents.

An attempt to set down briefly the results of a search for a meaningful philosophy of religion. The author's conclusion is that only as religion is a "commitment, a way of life," is it of any reality.

**The Atomistic Way,* by Warner Tabb, Exposition Press, ©1948, pp. 63, $2.

**Missions at the Grass Roots,* by William P. Shriver, New York, Friendship Press, ©1949, pp. vi, 170, $1.

**Young Christians at Work,* by T. Otto Nall and Bert H. Davis, New York, Association Press, 1949, pp. 116, $1.75.

*Something to Stand On,* by Lewis L. Dunnington, New York, Macmillan, 1949, pp. xv, 184, $2.50.

Here are twenty honest sermons in answer to an open letter published by the minister of the First Methodist Church, Iowa City, asking students of the University of Iowa to suggest subjects that were troubling them. Ministers who excuse their own timidity on the ground that "the people are not ready" will do well to read and ponder this little book. The fact that it is dedicated to and has an introduction by Dean Knudson is a further indication of its value.

**The Reunion of the Church,* by Lesslie Newbigin, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. 192, $3.

**La Religion des Cathares,* by Hans Söderberg, Uppsala, Almquist & Wiksells Boktryckeri AB, 1949, pp. 300, no price.

**Toward a Reborn Church,* by Walter Marshall Horton, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. 122, $1.50.

**Man's Destiny in Eternity,* by nine world thinkers, Boston, Beacon, 1949, pp. vi, 238, $2.75.

*Rise Up and Walk,* by Percy Elliott Lindley, Boston, Chapman and Grimes, ©1948, pp. 167, $2.50.

Twelve pep talks of the better sort by the dean of High Point College. His thesis is "People do not so much *lose* the game of life as *give* it away."

*Interpretation of the Book of Revelation,* by Apostolos Makrakis, Chicago, Hellenic Christian Educational Society, 1948, pp. xii, 552, $5.

Any reader really interested to know why the Greek Catholic Church is not likely to make much inroad in the life and thought of the western world may read this book. He may have questions at the end, but this will not likely be one of them.

**A Short History of Existentialism,* by Jean Wahl, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1949, pp. 58, $2.75.

**Arnobius of Sicca: The Case against the Pagans,* translated by George E. McCracken, (Volume 1), Westminster (Md.), Newman Press, 1949, pp. 372, $3.50.

**The Purim Anthology,* by Philip Goodman, Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society, 5709/1949, pp. xxxi, 525, $4.

**Youth Asks about Religion,* by Jack Finegan, New York, Association Press, 1949, pp. 192, $2.

**Christianity and Civilisation: Foundations,* by Emil Brunner, New York, Scribner, 1948, pp. xi, 172, $2.50.

**The Philosophy of Existence,* by Gabriel Marcel, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1949, pp. viii, 96, $2.75.

**The Function of the University,* by R. S. K. Seeley, New York, Oxford University Press, ©1948, pp. vii, 79, $1.50.

**The History of the Primitive Church,* by Jules Lebreton and Jacques Zeiller, New York, Macmillan, 2 vols., 1949, pp. 1272, $16.50.

**These Also Believe,* by Charles Samuel Braden, New York, Macmillan, 1949, pp. xv, 491, $6.

**Theologia Germanica,* edited by J. Bernhart, New York, Pantheon, ©1949, pp. 240, $2.50.

**The Age of Constantine the Great,* by Jacob Burckhardt, New York, Pantheon, ©1949, pp. 400, $4.50.

**Religion's Place in General Education,* by Nevin C. Harner, Richmond, John Knox Press, ©1949, pp. 167, $2.50.

**Issues in Jewish Education,* by Louis Katzoff, New York, Bloch, 1949, pp. xxi, 192, $3.50.

**The Doctrine of Grace in the Apostolic Fathers,* by Thomas F. Torrance, Edinburgh, Oliver and Boyd, ©1948, pp. vii, 150, 12/6.

**Art and Scientific Thought,* by Martin Johnson, New York, Columbia University Press, 1949, pp. 200, $3.

**When the Lamp Flickers,* by Leslie D. Weatherhead, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1948, pp. 206, $2.50.

**C. S. Lewis: Apostle to the Skeptics,* by Chad Walsh, New York, Macmillan, 1949, pp. xiii, 176, $2.50.

**Enriching Worship,* edited by A. J. William Myers, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. 393, $3.50.

**Evangelism According to Christ,* by Gaines S. Dobbins, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. 224, $2.50.

**The Best of Alexander Maclaren,* edited by Gaius Glenn Atkins, New York, ©1949, pp. xix, 167, $2.

**The Holy Imperative,* by Winston L. King, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. 224, $2.50.

**The Theology of the Old Testament,* by Otto J. Baab, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1949, pp. 287, $3.50.

**God's Grace and Man's Hope,* by Daniel Day Williams, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. 215, $2.75.

**God's Gold,* by Sandford Fleming, Philadelphia, Judson, ©1949, pp. 216, $2.

**An Introduction to Zen Buddhism,* by Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1949, pp. 136, $3.75.

**America's Real Religion,* by A. Powell Davies, Boston, Beacon, 1949, pp. 87, $1.

* To be reviewed.